Trieseler v. Helmbacher

18 Citing cases

  1. Swon v. Huddleston

    282 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1955)   Cited 58 times
    In Swon v. Huddleston, Mo., 282 S.W.2d 18, 55 A.L.R.2d 205, we held that if the facts alleged in equity justified the court in declaring a trust on any theory, the petition should be considered sufficient, citing cases.

    We are fully aware of the rule so vigorously argued by appellants that such a finding from parol evidence requires that the evidence be so clear, cogent and convincing as to exclude all doubt from the mind of the court. Decker v. Fittge, Mo., 276 S.W.2d 144; Trieseler v. Helmbacher, 350 Mo. 807, 168 S.W.2d 1030; Collins v. Shive, Mo., 261 S.W.2d 58. There are many, and somewhat confusing, definitions of a constructive trust, and some confusion as to the constituent elements. Many cases say that such a trust must be based on fraud, actual or constructive.

  2. Leone v. Bilyeu

    238 S.W.2d 317 (Mo. 1951)   Cited 8 times

    (1) Plaintiff does not have a full, adequate and complete remedy at law. Defendant is insolvent, a multiplicity of suits would be required and damages would not give proper relief. Sills v. Goodyear, 80 Mo. App. 128; Metropolitan Land Co. v. Manning, 98 Mo. App. 248, 71 S.W. 696; State ex rel. Central States Life Ins. Co. v. McElhinney, 232 Mo. App. 107, 90 S.W.2d 124; National Refining Co. v. Cox, 227 Mo. App. 778, 57 S.W.2d 778; Lockwood v. Lunsford, 56 Mo. 68; Trieseler v. Helmbacher, 350 Mo. 807, 168 S.W.2d 1030. (2) Injunction is a proper remedy to restrain harassing and continuous trespass of the nature alleged in plaintiff's petition. Landrum v. McMinds, 205 Mo. App. 66, 218 S.W. 899; Metropolitan Land Co. v. Manning, 98 Mo. App. 248, 71 S.W. 696; Nelson v. Kelley, 145 Mo. App. 110, 128 S.W. 832. (3) Section 2833, Mo. R.S.A., does not provide an adequate remedy in unlawful detainer.

  3. Doe v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc.

    395 S.W.3d 8 (Mo. 2013)   Cited 45 times
    Refusing to pierce the corporate veil on allegations that the parent company was responsible for maintaining the privacy of patients utilizing a subsidiary's services, or that subsidiary used forms and certain employees of parent company, since none of these things demonstrate that subsidiary was unable to act independently

    ) See e.g., Trieseler v. Helmbacher, 350 Mo. 807, 168 S.W.2d 1030, 1036 (1943) (“A confidential or fiduciary relation exists where two persons stand in such a relation as that, while it continues, confidence is necessarily reposed by the one and the influence which naturally grows out of that confidence is possessed by the other.”). Here, however, Mr. Doe's argument begs the question whether a fiduciary relationship has been recognized by this Court in the first instance. If not, then any error in requiring proof of negligence in order to show a breach of that fiduciary duty could not have been prejudicial, for Mr. Doe would not have been entitled to submit the theory at all.

  4. Doe v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc.

    No. SC92790 (Mo. Mar. 19, 2013)

    See e.g., Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Mo. banc 1997) (to show breach of fiduciary duty owed to client by attorney, client must prove: an attorney-client relationship; breach of a fiduciary obligation by the attorney; proximate causation; damages to the client; no other recognized tort encompasses the facts alleged); Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Patrick Davis, P.C., 283 S.W.3d 786, 792-93 (Mo. App. 2009) (Generally, "an adequately pleaded claim for breach of fiduciary duty consists of the following elements: the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties; a breach of that fiduciary duty; causation; and harm."); Shervin v. Huntleigh Sec. Corp., 85 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Mo. App. 2002) ("When breach of fiduciary duty is asserted ... the proponent must establish that a fiduciary duty existed between it and the defending party, that the defending party breached the duty, and that the breach caused the proponent to suffer harm.") See e.g., Trieseler v. Helmbacher, 168 S.W.2d 1030, 1036 (Mo. 1943) ("A confidential or fiduciary relation exists where two persons stand in such a relation as that, while it continues, confidence is necessarily reposed by the one and the influence which naturally grows out of that confidence is possessed by the other.") Here, however, Mr. Doe's argument begs the question whether a fiduciary relationship has been recognized by this Court in the first instance. If not, then any error in requiring proof of negligence in order to show a breach of that fiduciary duty could not have been prejudicial, for Mr. Doe would not have been entitled to submit the theory at all.

  5. Pollock v. Brown

    569 S.W.2d 724 (Mo. 1978)   Cited 44 times
    Holding there may be delivery even though the deed remains in the custody of the grantor

    And since a breach of a fiduciary or confidential relationship is itself a constructive fraud, if such a relationship is shown between the putative trustee and beneficiary, no proof of actual fraud is necessary in order to establish a constructive trust. Swon v. Huddleston, supra, l.c. 282 S.W.2d [18] at 25[9, 10]; Trieseler v. Helmbacher, 350 Mo. 807, 168 S.W.2d 1030, 1036[5-7] (1943). Thus, the availability to plaintiffs of the constructive trust remedy does not derive from an imputation of actual fraud, but from the breach of the fiduciary relationship which subsisted because [consistent with the principle of Parker v. Blakeley (338 Mo. 1189, 93 S.W.2d 981), supra, cited by defendants] 'to permit [defendants] to retain the property thus procured would tend to induce fraud and would be against public policy upon the true owner doing equity.'

  6. Cohn v. Jefferson Savings Loan Association

    349 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. 1961)   Cited 3 times

    And in this connection it must be noted in general that a constructive trust is an equitable device to prevent injustice, particularly unjust enrichment. Bogert, Trusts, 2nd Ed., § 471, p. 3; 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 142, p. 1027; Restatement, Restitution, comment p. 642; Trieseler v. Helmbacher, 350 Mo. 807, 816, 168 S.W.2d 1030, 1036. Upon this record, casually read, the plaintiff verbally, perhaps technically, testified to a text book constructive trust, but it does not follow that he is entitled as a matter of right to the equitable remedy. Trieseler v. Helmbacher, supra; Evans v. Evans, 196 Mo. 1, 93 S.W. 969.

  7. Jackson v. Tibbling

    310 S.W.2d 909 (Mo. 1958)   Cited 22 times

    But, plaintiff contends that the circumstances of this case place it within the rule announced in part (b). If this is correct, it is the well established rule that such circumstances authorize a court of equity to impose a constructive trust on the property in favor of plaintiff. See Swon v. Huddleston, Mo.Sup., 282 S.W.2d 18; Trieseler v. Helmbacher, 350 Mo. 807, 168 S.W.2d 1030; Vol. 3, Scott on Trusts, 2d Ed., § 462; Vol. 3, Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, §§ 495, 496; 54 Am.Jur., Trusts, § 233; 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 149; Restatement of Trusts, § 44; 35 A.L.R. 310, 45 A.L.R. 854; 80 A.L.R. 204; 129 A.L.R. 695; 159 A.L.R. 1008. We are convinced that the evidence clearly establishes the existence of an oral agreement on the part of Mr. Tibbling to devise the property by will to plaintiff in the event he died first.

  8. Johnson Fare Box Co. v. C. L. Downey Co.

    263 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1954)   Cited 1 times

    Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts, 231 S.W.2d 817; Bank of Mountain View v. Winebrenner, 335 Mo. 79, 195 S.W.2d 486; Van Ellen v. Howald, 40 Neb. 850, 50 N.W. 389; Friday v. Scherer, 110 S.W.2d 849; Getto v. Binkert, 40 P. 925; Mathews v. Monerief, 135 F.2d 645; Beheret v. Meyers, 240 Mo. 58; Scullin Steel Co. v. Mississippi Valley Iron Co., 308 Mo. 453. (3) A fiduciary relationship cannot exist unless the circumstances make it absolutely necessary for the beneficiary to rely completely on the advice of the fiduciary and make it probable that the fiduciary's influence will control the will of the beneficiary. Thrieseler v. Helmacher, 168 S.W.2d 1030; Patton v. Shelton, 328 Mo. 631, 40 S.W.2d 706. (4) Even if there had been a fiduciary relationship between Downey and Damon, the sale of the common stock of the Downey Company could not be set aside unless one of the following three things were present: (1) There was active fraud on the part of Damon; (2) There was a concealment or failure to disclose the material facts of the transaction on the part of Damon; (3) There was a complete inadequacy of consideration and this fact was unknown to Downey. Restatement of Restitution, Sec. 191; Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 49 Har. L. Rev. 521. (5) An implied contract to pay for services cannot exist, unless the services were rendered under such circumstances as would have led reasonable men in the position of the alleged promissor and promissee to have expected that payment would have been made. LaFontain v. Hayhurst, 89 Maine 388, 36 A. 623, 56 Am. St. Rep. 430; R.F. Baker Co. v. P. Ballantine Sons, 127 Conn. 680, 20 A.2d 82, 137

  9. Marciniak v. Wauregan Mills, Inc.

    93 A.2d 135 (Conn. 1952)   Cited 8 times
    In Marciniak v. Wauregan Mills, Inc., 139 Conn. 264, 266, 93 A.2d 626 (1952), the plaintiff required surgery to remove a second ruptured disc, and that surgery was not alleged in the complaint.

    The following cases were decided under different statutes and rules but illustrate various aspects of the practice. Statement held sufficient: Trieseler v. Helmbacher, 350 Mo. 807, 809, 168 S.W.2d 1030; Starmer v. Mid-West Chevrolet Corporation, 175 Okla. 160, 162, 51 P.2d 786; Seibold v. Muskogee, 155 Okla. 81, 83, 8 P.2d 35; Johnson v. Commonwealth Building Loan Assn., 182 Ark. 226, 230, 31 S.W.2d 136; Mahmet v. American Radiator Co., 294 S.W. 1014 (Mo.). Filing a printed transcript of testimony does not conform to a rule requiring a concise statement of facts: Casey v. East Carolina Ry., 198 N.C. 432, 433, 152 S.E. 38; Dondore v. Rohner, 224 Iowa 1, 3, 275 N.W. 886; Cornell-Andrews Smelting Co. v. Boston P. R. Corporation, 215 Mass. 381, 387, 102 N.E. 625; see New Haven Water Co. v. Wallingford, 72 Conn. 293, 301, 44 A. 235. Examined against this background, the defendants' appendix seems reasonably adequate in form to present the facts relevant to the issue.

  10. Hunter v. Hunter

    361 Mo. 799 (Mo. 1951)   Cited 46 times
    In Hunter v. Hunter, Mo., 237 S.W.2d 100, 103, this court said: "A cause of action accrues, and limitations thereon begin to run, when the right to sue arises."

    Woodruff v. Shores, 354 Mo. 742, 190 S.W.2d 994; Bisesi v. Farm Home Savings L. Assn., 231 Mo. App. 897, 78 S.W.2d 871; 1 Wood on Limitations of Actions, (Fourth Ed.), sec. 6, pp. 18, 19, 20. (2) The cause of action which respondent attempts to plead in Count I of his petition for an accounting and recovery of money is barred by the five-year period of limitation enacted in Section 1014, R.S. 1939. Triesler v. Helmbacher, 350 Mo. 807, 168 S.W.2d 1030; Coleman v. Crescent Insulated Wire Cable Co., 350 Mo. 781, 168 S.W.2d 1060; Gwin v. Gwin, 219 S.W.2d 282; 1 Wood on Limitations of Actions, (Fourth Ed.), sec. 6. p. 21; Leavell v. Blades, 237 Mo. 695, 141 S.W. 893. (3) The cause of action which respondent attempts to plead in Count II of his petition for partition of real estate allegedly held by the parties as tenants in common is barred by the ten year period of limitation provided in either Section 1013 or 1002, R.S. 1939.