Other courts have dismissed conclusory Monell claims that "d[id] not describe any specific policy, custom or practice that allegedly caused a violation of [a plaintiff's] constitutional rights," and did not allege any "factual allegations describing any specific policy, custom or practice that was established by any particular defendant." Triemert v. Washington Cnty., No. 13-CV-1312 (PJS/JSM), 2013 WL 6729260, at *12 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2013) (emphasis in original), aff'd, 571 F. App'x 509 (8th Cir. 2014). The Court agrees that the alleged customs of failing to provide foster children with timely medical or mental health treatment and safe and appropriate foster care placements are insufficient under Monell.
"A broad assertion that an unconstitutional policy exists 'is nothing more than a bare recitation of legal standards.'" Osberry v. Slusher, 750 F. App'x 385, 398 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Brown v. Cuyahoga Cnty., 517 F. App'x 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Triemert v. Washington Cnty., Civ. No. 13-1312, 2013 WL 6729260, at *12 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2013) (Schiltz, J., adopting Report & Recommendation of Graham, M.J.) (plaintiff's "vague and conclusory allegations that his injuries were caused by some unidentified unconstitutional policies, customs or practices is not sufficient to state a Monell claim"), aff'd, 571 F. App'x. 509 (8th Cir. 2014).
The law demands more of plaintiffs.Baker v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 17-CV-02271-SRN/KMM, 2018 WL 1838060, at *9 (D. Minn. Apr. 18, 2018), aff'd, 753 Fed. Appx. 428 (8th Cir. 2019)(unpublished) (citing Triemert v. Wash. Cty., No. 13-CV-1312 (PJS/JSM), 2013 WL 6729260, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2013), aff'd, 571 Fed. App'x 509 (8th Cir. 2014)). Additionally, federal courts have long recognized that the "power to control the disposition of contests over elections to . . . state and local offices," as well as validity of a ballot or ballot procedures, is a question of state law.
The law demands more of plaintiffs.Triemert v. Wash. Cty., No. 13-cv-1312 (PJS/JSM), 2013 WL 6729260, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2013), aff'd, 571 F. App'x 509 (8th Cir. 2014).
(Am. Compl. ¶ 67.) This conclusory allegation simply will not suffice. See, e.g. Triemert v. Washington Cty. , Civ. No. 13–1312, 2013 WL 6729260, at *12 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2013) (Schiltz, J., adopting Report & Recommendation of Graham, M.J.) (plaintiff's "vague and conclusory allegations that his injuries were caused by some unidentified unconstitutional policies, customs or practices is not sufficient to state a Monell claim"), aff'd , 571 Fed. App'x. 509 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam ); D.B. v. Hargett , Civ. No. 13–2781, 2014 WL 1371200, at *8 (D. Minn. Apr. 8, 2014) (Davis, C.J., adopting Report & Recommendation of Brisbois, M.J.). As in Iqbal , Plaintiffs offer only "threadbare recitals of the elements" of a Monell claim "supported by mere conclusory statements, [which] do not suffice." 556 U.S. at 678.
Moreover, VTL § 511 was well within the state's authority to regulate the use of its roads. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 523 (1959) ("The power of the State to regulate the use of its highways is broad and pervasive."); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999) (reaffirming that an individual "does not have a fundamental right to drive a motor vehicle"); Triemert v. Washington Cty., No. 13-CV-1312, 2013 WL 6729260, at *9 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2013) ("It is beyond dispute that states may impose driver licensing and vehicle registration requirements upon their citizens . . . ."), aff'd, 571 F. App'x 509 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Gaebel v. N.Y. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 976 N.Y.S.2d 816, 826 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (reaffirming that "the state may regulate the right to drive and the possession of a driver's license in the furtherance of highway safety and to protect against potential injury to the public"). Accordingly, the Town's enforcement of VTL § 511 does not constitute a policy of constitutional deprivation and therefore cannot support municipal liability.
ory under [s]tate law[,] unless[] while operating a vehicle in commerce or for profit," (Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. ("Pl.'s Opp'n") at unnumbered 2 (Dkt. No. 112)), the State's authority to regulate the use of its roads is well established, see, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 523 (1959) (holding that "[t]he power of the State to regulate the use of its highways is broad and pervasive"); Hendrickv. State of Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915) (holding that a state may prescribe regulations related to the operation of motor vehicles on its highways, including registration and licensing requirements); Millerv. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999) (reaffirming that an individual "does not have a fundamental right to drive a motor vehicle"); Triemert v. Washington Cty., No. 13-CV-1312, 2013 WL 6729260, at *9 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2013) ("It is beyond dispute that states may impose driver licensing and vehicle registration requirements upon their citizens . . . ."), aff'd, 571 F. App'x 509 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Allen v. N.Y. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 991 N.Y.S. 2d 701, 723 (App. Div. 2014) (noting that "[the Constitution] does not recognize a fundamental 'right to drive'"); Gaebel v. N.Y. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 976 N.Y.S. 2d 816, 826 (App. Div. 2013) (reaffirming that "the state may regulate the right to drive and the possession of a driver's license in the furtherance of highway safety and to protect against potential injury to the public"). Notably, "the Supreme Court has held that states may constitutionally regulate the use of public highways" without limiting "its holding[s] to commercial uses of public highways."