Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0646-14T1
03-16-2016
THERESA TRIOLA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent-Respondent.
David R. Castellani, attorney for appellant. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Thomas R. Hower, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Guadagno and Vernoia. On appeal from the Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, Docket No. 2-1269700. David R. Castellani, attorney for appellant. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Thomas R. Hower, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Petitioner Theresa Triola appeals from the August 21, 2014 final administrative decision of the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS), reversing the initial decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) and denying her application for accidental disability retirement benefits. We affirm.
The facts found by the ALJ were accepted by the Board in its final administrative decision and are not disputed. From November 2007 to June 2010, Triola worked as a Supervisor of Educational Programs I (SEP-I) for the Department of Children and Families (DCF) at the Cumberland Campus of the DCF Regional School in Vineland (Vineland School). The Vineland School services two specific populations of special needs students, ranging in age from three to twenty-one: (1) students that are non-ambulatory, nonverbal, or cognitively impaired; and (2) "emotionally disturbed" students who are "heavily medicated on a daily basis." Triola worked forty to sixty hours per week at the school and held multiple titles, including principal and vice principal. She also performed secretarial and teacher duties.
On April 6, 2010, a sixteen-year-old female student became disruptive in class and began to threaten staff members. The student fled the classroom, ran down the hallway toward Triola, raised her fist while running, and punched Triola in the right side of her face as she collided with her. Both Triola and the student fell onto the floor.
Triola did not recall any of the events immediately after her fall, but was able to fill out an incident report. Later that day, Triola sought medical treatment and reported experiencing significant pain in her jaw and right shoulder. A nurse practitioner at the South Jersey Healthcare Occupational Department in Vineland diagnosed Triola with a facial contusion, cervical strain, and a right shoulder strain. Triola did not report to work for the remainder of the week. When she returned the following week, she felt "foggy" and "hazy."
There are conflicting accounts of whether Triola was knocked unconscious that were not resolved by the ALJ. Because the ALJ's finding that Triola is totally and permanently disabled from her SEP-I position is undisputed, whether Triola was unconscious is immaterial to our opinion. --------
In the following weeks, Triola continued to experience numbness, tingling, and burning along her right side. She suffered from headaches and back spasms, experienced a constant pulling and radiating sensation down her right arm, and also had difficulty sitting for long periods of time.
On April 15, 2010, the Director of the Office of Education notified Triola by letter that her "unclassified interim appointment" as SEP-I was being discontinued, effective June 18, 2010.
On April 16, 2010, Triola was examined by a physician who suspected a torn rotator cuff and placed her on medical leave for the remainder of the school year. In May 2010, Triola underwent an MRI, which indicated disc bulges in her cervical spine and rotator cuff tendonitis, but not a torn rotator cuff. On June 18, 2010, in accordance with the April 15 letter, Triola's employment at the Vineland School was terminated.
Triola filed an application for disability benefits with the Board on December 30, 2011, claiming that she was totally and permanently disabled. On September 21, 2012, the Board denied Triola's application and found that she was not "totally and permanently disabled from the performance of [her] regular and assigned duties." Triola requested an administrative hearing and, on November 13, 2012, the matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Law.
Hearings were held on October 18, 2013, and January 24, 2014. On June 20, 2014, the ALJ filed an initial decision, recommending that Triola be awarded disability benefits. PERS filed exceptions, and on August 21, 2014, the Board issued a final decision adopting the ALJ's factual findings, but rejecting his legal conclusions. Triola's application for disability benefits was denied.
On appeal, Triola claims the decision by the Board, in disregarding the ALJ's legal determination concerning her general area of employment, was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
Our review of an administrative agency determination is limited. Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995). The Board has the ultimate authority, upon a review of the record submitted by the ALJ, to adopt, reject or modify the recommended report and decision of the ALJ. N.J. Dep't of Pub. Advocate v. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 189 N.J. Super. 491, 507 (App. Div. 1983). However, when rejecting or modifying a factual finding or a conclusion of law, the Board must "state clearly the reasons for doing so." N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c).
We will not upset an agency's factual findings unless they are "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or . . . lacked fair support in the evidence[.]" Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963). However, we are not bound by an agency's legal conclusions or its interpretation of a statute. Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992). The party challenging an administrative decision bears the burden of proof. Boyle v. Riti, 175 N.J. Super. 158, 166 (App. Div. 1980).
For a PERS member to qualify for accidental disability retirement benefits, the member must show that he or she is:
permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of [the member's] regular or assigned duties, the
time and place where the duty causing the disability was performed, [and] that the disability was not the result of [the member's] willful negligence and that the member should be retired.
[N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43.]
Because case law interpreting the PERS disability statute, N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43, is sparse, we look to cases interpreting other statutes addressing disability benefits, such as N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7, (Police and Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS)); N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39, (Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund (TPAF)); N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10, (State Police Retirement System (SPRS)); and N.J.S.A. 43:7-12, (Prison Officers' Pension Fund (POPF)). Each of these pension systems conditions the grant of disability benefits on satisfying identical standards. Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 192 n.1 (2007).
In Richardson, the Court established a five-part test for a PFRS member to qualify for accidental disability benefits:
1. that he is permanently and totally disabled;
2. as a direct result of a traumatic event that is
a. identifiable as to time and place,
b. undesigned and unexpected, and
c. caused by a circumstance external to the member (not the result of pre-
existing disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work);
3. that the traumatic event occurred during and as a result of the member's regular or assigned duties;
4. that the disability was not the result of the member's willful negligence; and
5. that the member is mentally or physically incapacitated from performing his usual or any other duty.
[192 N.J. at 212-13.]
The Richardson Court re-examined the third prong's traumatic event standard, which was "in need of a course correction," id. at 210, after several decisions that were "inconsistent with the legislative intent underlying the statute," id. at 211. The Court concluded that a traumatic event should be understood to mean "essentially the same as what we historically understood an accident to be -- an unexpected external happening that directly causes injury and is not the result of pre-existing disease alone or in combination with work effort." Id. at 212. The Court provided examples of what constituted a traumatic event, including a "gym teacher who trips over a riser and is injured." Id. at 213.
Here, the first, second, third, and fourth prongs of the Richardson test are not contested. The distraught student running into Triola while attempting to flee the Vineland School was an unexpected and traumatic event, identifiable as to time and place, occurred during Triola's duties as principal, and rendered her, according to expert testimony, permanently and totally disabled from her SEP-I position, which required her to lift and restrain special needs students on a daily basis.
As to the fifth Richardson prong, both parties accept that Triola is physically incapacitated from performing her SEP-I job. The dispute however is whether Triola is "physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance" of her duties "in the general area of [her] ordinary employment." Bueno v. Bd. of Trs., 404 N.J. Super. 119, 126, 130 (App. Div. 2008) (alteration in original) (first quoting N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39(b), then quoting Skulski v. Nolan, 68 N.J. 179, 205 (1975)), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 540 (2009).
Before reaching the question of Triola's general area of ordinary employment, we first consider whether the Bueno general area of ordinary employment standard is applicable to the PERS disability statute, N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43. In Bueno, we determined that the standard was applicable under the TPAF ordinary disability retirement statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39(b). 404 N.J. Super. at 130-31. We have not yet considered the application of that standard to N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43.
In Bueno, a tenured teacher suffered chest pains and heart palpitations as a result of work-related harassment at the school where she taught. Id. at 122-23. After hearing testimony from three experts, an ALJ rejected the testimony of Bueno's two doctors, and found the testimony of the TPAF Board's psychiatrist to be credible. Id. at 124. The ALJ accepted the psychiatrist's conclusion that Bueno was not "mentally incapacitated for or permanently disabled from the performance of her duties" because she suffered from a "merely transient" adjustment disorder, and an anxiety disorder that was treatable with medication. Ibid. The Board adopted the ALJ's recommended denial of ordinary disability benefits. Id. at 122.
Bueno appealed, arguing that her denial of disability benefits lacked support in the record because the Board's psychiatrist admitted that Bueno could not function as a second-grade teacher at the particular school where she worked, even with medication. Id. at 124.
We affirmed the denial of ordinary disability benefits and held that Bueno was "required to 'establish incapacity to perform duties in the general area of [her] ordinary employment.'" Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting Skulski, supra, 68 N.J. at 205). We concluded that Bueno "failed to even prove that she was disabled from teaching for other employers," and was required to establish that she was totally and permanently disabled in her general area of ordinary employment. Id. at 131.
We now conclude that the general area of ordinary employment standard applies to the PERS accidental disability statute. We note that the TPAF statute considered in Bueno contains "identical standards" to the PERS accidental disability statute. Richardson, supra, 192 N.J. at 192 n.1. Both statutes contain the same language that an employer "shall have certified to the board that the member is permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his regular and assigned duties, the time and place where the duty causing the disability was performed, that the disability was not the result of his willful negligence and that the member should be retired." N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43; N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39. The statutes' language and our case law support a finding that the standard applies to the PERS accidental disability statute.
Applying that standard to the facts here, it is clear that Triola's general area of ordinary employment extends beyond both the Vineland School for which she served as a SEP-I, and the DCF schools generally. Although the unique educational setting of the DCF schools required an ability to lift and restrain students, those were only two of the many tasks in the SEP-I job description. It is true that, under Bueno, we look to an employee's job description for guidance in determining the general area of ordinary employment. However, the general area of ordinary employment is not borne out of any one or two particular tasks, but requires an examination of the entire job description. To hold otherwise would open the floodgates to permitting accidental disability benefits any time that an employee is permanently and totally disabled from performing one of the many tasks that they are charged with carrying out.
Indeed, Triola and other principals at DCF schools were charged with many job responsibilities as part of the SEP-I position, including developing "carefully planned programs"; evaluating employees and programs; maintaining "effective public relations with pupils, other school employees, and the general public"; leading staff members in the "continuing improvement of the education program"; and formulating and directing "the implementation of education[al] aims and procedures."
Although some of Triola's duties related specifically to schools with special needs students, many of her responsibilities transcend that specialty. She has failed to show that she is incapable of performing these tasks, which were part of the SEP-I job description and similar to duties in the general area of school administration.
Triola testified that she was more than just a principal at the Vineland School, but "was everything." She created lesson plans, coordinated substitute teachers and bus transportation, oversaw the work of staff members for five classrooms, and ensured compliance with classroom age composition restrictions and professional-to-student ratios. Triola also performed secretarial and teaching functions. As is illustrated by her work as an adjunct professor teaching nutrition and health at Gloucester County Community College, her responsibilities extend further than the specific special needs students that she served in the Vineland School. These responsibilities indicate how far her general area of ordinary employment extends.
Triola was more than a certified teacher or principal for the handicapped. She received her undergraduate degree in physical education, and her Ph.D. in Education. Although she served the particular niche of special education students, her general area of ordinary employment was as a principal of a school, which included teaching students and the administration of the school. Aside from the physically-demanding tasks in the SEP-I job description that were specific to special needs students, she has "failed to even prove that she was disabled from [being an administrator] for other employers." Bueno, supra, 404 N.J. Super. at 131.
We are satisfied that the Board correctly determined that, although Triola "can no longer perform her specific job duties" at DCF schools, "she has presented no evidence that she is unable to perform teaching or administrative duties in another school setting."
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION