Opinion
No. 1 CA-JV 14-0014
06-17-2014
TRICIA C., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, C.C., Appellees.
Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer, P.C., Anthem By Florence M. Bruemmer, Tanya R. Imming-Hill Counsel for Appellant Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE
LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. P1300JD201200063
The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer, P.C., Anthem
By Florence M. Bruemmer, Tanya R. Imming-Hill
Counsel for Appellant
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Maurice Portley delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Andrew W. Gould joined. PORTLEY, Judge:
¶1 Tricia C. ("Mother") appeals the order terminating her parental rights to her child, C.C. She argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that termination was in the best interests of the child. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
"We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court's order." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549, ¶ 7, 225 P.3d 604, 606 (App. 2010).
¶2 C.C. was born in 2006 to Mother and Steven C. ("Father"). Mother was the primary parent. Father was essentially absent from the child's life and was subsequently incarcerated in 2012.
¶3 The Arizona Department of Economic Security ("ADES") received a report in July 2012 that Mother had dragged C.C. across a concrete driveway. Although the ADES investigators could not confirm that Mother had abused C.C., the child subsequently disclosed that Mother verbally abused him and that he did not feel safe with her. Mother denied all allegations of abuse. ADES concluded that Mother had issues with alcohol and recommended that she seek treatment.
The Arizona Department of Child Safety ("ADCS") has replaced ADES. Because this case preceded the creation of the ADCS, we will refer to ADES as the agency prosecuting this case.
¶4 Mother contends she did not address her alcohol issues because alcohol was legal and "there [was] no reason" that she should be required to stop drinking. As a result, ADES took C.C. into temporary physical custody and placed him with his maternal grandmother ("Grandmother"). ADES then filed a dependency petition against both parents. After separate hearings, the juvenile court found C.C. to be dependent as to both parents and ordered a case plan of family reunification.
¶5 Nearly one year later, ADES filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of both parents. The motion alleged that Mother (1) was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities due to alcohol abuse and (2) had willfully refused or substantially neglected to address the reasons that caused C.C. to be in out-of-home care for nine months or longer. ADES sought to terminate Father's parental rights because he was in prison on a felony conviction and it was "of such length that the child [would] be deprived of a normal home for a period of years."
¶6 At the severance hearing, both parents stipulated to the statutory grounds for termination, but contested whether termination was in the child's best interests. The ADES case manager testified and Mother and Father made statements to the court. The court took the matter under advisement and subsequently issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and ordered that the parental rights of Mother and Father to C.C. be terminated. Mother then filed this appeal.
Father is not a party to this appeal.
DISCUSSION
¶7 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by finding that termination was in the child's best interests. She contends that she was able to effectively parent him and they shared a strong bond. Mother also contends that termination was improper because ADES should have first offered permanent guardianship before seeking termination of her parental rights.
¶8 "[W]e review the juvenile court's findings of fact for clear error" and will reverse the termination order if the juvenile court's decision is not supported by reasonable evidence. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 376, ¶ 13, 231 P.3d 377, 380 (App. 2010). Because the juvenile court is in the "the best position to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of the parties, observe the parties, and make appropriate factual findings," this court will not reweigh the evidence or replace our conclusions for that of the juvenile court. Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, 351, ¶ 31, 312 P.3d 861, 867 (App. 2013) (quoting In re Pima County Juv. Action No. 93511, 154 Ariz. 543, 546, 744 P.2d 455, 458 (App. 1987).
¶9 The juvenile court can terminate parental rights if it "find[s] the existence of one of several enumerated statutory grounds for termination." Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 280, ¶ 1, 110 P.3d 1013, 1014 (2005) (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 8-533(B)). It must also find "that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interests of the child." Id. (citing A.R.S. § 8-533(B)). The best interests finding must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 284, ¶ 22, 110 P.3d at 1018. Best interests can be shown by evidence demonstrating "an affirmative benefit to the child by removal or a detriment to the child by continuing in the relationship." Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't. of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 14, 53 P.3d 203, 207 (App. 2002) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Absent any changes material to this decision, we cite to the current version of the applicable statute.
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¶10 Here, the case manager testified that termination was in the child's best interests because: (1) he was adoptable and Grandmother was ready to adopt him; (2) Grandmother could properly care for C.C., and the two already shared an emotional attachment; and (3) termination would provide C.C. with much needed stability, structure, and permanency because he would have "a parent there on a day-to-day basis[,] to attend meetings, to support him in school activities, to help him with his home work." The case manager also testified that C.C. would be harmed if parental rights were continued because the parents could not provide permanence, stability, or security.
¶11 The juvenile court considered the testimony and all of the evidence, and determined that termination was in the best interests of C.C. because it "would further the plan of adoption" with a family member who could provide a "stable home, free of drugs and alcohol." See Bennigno R., 233 Ariz. at 350, ¶ 23, 312 P.3d at 866 (recognizing that factors favoring a finding that termination is in the best interests of the child are: (1) whether an adoption plan exists; (2) whether the placement meets the needs of the child; and (3) the presence of a statutory ground for termination). Because the juvenile court's determination was supported by sufficient evidence, we find no error.
¶12 Mother also argues that termination was improper because ADES should have pursued the option of guardianship before filing a petition to terminate her parental rights. Mother did not raise the issue with the juvenile court and it is therefore waived. Kimu P. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 39, 44 n.3, ¶ 19, 178 P.3d 511, 516 n.3 (App. 2008) (noting that we will not address an issue that was not raised first to the juvenile court). Furthermore, she has not provided any authority for her argument on appeal. See A.R.S. § 8-533(A) (showing there is no statutory requirement that a petition for termination of parental rights must be preceded by a guardianship proceeding). Consequently, we find no error.
CONCLUSION
¶13 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the termination of Mother's parental rights to C.C.