Opinion
21-CV-9238 (PGG) (JLC)
08-15-2023
TREBCO SPECIALTY PRODUCTS INC., Plaintiff, v. THE INDIVIDUALS, CORPORATIONS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, PARTNERSHIPS, AND UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS IDENTIFIED ON SCHEDULE A HERETO, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JAMES L. COTT, United States Magistrate Judge
To The Honorable Paul G. Gardephe, United States District Judge:
In this copyright infringement action brought by Trebco Specialty Products Inc. (“Trebco”), a final default judgment, Dkt. No. 99, and permanent injunction, Dkt. No. 101, were issued against 35 defendants (the “Defaulting Defendants”).The case was then referred to me to conduct an inquest into damages. Dkt. No. 100. For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that the Court (1) award Trebco $1,400,000 in statutory damages, (2) issue an order freezing each Defaulting Defendant's assets, and (3) authorize the release and transfer of those assets to Trebco until the awards against each of the respective Defaulting Defendants are satisfied.
Trebco initially commenced this action against 109 defendants but has since filed notices of voluntary dismissal with respect to 74 of them. See Dkt. Nos. 21, 41, 5862, 65, 68-71, 82-84, 87, 89-93, 96-97.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The following facts, which are drawn from a review of Trebco's pleadings, motion papers, and submissions related to this inquest, are deemed established for the purpose of determining the damages to which Trebco is entitled. See, e.g., City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (“It is an ‘ancient common law axiom' that a defendant who defaults thereby admits all ‘well-pleaded' factual allegations contained in the complaint.”) (citation omitted); Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009) (“In light of [defendant's] default, a court is required to accept all of [plaintiff's] factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor[.]” (citing Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981))).
Trebco is a Connecticut corporation with its principal place of business in Milford, Connecticut. Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 15, Dkt. No. 1. Trebco sells, advertises, and promotes WubbaNub brand products-a line of animal plush toy pacifiers-worldwide. Id. ¶¶ 16, 21. Between 1999 and 2016, Trebco obtained copyright registrations for its WubbaNub products. Id. ¶ 18. Today, Trebco owns exclusive rights to WubbaNub pacifiers and is the official source of the brand's products in the United States. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (“Pl. Mem.”) ¶¶ 5, 7, Dkt. No. 103.
Defaulting Defendants are individuals and businesses based mainly in China who have sold and shipped “unauthorized imitations” of WubbaNub products (the “Counterfeits”) throughout the United States via online marketplaces hosted on Amazon, eBay, Joom, AliExpress, and Wish. Pl. Mem. ¶¶ 9, 11. Defaulting Defendants do not conduct business with Trebco, nor are they authorized to market or sell WubbaNub products. Pl. Mem. ¶ 14; Compl. ¶ 31. Furthermore, the Counterfeits “are strikingly similar, or at least substantially similar” to the WubbaNub pacifiers, Pl. Mem. ¶ 10, and Defaulting Defendants have continued to sell the Counterfeits despite Trebco's efforts to enforce its copyrights. Pl. Mem. ¶ 12. Thus, Trebco seeks $1,750,000 in statutory damages, Dkt. No. 103-1 (requesting $50,000 from each of 35 Defaulting Defendants), Pl. Mem. ¶ 59; a permanent injunction, id. ¶ 67; and a post-judgment asset freeze and transfer of Defaulting Defendants' frozen assets to Trebco. Id. ¶¶ 78-80.
The Court issued a permanent injunction against Defaulting Defendants on October 13, 2022. See Dkt. No. 101. Thus, this request for relief has been granted.
In its complaint, Trebco also sought to recover reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505. Compl. ¶ 65. However, as Trebco did not provide the supporting documents required by the Court's October 13, 2022 scheduling order, Dkt. No. 102, it has waived its right to fees.
B. Procedural Background
Trebco brought this action on November 8, 2021, alleging a copyright infringement claim against Defaulting Defendants in violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. Compl. ¶ 50. On February 1, 2022, the Court granted Trebco's application for a temporary restraining order against Defaulting Defendants and issued an order requiring them to appear at a show cause hearing on April 5, 2022. Dkt. No. 28. Although Defaulting Defendants were timely served, Dkt. No. 33, they did not appear at the hearing. Dkt. No. 99 at 2. The Court therefore issued a preliminary injunction against Defaulting Defendants. Dkt. No. 67. Thereafter, on June 7, 2022, Trebco moved for a default judgment. Dkt. No. 81.
Trebco also filed a claim under New York State Unfair Competition common law. Compl. ¶¶ 67-74. However, as Trebco did not further address this claim in its Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it will not be considered as part of this inquest.
On October 13, 2022, the Court granted a default judgment and permanent injunction against Defaulting Defendants and referred this case to me to conduct an inquest into damages. Dkt. Nos. 99, 100-01. On November 7, 2022, pursuant to court order, Dkt. No. 102, Trebco submitted Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an affidavit from their attorney, Christopher Tom. Dkt. Nos. 103, 104.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Default Judgment and Liability
“A default judgment entered on well-pleaded allegations in a complaint establishes a defendant's liability.” Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading Inc., 58 F.3d 849, 854 (2d Cir. 1995) (brackets omitted) (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 69 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973)). “While a party's default is considered a concession of all well-pleaded allegations of liability, it is not considered an admission of damages.” Rovio Ent., Ltd. v. Allstar Vending, Inc., 97 F.Supp.3d 536, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Metro Found. Contractors, Inc., 699 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2012)). “The district court must instead conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.” Am. Jewish Comm. v. Berman, No. 15-CV-5983 (LAK) (JLC), 2016 WL 3365313, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2016) (quoting Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1999)), adopted by 2016 WL 4532201 (Aug. 29, 2016).
A plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing [its] entitlement to recovery and thus must substantiate [its] claim with evidence to prove the extent of damages.” Dunn v. Advanced Credit Recovery Inc., No. 11-CV-4023 (PAE) (JLC), 2012 WL 676350, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 1114335 (Apr. 3, 2012). “To establish damages upon default, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the ‘compensation sought relate[s] to the damages that naturally flow from the injuries pleaded.'” Am. Jewish Comm., 2016 WL 3365313, at *3 (quoting Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 1992)). “In determining damages not susceptible to simple mathematical calculation, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) gives courts discretion to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary or whether to rely on detailed affidavits or documentary evidence.” Id. at *4 (citation omitted). An evidentiary hearing is not necessary when the documents submitted provide a “sufficient basis from which to evaluate the fairness of” the damages requested. Fustok v. ContiCommodity Servs. Inc., 873 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1989).
By virtue of their default, Defaulting Defendants have conceded liability as to the allegations set forth in the complaint, which adequately pleaded a valid cause of action. See Taizhou Zhongneng Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Koutsobinas, 509 Fed.Appx. 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2013) (defaulting defendant's liability depends on whether “allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action”). “To prevail on a claim of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show both [1] ownership of a valid copyright and [2] copying” of a protected work without authorization. Knickerbocker Toy Co., Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int'l., Inc., 668 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir. 1982) (citations omitted); accord Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 501(b)). “[C]opying may be shown by indirect evidence[] ‘if the two works are so strikingly similar as to preclude the possibility of independent creation[.]'” Tangle, Inc. v. Individuals, Corps., Ltd. Liab. Cos., P'ships, And Unincorporated Ass'ns Identified On Schedule A Hereto, No. 21-CV-9352 (LGS) (RWL), 2022 WL 2442302, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2022) (quoting Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 471 (2d Cir. 1995)) (cleaned up), adopted in part by 2022 WL 3098306 (Aug. 4, 2022). “[S]imilarity, in turn, hinges on ‘whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.'” Id. (quoting Hamil America, Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Here, both elements are met as Trebco adequately alleged that (1) it owns valid copyrights, Compl. ¶ 1; Dkt. No. 1-1 Ex. A, and (2) the Counterfeits were “strikingly similar” to genuine Trebco products and were sold without Trebco's authorization. Compl. ¶¶ 54-57; Pl. Mem. ¶¶ 10, 14. Thus, Trebco has established liability as a matter of law.
Moreover, the entry of a permanent injunction, Dkt. No. 101, reflects that liability has been established here. See, e.g., Harris v. Fairweather, No. 11-CV-2152 (PKC) (AJP), 2012 WL 3956801, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2012) (permanent injunction granted due to defendant's default which “constitutes an admission of liability”) (collecting cases), adopted by 2012 WL 5199250 (Oct. 19, 2012).
Therefore, the only remaining issue is whether Trebco has provided adequate support for its request for damages. As discussed below, Trebco's submissions form a “sufficient basis from which to evaluate the fairness” of its request for damages, and thus, a hearing is unnecessary. Fustok, 873 F.2d at 40.
B. Statutory Damages
1. Legal Standards
Under Section 504 of the Copyright Act, a copyright owner whose copyright is infringed is entitled to either actual damages and any profits gained by the infringer, or statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a). When, as Trebco has done here, a copyright owner elects to recover statutory damages, they may recover an amount “not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). In cases of willful infringement, however, the court has the discretion to increase the award up to $150,000 per work. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
“Statutory damages ‘are available without proof of plaintiff's actual damages,' and are useful in cases ‘where proof of actual damages or profits is insufficient.'” EMI April Music Inc. v. 4MM Games, LLC, No. 12-CV-2080 (DLC) (JLC), 2014 WL 325933, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2014) (quoting Lucerne Textiles, Inc. v. H.C.T. Textiles Co., No. 12-CV-5456 (KMW) (AJP), 2013 WL 174226, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2013) (internal citations omitted), adopted by 2013 WL 1234911 (Mar 26, 2013)), adopted by 2014 WL 1383468 (Apr. 7, 2014). “The Copyright Act affords the . . . court ‘wide discretion' in setting the amount of statutory damages.” Myeress v. Elite Travel Grp. USA, No. 18-CV-340 (AJN), 2018 WL 5961424, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2018) (quoting Fitzgerald Publ'g. Co. v. Baylor Publ'g. Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 1110, 1116 (2d Cir. 1986)). Additionally, when a defendant has acted willfully, as Trebco alleges here, a court should consider incorporating both a compensatory and punitive component to “discourage further wrongdoing by the defendants and others.” CJ Prods. LLC v. Your Store Online LLC, No. 11-CV-9513 (GBD) (AJP), 2012 WL 2856068, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 4714820 (Oct. 3, 2012). To determine the amount of statutory damages for copyright infringement, courts in this Circuit consider the following factors:
(1) the infringer's state of mind; (2) the expenses saved, and profits earned, by the infringer; (3) the revenue lost by the copyright holder; (4) the deterrent effect on the infringer and third parties; (5) the infringer's cooperation in providing evidence concerning the value of the infringing material; and (6) the conduct and attitude of the parties.Myeress, 2018 WL 5961424, at *3 (quoting Bryant v. Media Right Productions, 603 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2010)).
2. Application
Trebco seeks $50,000 in increased statutory damages for willful copyright infringement from each of the 35 Defaulting Defendants under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). Because Defaulting Defendants have failed to appear and provide necessary records, it is impossible for the Court to ascertain the value of the infringing material (factor five), the expenses saved or profits reaped by Defaulting Defendants (factor two) and, by extension, the revenues that Trebco lost (factor three) as a result of Defaulting Defendants' infringement. The Court can, however, infer Defaulting Defendants' state of mind from their default (factor one) and evaluate factors such as the deterrent effect on Defaulting Defendants and third parties (factor four), and Defaulting Defendants' conduct (factor six). As discussed below, the consideration of these remaining factors warrants an increased statutory reward.
Defaulting Defendants' state of mind and their conduct (factors one and six), weigh in favor of increased statutory damages. “Copyright infringement is deemed willful by virtue of a defendant's default.” Rovio Ent., 97 F.Supp.3d at 546 (citing All-Star Mktg. Grp., LLC v. Media Brands Co., 775 F.Supp.2d 613, 621-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)); see also e.g., Sadowski v. Render Media Inc., No. 17-CV-9045 (PGG) (JLC), 2020 WL 1178629, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2020) (“[T]he Court may . . . find that [defendant's] conduct . . . was willful by virtue of its default.”), adopted by 2020 WL 5968668 (Oct. 8, 2020). Furthermore, when determining statutory damages there is
a rebuttable presumption that the infringement was committed willfully for purposes of determining relief if the violator[] . . . knowingly provided . . . false contact information . . . in registering, maintaining, or renewing a domain name used in connection with the infringement.17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(3)(A); see also, e.g., Int'l Typeface Corp. v. Shellabarger, No. 06-CV-260 (HLM), 2008 WL 11333693, at *8,10 (N.D.Ga. June 30, 2008) (court presumed willful copyright infringement when defendant provided false name and physical address to domain name registrar when registering website used for infringing activity). Here, many of the names and addresses that Defaulting Defendants used to register their website domains contained false information as they were “incomplete, contain[ed] randomly typed letters, or fail[ed] to include cities or states.” Pl. Mem. ¶ 62.
Additionally, a defendant's selling activity can demonstrate willful infringement. See, e.g., Spin Master Ltd. v. Alan Yuan's Store, 325 F.Supp.3d 413, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). In Spin Master, the court concluded that defendant internet sellers willfully infringed on the plaintiff's copyrights because they “hid behind internet aliases to avoid detection” and “often created multiple aliases.” Id. Here too, Defaulting Defendants “use[d] privacy services that conceal[ed] [their] identit[ies] and contact information,” Compl. ¶ 37, and “operate[d] under multiple fictitious names.” Id. at ¶ 38. Thus, Defaulting Defendants acted willfully by virtue of having defaulted, the statutory presumption of willfulness, and their conduct. Therefore, Trebco is entitled to an increased reward. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
The desired deterrent effect (factor four) on Defaulting Defendants and other potential infringing parties also justifies a significant award. See, e.g., CJ Prods. LLC, 2012 WL 2856068 at *3 (“[T]he goal of deterring similar conduct by other enterprises requires a substantial award.” (citation omitted)); Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., No. 07-CV-8822 (HB) (THK), 2010 WL 3629688, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2010) (“[T]he Court must consider the deterrent effect on both other potential infringers as well [as] Defendants themselves.”), adopted by 2010 WL 3629587 (Sept. 16, 2010). Accordingly, the Court's evaluation of these factors strongly favors awarding Trebco increased statutory damages for Defaulting Defendants' willful copyright infringement.
Turning to Trebco's request for $50,000 in statutory damages against each Defaulting Defendant, the Court notes that other courts in this District have awarded the same amount in similar cases. See, e.g., Tangle, 2022 WL 2442303, at *8 ($50,000 awarded per defaulting defendant when defendants sold counterfeit toys on websites that included Amazon and Wish) (collecting cases). However, courts typically grant a plaintiff's request for statutory damages in full when a defendant continues its conduct despite receiving notices to end its infringing activity. See, e.g., Lucerne Textiles, Inc., 2013 WL 174226, at *3 ($30,000 awarded in statutory damages in copyright case where defendant defaulted and plaintiff sent cease and desist letters prior to lawsuit); Hounddog Prods., L.L.C. v. Empire Film Grp., Inc., 826 F.Supp.2d 619, 631-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ($150,000 awarded in statutory damages in copyright case where defendant received notice it no longer had authorization to use copyright prior to lawsuit).
Here, Trebco alleges that “despite [its] enforcement efforts, [Defaulting] Defendants have persisted in creating . . . [i]nternet [s]tores and engaging in continued sales of the Counterfeit[s.]” Pl. Mem. ¶ 12. Trebco did not explain, however, what specific enforcement efforts it took prior to filing suit. For example, it provided no evidence of having sent cease and desist letters or notices seeking to end the infringing activity. Accordingly, I recommend an award of $40,000 per Defaulting Defendant (instead of the requested $50,000) in statutory damages for copyright infringement. See, e.g., Whitehead v. Mix Unit, LLC, No. 17-CV-9476 (VSB) (JLC), 2019 WL 384446, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2019) (requested statutory damages for copyright infringement reduced from $30,000 to $25,000 where defendant defaulted and distinguished from other cases where higher statutory damages were awarded because defendant continued infringement despite receiving notices to end its infringing activity), adopted by 2019 WL 1746007 (Apr. 18, 2019); Hollander Glass Texas, Inc. v. Rosen-Paramount Glass Co., Inc., 291 F.Supp.3d 554, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (same) (collecting cases), adopted by No. 17-CV-2105 (VSB) (GWG), 2019 WL 416327 (Feb. 1, 2019).
C. Asset Freeze and Transfer Order
Trebco also seeks an order freezing Defaulting Defendants' assets and transferring those assets to Trebco. As a matter of equitable relief and to prevent further copyright infringement, I recommend that Trebco's requests to freeze and transfer assets be granted.
1. Asset Freeze
Rule 69(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he procedure on execution-and in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution-must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is located ....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 69(a)(1). Section 5222 of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules permits a judgment creditor to serve a restraining notice on a judgment debtor, which prohibits the judgment debtor from “mak[ing] or suffer[ing] any sale, assignment, transfer[,] or interference with any property in which [it] has an interest,” except in limited circumstances. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5222(b). Thus, once a defendant is found liable and a money judgment is rendered against it, a district court sitting in New York has the power to restrain that defendant's assets. See, e.g., Off-White LLC v. _^ Warm House ^_^, No. 17-CV-8872 (GBD) (GWG), 2019 WL 418501, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2019) (granting motion for postjudgment asset restraint); accord WowWee Grp. Ltd. v. Haoqin, No. 17-CV-9893 (WHP), 2019 WL 1316106, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2019).
In addition to a money judgment, Defaulting Defendants should also be subject to post-judgment asset freezes pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 and C.P.L.R. § 5222. Trebco sought an accounting of Defaulting Defendants' profits attributable to the infringing activity in its complaint. Compl. ¶¶ 61-62. Equitable remedies such as an asset freeze may be sought as part of an action for an accounting of profits. See, e.g., Gucci Am. Inc. v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 2014). While Trebco now seeks statutory damages in lieu of an accounting, an asset restraint is nonetheless appropriate to ensure that defendants do not hide assets. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11-CV-4976 (NRB), 2015 WL 5638060, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2015). But see WowWee Grp. Ltd. v. Meirly, 18-CV-706 (AJN), 2019 WL 1375470, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2019) (declining to grant asset freeze because plaintiffs had “elected statutory damages”). Furthermore, because the district court already issued an asset freeze on a preliminary basis, Dkt. Nos. 28, 67, that relief should now be made permanent.
2. Transfer Order
The court should also grant the request to transfer Defaulting Defendants' assets to Trebco. Rule 64(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a]t the commencement of and throughout an action, every remedy is available that, under the law of the state where the court is located, provides for seizing a person or property to secure satisfaction of the potential judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 64(a). In New York, Section 5225 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules authorizes this Court to compel a nonparty to surrender a judgment debtor's property. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5225.
“Courts in this district routinely order transfers of infringing defendants' frozen assets to plaintiffs in counterfeit cases, relying on the authority to issue injunctive relief under Rule 64 . . . and ‘[a] Court's inherent equitable power to issue remedies ancillary to its authority to provide final relief.'” Ideavillage Prods. Corp. v. Aarhus, No. 18-CV-2739 (JGK) (SDA), 2019 WL 2290514, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2019) (quoting Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09-CV-8458 (RJS), 2010 WL 308303, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2010)), adopted by 2019 WL 2287726 (May 28, 2019); see also 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (“Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under [the Copyright Act] may . . . grant temporary and final injunctions as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.”); see also Off-White, 2019 WL 418501, at *6 (collecting cases and rejecting report and recommendation to deny transfer of frozen assets). Furthermore, “‘the need for [asset freeze and transfer] is clear: without this relief, defendants would have . . . a fourteen-day window [under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(a)] in which to hide their assets.” Forbse, 2015 WL 5638060, at *4. Therefore, Trebco's request for a transfer order should be granted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Trebco should be awarded $1,400,000 in statutory damages ($40,000 from each of the 35 Defaulting Defendants) and the Court should issue an order freezing each Defaulting Defendant's assets and authorizing the release and transfer of those assets to Trebco until the damages awards against each of the respective Defaulting Defendants are satisfied.
PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file any objections. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (b), (d). A party may respond to any objections within fourteen (14) days after being served. Such objections, and any responses to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Paul G. Gardephe and the undersigned, United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, New York 10007. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Gardephe.
FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).