Whether the defendant is actually guilty of the traffic violation is for a jury or a court to decide, and not an officer on the scene. Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32 (1998) (citing Burris, 330 Ark. 66, 954 S.W.2d 209 (1997)). Thus, Robinson's argument that Trooper Outlaw could not have developed probable cause to initiate a traffic stop because Robinson did not violate any statute is unavailing.

Hinojosa asserted that the license plate cover did not violate Arkansas or Arizona law, and that Sergeant Drown's mistake of law rendered the traffic stop without probable cause and, therefore, illegal. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress in an order issued on November 5, 2007, and filed a letter containing its findings regarding the suppression motion the same day. Quoting from Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32 (1998) and Burris v. State, 330 Ark. 66, 73, 954 S.W.2d 209, 213 (1997), the trial court stated in the letter of findings that the supreme court had previously held that a law enforcement officer's mistake of law does not negate probable cause; instead, "all that is required is that the officer had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred." Hinojosa entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling under Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b), and filed a timely notice of appeal.

[1, 2] In reviewing a ruling denying a defendant's motion to suppress, we make an independent determination, based on the totality of the circumstances, and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32 (1998). We reverse only if the trial court's ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.

This court has cited Whren in two cases. SeeTravis v. State, 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32 (1998); Burris v. State 330 Ark. 66, 954 S.W.2d 209 (1997). Neither case dealt with the issue of pretextual arrests but rather cited Whren for the proposition that probable cause of a traffic violation is all that is required for a police officer to make a stop.

In order for a police officer to make a traffic stop, he must have probable cause to believe that the vehicle has violated a traffic law. Laime v. State, 347 Ark. 142, 60 S.W.3d 464 (2001); Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32 (1998). Whether a police officer has probable cause to make a traffic stop does not depend on whether the driver was actually guilty of the violation which the officer believed to have occurred.

Furthermore, whether a police officer has probable cause to make a traffic stop does not depend on whether the driver was guilty of the violation that the officer believed to have occurred. Travis v. State , 331 Ark. 7, 10, 959 S.W.2d 32, 34 (1998). In Travis , the deputy stopped a truck with a Texas license plate because he mistakenly believed the truck was being operated in violation of the law.

ions were objectively reasonable in the circumstances, and in mistake cases the question is simply whether the mistake, whether of law or of fact, was an objectively reasonable one."); State v Hammang, 249 Ga App 811, 811; 549 SE2d 440 (2001)(an officer's actions are not rendered improper by a later legal determination that a statute was not violated by the defendant according to a technical legal definition or distinction, where the officer determined in good faith that a violation occurred and the nature of the mistake was not arbitrary and harassing); Harrison v State, 800 So2d 1134, 1138-1139 (Miss, 2001) (traffic stop was based on mistake of law relative to statute addressing construction-zone speed limits, but deputies had an objectively reasonable basis for believing statute was violated; Mississippi Supreme Court noted that the trial court and half the judges of the court of appeals also erroneously construed the statute in a manner that supported the finding of a violation); Travis v State, 331 Ark 7, 10-11; 959 SW2d 32 (1998) (no constitutional violation relative to a traffic stop where the officer reasonably, but erroneously, believed that the pertinent law required license plates to display expiration stickers); DeChene v Smallwood, 226 Va 475, 479-481; 311 SE2d 749 (1984) (finding it "fairly arguable" that garage-keeper statute allowed for an arrest under the facts, and therefore officer had a reasonable basis to believe in the applicability of the statute; the court noted that "an arrest resulting from a mistake of law should be judged by the same test as one stemming from a mistake of fact"). The dissent maintains that we are required to construe the statute in favor of defendant under the rule of lenity, given our statement that MCL 257.225(2) is ambiguous at best.

See United States v. Southerland, 486 F.3d 1355 [1359], 376 U.S.App.D.C. 235 [239] (D.C.Cir.2007) [ (even though officers erroneously believed license plate had to be affixed to the front bumper, the license plate was on the dashboard and not affixed to the front of the car as required by Maryland law, and stop was objectively reasonable) ]. See also Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7 [10–11], 959 S.W.2d 32 [34] (1998)[ (officer reasonably, but erroneously, believed license plate was required to display expiration stickers) ]; People v. Teresinski, 30 Cal.3d 822 [839], 180 Cal.Rptr. 617 [626–27], 640 P.2d 753 [762–63] (1982) [ (although detention was illegal because curfew law had not been violated, a robbery victim's testimony was admissible) ]; People v. Glick, 203 Cal.App.3d 796 [803], 250 Cal.Rptr. 315 [319] (1988)[ (officer's stop of New Jersey vehicle was reasonable even though based on officer's erroneous understanding of New Jersey registration laws) ]; Stafford v. State, 284 Ga. 773 [774–75], 671 S.E.2d 484 [485] (2008)[ (officer erroneously believed it was illegal to stop in the middle of a residential street, but a statute made it illegal to park in the middle of a two-way roadway, which provided a sound basis for the officer's stop) ]; State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119 [125], 982 P.2d 954 [960] (1999) [ (even allowing for reasonable mistakes of law by po

[2,3] Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.1 (a)(iii) provides that a law enforcement officer may make a warrantless arrest of a person when the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person has committed any violation of law in the officer's presence, including traffic offenses. Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32 (1998). Here, the officers had reasonable cause to believe that the driver of the truck was violating Ark. Code Ann. § 27-14-304 (Repl.

And many other courts besides have expressly rejected such a categorical approach, preferring instead the traditional totality of the circumstances test. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir.2005); Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32, 34 (1998); Moore v. State, 986 So.2d 928, 935 (Miss.2008); State v. Heien, 366 N.C. 271, 737 S.E.2d 351, 356 (2012); City of Wilmington v. Conner, 144 Ohio App.3d 735, 761 N.E.2d 663, 667 (2001); State v. Wright, 791 N.W.2d 791, 799 (S.D.2010).