Therefore, “district courts routinely invoke the doctrine of abstention in insurance coverage actions, which necessarily turn on issues of state law”. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Philips Electronics North America Corp., 2004 WL 193564, *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Fireman's Fund, 932 F.Supp. at 621 (“if this Court were to adjudicate this claim, there would be duplicative proceedings”).

Instead, Allstate's authorities simply show that federal courts often decline jurisdiction where there is an ongoing parallel state proceeding regarding the same state-law issues that are raised in the federal action. See, e.g., Hartford Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Karp, 108 F.3d 17 22–23 (2d Cir. 1997) (no abuse of discretion to decline jurisdiction in favor of a concurrent action proceeding in Connecticut state court); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., No. 02-cv-9800 (WHP), 2004 WL 193564 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (abstaining where "the claims of the parties, including plaintiffs in this action, are either already before the Illinois court, or may be adjudicated in the Illinois Action by way of third-party claim, counterclaim or affirmative defense"); Cadle Co., 929 F.Supp. at 639 (abstaining where "the claims of all parties in interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated in the state court proceedings currently pending"). But where, as here, there is no parallel state-court proceeding, the mere presence of state-law claims does not in the slightest weigh in favor of abstention.

Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995). "In determining whether to invoke the doctrine of abstention in the context of a declaratory judgment action where there exists a concurrent state court action," Travelers Indem. Co. v. Philips Electronics N. Am. Corp., 02 Civ. 9800 (WHP), 2004 WL 193564, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2004), federal courts have considered the following factors: (1) the scope of the pending state proceeding and the nature of the defenses available there; (2) whether the claims of all parties in interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated in that proceeding; (3) whether the necessary parties have been joined; (4) whether such parties are amenable to process in that proceeding; (5) avoiding duplicative proceedings; (6) avoiding forum shopping; (7) the relative convenience of the fora; (8) the order of filing; and (9) choice of law.

Indeed, plaintiff's only argument under Brillhart is that New York law will govern the parties' dispute, regardless of the litigation forum, and that the "choice of law" factor therefore favors adjudication in New York. But this factor cannot bear the weight plaintiff places on it. Though the applicability of federal law militates strongly against Brillhart abstention, the choice between different state laws is of comparatively small import, particularly when other factors point decidedly toward abstention. See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Philips Electronics North America Corp., No. 02 Civ. 9800 (WHP), 2004 WL 193564, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2004). Of course, it may be true that a federal court in New York is better equipped to apply New York law than a state court in California.

Wilton explains that the purpose of the Act is to "place a remedial arrow in the district court's quiver; it created an opportunity, rather than a duty, to grant a new form of relief to qualifying litigants." Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288; see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Philips Electronics North America Corp., No. 02 Civ. 9800, 2004 WL 193564, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2004). According to Wilton, suits brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act "justify a standard vesting district courts with greater discretion in declaratory judgment actions than that permitted" by the related Colorado River abstention doctrine.