Opinion
Civil Action No. H-22-868
2022-07-19
Gerardo TREJO-MUNOZ, Plaintiff, v. Larry HENDERSON and Noble LLC, Defendants.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Gerardo Trejo-Munoz: Kiernan Angus McAlpine, Daspit Law Firm, 440 Louisiana St., Suite 1400, Houston, Texas 77002, 712-588-0383. Attorney for both Defendants Larry Henderson and Noble LLC: Sadi Rafael Antonmattei-Goitia, The Fuentes Firm, P.C., 5507 Louetta Rd., Suite A, Spring, Texas 77379, 932-701-7950.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Gerardo Trejo-Munoz: Kiernan Angus McAlpine, Daspit Law Firm, 440 Louisiana St., Suite 1400, Houston, Texas 77002, 712-588-0383.
Attorney for both Defendants Larry Henderson and Noble LLC: Sadi Rafael Antonmattei-Goitia, The Fuentes Firm, P.C., 5507 Louetta Rd., Suite A, Spring, Texas 77379, 932-701-7950.
ORDER
DAVID HITTNER, United States District Judge
Pending before the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Bifurcate, Defendants’ 1st Amended Motion to Bifurcate, and Defendants’ Unopposed Motion and/or Advisory Regarding Correct Party Name and to Correct Caption. Having considered the motions, submissions, and applicable law, the Court determines the original motion to bifurcate should be denied as moot, the amended motion to bifurcate should be denied, and the motion to correct should be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a personal injury lawsuit arising from an auto accident. On December 28, 2021, Plaintiff Gerardo Trejo-Munoz ("Trejo") was driving in Houston, Texas. While attempting to execute a left turn, Defendant Larry Henderson ("Henderson"), allegedly driving a truck on behalf of Defendant Noble LLC ("Noble"), struck Plaintiff's vehicle, allegedly resulting in injuries.
On February 22, 2022, Trejo filed suit in the 55th Judicial District Court for Harris County, Texas, asserting claims for negligence and negligence per se. On March 17, 2022, Henderson and Noble (collectively, "Defendants") removed to this Court on the basis of diversity. On March 25, 2022, Defendants moved to bifurcate the trial pursuant to Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 72.052. On March 28, 2022, Defendants filed an amended motion to bifurcate. Also on March 28, 2022, Defendants moved to correct the case caption.
II. LAW & ANALYSIS
Defendants move for bifurcation of the case and to correct the case caption. The Court first addresses the motion to bifurcate, then the motion to correct.
I. Motion to Bifurcate
In 2021, a Texas law went into effect requiring courts, at the motion of the defendant, to bifurcate trials in civil actions involving only certain commercial motor vehicle accidents. Travis Cox, New State Law Creates a Dual Path to Justice in Trucking Accident Claims , Tex. Law. (June 1, 2021), https://www.law.com/texaslawyer/2021/06/01/new-state-law-creates-a-dual-path-to-justice-in-trucking-accident-claims/; see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 72.052(a). The law requires that, in civil actions involving commercial motor vehicle accident, "on motion by a defendant, the court shall provide for a bifurcated trial under this section." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 72.052(a). This bifurcation has the effect of splitting the jury trial into a compensatory liability and damages phase and a punitive liability and damages phase. See id. § 72.052(c), (d). Such motion "shall be made on or before the later of: (1) the 120th day after the date the defendant bringing the motion files the defendant's original answer; or (2) the 30th day after the date a claimant files a pleading adding a claim or cause of action against the defendant." Id. § 72.052(b). Defendants filed their motion within the required time period. Thus, the only inquiry remaining is whether this Court is bound by state law.
"Federal diversity jurisdiction provides an alternative forum for the adjudication of state-created rights, but it does not carry with it generation of rules of substantive law." Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc. , 518 U.S. 415, 426, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996). Under the familiar Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. Id. at 427, 116 S.Ct. 2211 ; see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Making this determination is often more difficult than it sounds. See, e.g. , Helen Hershkoff, Shady Grove: Duck-Rabbits, Clear Statements, and Federalism , 74 ALB. L. REV. 1703 (2011) (discussing the confusion in lower courts resulting from a divided Supreme Court's failure to deliver a clear majority rule in Erie doctrine cases). The Court must first determine whether a Federal Rule answers the question and, if it does, apply that rule unless it exceeds statutory authorization or Congress's rulemaking power. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 559 U.S. 393, 398, 130 S.Ct. 1431, 176 L.Ed.2d 311 (2010) (plurality opinion).
Whether a Federal Rule controls over Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 72.052 (" Section 72.052") is a question of first impression. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) states that federal courts "may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims." Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Initially, Rule 42(b) may be read so as not to conflict with Section 72.052. After all, Rule 42(b) imbues in federal courts the power to exercise discretion in splitting up claims and cases, and Section 72.052 only slightly limits the universe in which that discretion may be utilized. However, precedent makes clear this is not the proper reading. As Justice Scalia has recognized, the word "may" in the Federal Rules is used to vest categorical permission in the district court. See Shady Grove , 559 U.S. at 398–99, 130 S.Ct. 1431 (majority opinion) (addressing the use of the word "may" in Rule 23). A state law that creates situations in which a particular resolution is compelled while an applicable Federal Rule grants the district court categorical permission thus gives rise to a conflict. See id. at 401, 130 S.Ct. 1431 ("Rule 23 permits all class actions that meet its requirements, and a State cannot limit that permission by structuring one part of its statute to track Rule 23 and enacting another part that imposes additional requirements.").
After determining a Federal Rule and a state law conflict, the Court must determine if the Federal Rule "is consonant with the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, and the Constitution." Gasperini , 518 U.S. at 427 n.7, 116 S.Ct. 2211. If it is, the Federal Rule applies regardless of contrary state law. Id. In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure subject to its review, but with the limitation that those rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." Shady Grove , 559 U.S. at 406–07, 130 S.Ct. 1431 (plurality opinion) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) ). This limitation means that the rule must "really regulate[ ] procedure, [ ]the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them." Hanna v. Plumer , 380 U.S. 460, 464, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965) (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. , 312 U.S. 1, 14, 61 S.Ct. 422, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1941) ). Here, Rule 42(b) is squarely procedural, rather than substantive. The Rule specifically limits the reasons for which a court may bifurcate to convenience, expedition, economizing, and avoiding prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). If the trial were bifurcated, the same substantive Texas law would apply and the plaintiff's right to a jury preserved. In short, Rule 42(b) governs only the manner and means by which by which a litigant's rights are enforced, and does not alter the rules of decision courts use to adjudicate those rights. See Shady Grove , 559 U.S. at 407, 130 S.Ct. 1431. The Court finds that Rule 42(b) regulates procedure and is thus in accordance with the Rules Enabling Act.
Accordingly, the Court finds Rule 42(b) controls over Section 72.052. The discretion to bifurcate is reserved to the Court. Cf. McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC , 980 F.3d 937, 974 (4th Cir. 2020) ("[I]n our federal system, bifurcation is a case-specific procedural matter within the sole discretion of the trial court."); Nester v. Textron, Inc. , 888 F.3d 151, 163 (5th Cir. 2018) ("[A] district court is simply not bound by state law when deciding whether to bifurcate."); Bonasera v. New River Elec. Corp. , 518 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1152 (S.D. Ohio 2021) (" Rule 42(b) is a valid procedural rule and therefore controls a bifurcation analysis in federal court despite the conflicting Ohio law."). The Court determines Defendants’ motion to bifurcate should be denied.
Also pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Bifurcate, filed on March 25, 2022. On March 28, 2022, Defendants filed Defendants’ 1st Amended Motion to Bifurcate. The Court thus finds the original motion to bifurcate is superseded by the amended motion, and accordingly should be denied as moot.
II. Motion to Correct
Defendants also move to correct a mistake in the case caption and clarify the record. The company for which Henderson worked is called "Noble LLC." In a previous filing, Defendants had mistakenly referred to the company as "Noble Trucking LLC." There is no company named Noble Trucking LLC involved in this dispute, and Trejo does not contend the existence of such a company. Accordingly, the Court finds the motion should be granted.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendants’ Motion to Bifurcate is DENIED AS MOOT. The Court further
ORDERS that Defendants’ 1st Amended Motion to Bifurcate is DENIED. The Court further
ORDERS that Defendants’ Unopposed Motion and/or Advisory Regarding Correct Party Name and to Correct Caption is GRANTED. The docket, the case caption, and all future filings will be changed to reflect that Noble Trucking, LLC is not a party to this litigation.