Opinion
No. CV04-4000933
August 23, 2005
MEMORANDUM RE MOTION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION ( # 110)
In this action the Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that it is the record owner of property at 329 and 337 Old Springfield Road, Stafford, Connecticut and the Defendant has no right to exercise any dominion, control or possession over any portion of the property; temporary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining the Defendant from exercising any dominion, control or possession over the property; an accounting of rents; and compensatory and punitive damages. The Plaintiff now seeks a temporary injunction enjoining the Defendant from exercising any dominion, control or possession over the subject property during the pendency of this action or until further order of the court.
"It is well settled in Connecticut that `a plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary or temporary injunction only if that plaintiff proves a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm to him if the injunction is not issued.' Scatena v. Rowland, 47 Conn.Sup. 251, 253, 785 A.2d 1232 (2001). To demonstrate that she is likely to prevail on the merits, the plaintiff must present enough evidence to make her right clear, but need not put on a full trial on the merits. `[A] temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy . . . It should not be granted where, among other things, the plaintiff's legal rights are not clear.' (Citation omitted.) Zoning Commission of Sachem's Head Assn. v. Leninski, 34 Conn.Sup. 66, 70, 376 A.2d 771 (1976). However, `a hearing on a CT Page 11768-ea preliminary injunction is not a forum for a full investigation into the merits of the plaintiffs' claims.' Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 296 F.Sup. 456, 459 (D.Conn. 1968) . . . `A finding that a substantial probability of irreparable harm exists requires a two part analysis: (1) whether there is a substantial probability that the alleged harm will result; and (2) whether the harm, if it occurs, will be irreparable.' International Assn. of Firefighters, Local 786 v. Serrani, 26 Conn.App. 610, 616, 602 A.2d 1067 (1992). Harm is irreparable when it `cannot be adequately compensated in damages or cannot be measured by any pecuniary standard . . .' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Assn. of Clinical Labs. v. Connecticut Blue Cross, Inc., 31 Conn.Sup. 110, 113-14, 324 A.2d 288 (1973)." Morytko v. Westfort, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV04 400600S (Tanzer, J., May 31, 2005) ( 39 Conn. L. Rptr. 427). "In the . . . situation of a temporary injunction to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be determined after a full hearing on the merits, we have said that `the court is called upon to balance the results which may be caused to one party or the other, and if it appears that to deny or dissolve it may result in great harm to the plaintiff and little to the defendant, the court may well exercise its discretion in favor of granting or continuing it, unless indeed, it is very clear that the plaintiff is without legal right.'" (Emphasis added.) Olcott v. Pendleton, 128 Conn. 292, 295, 22 A.2d 633 (1941). This criterion necessarily requires consideration of the probable outcome of the litigation. Decisions of our trial courts have frequently referred to the burden of an applicant to show a reasonable degree of probability of success before a temporary injunction to preserve the status quo maybe granted. Connecticut State Medical Society v. Connecticut Medical Service, Inc., 29 Conn.Sup. 474, 477-78, 293 A.2d 794 (1971); Hopkins v. Hamden Board of Education, 29 Conn.Sup. 397, 417, 289 A.2d 914 (1971); Torrington Drive-In Corporation v. I.A.T.S.E.M.P.M.O. Local 402, A.F.L., 17 Conn.Sup. 416, 418 (1951). The need to show an irreparable loss unless the status quo is preserved has also been often mentioned. Covenant Radio Corporation v. Ten Eighty Corporation, 35 Conn.Sup. 1, CT Page 11768-eb 3, 390 A.2d 949 (1977); Colchester v. Reduction Associates, Inc., 34 Conn.Sup. 177, 185, 382 A.2d 1333 (1977)." Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals, 196 Conn. 451, 457-8 (1985).
By decision dated April 15, 2003, Smith v. Trinity United Methodist Church, Springfield, 263 Conn. 135 (2003), the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in Smith v. Trinity United Methodist Church of Springfield, Massachusetts, 47 Conn.Sup. 618 (2003), and adopted that decision as a proper statement of the law. In that decision, the court found that on February 28, 1995, testatrix Evelyn Pay Long quitclaimed, by valid deed, the property at issue here in Stafford, Connecticut, to the Plaintiff; Trinity United Methodist Church of Springfield, Massachusetts. In a subsequent lawsuit, Trinity United Methodist Church of Springfield, Massachusetts v. Levesque, 88 Conn.App. 661, 667, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 907 (2005), the Appellate Court noted that the previous litigation established Plaintiff's ownership of the property.
It is therefore clear that the Plaintiff's success in this matter is essentially assured by the previous decisions of the Supreme and Appellate Court involving the property at issue here. Although the Defendant claims that she was not a party to the Levesque litigation and therefore cannot be bound by it, she was a party to the Smith litigation and is certainly bound by the decision there.
The Defendant also claims that the Plaintiff has failed to allege and prove irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law. In its motion the Plaintiff has alleged that it is suffering irreparable harm because it is unable to take possession of the property. "A party seeking injunctive relief has the burden of alleging and proving irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law . . . A prayer for injunctive relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and the court's ruling can be reviewed only for the purpose of determining whether the decision was based on an erroneous statement of law or an abuse of discretion . . . Therefore, unless the trial court has abused its discretion, or failed to exercise its CT Page 11768-ec discretion . . . the trial court's decision must stand . . . The extraordinary nature of injunctive relief requires that the harm complained of is occurring or will occur if the injunction is not granted. Although an absolute certainty is not required, it must appear that there is a substantial probability that but for the issuance of the injunction, the party seeking it will suffer irreparable harm . . . We note also that, [i]n exercising its discretion, the court, in a proper case, may consider and balance the injury complained of with that which will result from interference by injunction." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wallingford v. Werbiski, 274 Conn. 483, 493 (2005). In addition it has been "held that in determining whether to grant injunctive relief, `a more liberal rule [is] followed in cases of a permanent or continuing nuisance,' such as a trespass. Hartford Rayon Corporation v. Cromwell Water Co., 126 Conn. 194, 199, 10 A.2d 587 (1940); see also Sisters of Saint Joseph Corporation v. Atlas Sand, Gravel Stone Co., 120 Conn. 168, 180 A. 303 (1935)." Walton v. New Hartford, 223 Conn. 155, 166 (1992).
It is clear from the history of this matter that the Defendant has resisted, and continues to resist, despite the decisions of the Supreme, Appellate and Superior Courts, the Plaintiff's rights in the property in question. Although title to the property has been established as residing with the Plaintiff, it is being deprived of its full right to possession, control and use of the property by the Defendant. The Plaintiff is unable to rent the property because prospective tenants do not want to get in the middle of a dispute between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. At the hearing on the motion for temporary injunction, the Plaintiff established that the Defendant is interfering with the Plaintiff's attempts to take possession of the property and exerting control over the property by erecting no trespassing signs and ordering representatives of the Plaintiff off the property. She has also stated that she will continue to impede their access to the property. At her deposition on July 12, 2005, the Defendant stated that if anyone from the Plaintiff Church came on the property again she would do the same thing she did on June 25, 2005 when a representative of the Church came CT Page 11768-ed on the property. Then she asked him to leave and called the state police to get him off the property when he would not. Despite being ordered by the Plaintiff to not enter the property, the Defendant stated she goes on the premises every day and has a key to the houses located on the property. She continues to profess that the Plaintiff does not have title to the property and a right to be there. Even in her answer, "the fact of the defendant exercising dominion, possession and control of the property at all times is admitted" and the "allegation that the defendant refuses to relinquish any control over the property is admitted." It is clear that the Plaintiff is being irreparably harmed in that it is being deprived of the full use and enjoyment of its property. In addition, the equities of this case decidedly fall in its favor.
Based on these facts, and the standards for issuance of a temporary injunction, the motion is granted.
It is hereby ordered: That the Defendant, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Evelyn Page Long, and any of her representatives, agents, servants and employees, are enjoined from exercising any dominion, control or possession, including but not limited to renting or leasing, over any portion of the properties located at 329 and 337 Old Springfield Road, Stafford, Connecticut; and that the Defendant, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Evelyn Page Long, and any of her representatives, agents, servants and employees, are enjoined from entering upon the properties located at 329 and 337 Old Springfield Road, Stafford, Connecticut for any purpose; and that the Defendant, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Evelyn Page Long, and any of her representatives, agents, servants and employees, are enjoined from harassing or intimidating those persons who are rightfully upon the properties located at 329 and 337 Old Springfield Road, Stafford, Connecticut until further order of this court.
Jane S. Scholl, J. CT Page 11768-ee