Opinion
No. AAN-CV06 5002739-S
April 26, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION #110
This memorandum of decision addresses the issues raised in the Motion for Reconsideration (#110) filed by the defendant Mario Munez under date of March 15, 2007. This memorandum of decision further addresses the issues raised in Plaintiff's Motion in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration (#111) filed under date of March 22, 2007 with an accompanying Memorandum of Law (#111.50). Previously, the defendant had moved to dismiss the underlying motor vehicle action based on lack of in personam jurisdiction (#105); the plaintiff Iris Trinidad objected to the motion to dismiss (#106); and on March 13, 2007, the court denied the motion to dismiss while sustaining the objection thereto (#107). Through motion #110, the defendant specifically moved for reconsideration of the court's determination that in personam jurisdiction was sufficiently established in the present matter.
The court has granted the defendant's Motion for Reconsideration (#110) and heard oral argument from the parties on April 23, 2007. Upon reconsideration, however, the court finds no basis for modifying its previous decision on the issue of in personam jurisdiction. See Fine Homebuilders, Inc. v. Perrone, 98 Conn.App. 852, 911 A.2d 1149 (2006).
The ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss (#107) was based upon the court's construction and application of the principles of jurisdiction clearly enunciated in Fine Homebuilders, Inc. v. Perrone, supra. In support of his request for a different result, the defendant has submitted two Superior Court decisions for the court's consideration: Stevens v. Thompson, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV05 4011551S (October 5, 2005, Corradino, J.) [40 Conn. L. Rptr. 88] and Sutton v. Smolnik, Superior Court, judicial District of New Britain, Docket No. CV05 04005217S (January 12, 2006, Domnarski, J.). Both decisions predate Fine Homebuilders, Inc., v. Perrone, supra, and in view of the Appellate Court's opinion, the court does not find the reasoning presented in those cases to be persuasive. Moreover, the court concludes that the defendant's requested analysis and result is consistent not with the Appellate Court's majority opinion in Fine Home Builders, Inc. v. Perrone, but with the dissent. See Fine Homebuilders, Inc., v. Perrone, supra, 98 Conn.App. 862 ("Proper service of process is not some mere technicality." McLachlan, J., dissenting.)
While the notion of "judicial independence" remains intrinsic to the role of the trial judge in all cases, "[i]t is axiomatic that a trial court is bound by Supreme Court precedent . . . This principle is inherent in a hierarchical judicial system." (Citations omitted.) Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Bridgeport, 237 Conn. 184, 195, 676 A.2d 831 (1996). Whenever faced by legal conundra not yet resolved by the Supreme Court, the judges of the Superior Court are "bound by the language of the Appellate Court" if relevant caselaw is available. Kelly v. Camillo, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 05 4004458 (September 13, 2006, Mintz, J.) (n. 2 citing Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Bridgeport, supra, 237 Conn. 195.
As previously stated in the Memorandum of Decision dated March 13, 2007 (#107), this court finds that the principles of Fine Homebuilders, Inc. v. Perrone are fully and fairly applicable to the circumstances presented in the pending matter. Utilizing this relevant Appellate Court opinion, the court has concluded that under the clear purpose of § 52-62(c) was fully achieved through the defendant's receipt of actual and substantive notice of the pending litigation. Accordingly, as required by the analysis in Fine Homebuilders, Inc. v. Perrone, this court has focused upon the "actual notice" received by the defendant, manifest in the specific text of the request for extension of time (#102) that establishes his obvious awareness of the nature and extent allegations he had been called upon to defend.
As stated in Fine Homebuilders, Inc. v. Perrone, supra; 98 Conn.App. 852; when construing review of the decisional law regarding the purpose of another statutory protocol for provision of service of process, § 52-57(a): "Our Supreme Court has determined that the purpose of abode service is to afford a defendant actual notice of a pending action. `Abode service is only a step removed from manual service and serves the same dual function of conferring jurisdiction and giving notice . . . Its chief purpose is to ensure actual notice to the defendant that the action is pending.' (Citation omitted.) Smith v. Smith, 150 Conn. 15, 20, 183 A.2d 848 (1962)." (Emphasis added.) Id., 857.
Although constrained to maintain its reliance upon the majority opinion in Fine Homebuilders, Inc. v. Perrone, the court takes judicial notice of the fact that on March 21, 2007, the Supreme Court granted certification for review of that matter, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly determine that a state marshal's service of process at a locked front gate of a gated single-family estate was sufficient service of process?" Fine Homebuilders, Inc. v. Perrone, 282 Conn. 901 (2007). However, until the Supreme Court has resolved the contest here presented by the defendant, in conformity with Judge McLachlan's dissenting opinion, the Superior Court is obliged to adhere to the extant opinion of the Appellate Court. See Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Bridgeport, supra, 237 Conn. 195.