Opinion
No. 4D22-716.
03-29-2023
Jack R. Reiter and Robert C. Weill of GrayRobinson, P.A., Miami, for appellants. Jeffrey J. Molinaro of Fuerst Ittleman David & Joseph, Miami, for appellee.
Jack R. Reiter and Robert C. Weill of GrayRobinson, P.A., Miami, for appellants.
Jeffrey J. Molinaro of Fuerst Ittleman David & Joseph, Miami, for appellee.
Per Curiam.
We reverse the order requiring appellant and appellant's attorney to pay $3,200 in attorney's fees as a sanction for litigation conduct. While a court has inherent authority to impose attorney's fees against an attorney for bad faith conduct, the court must make "an express finding of bad faith conduct [which] must be supported by detailed factual findings describing the specific acts of bad faith conduct that resulted in the unnecessary incurrence of attorneys' fees." Moakley v. Smallwood, 826 So.2d 221, 227 (Fla. 2002). "Although the magic words `bad faith' are not necessary, the trial court must use equivalent language to describe the sanctionable conduct." Hicks v. Hicks, 284 So.3d 576, 579 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). While the order in this case detailed conduct that the court found "improper," the court did not find bad faith or use any "equivalent language." See id. We have examined the attorney's conduct and cannot conclude that it constituted the type of vexatious litigation conduct that would warrant exercising the court's inherent sanction authority.
We are without jurisdiction to address the remainder of the sanction order. See Ruppel v. Gulf Winds Apartments, Inc., 508 So.2d 534, 535 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
Reversed with directions to vacate the sanction order assessing attorney's fees.
Gerber and Levine, JJ., concur.
Warner, J., dissents without opinion.