Opinion
Civil Action 6:23-1960-HMH-KFM
09-20-2023
Tara Trantham, Plaintiff, v. Omni Financial of Nevada, Inc., Defendant.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the court on the defendant's motion to compel arbitration or, in the alternative, to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (doc. 6). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g) (D.S.C.), all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.
BACKGROUND AND FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, an attorney, was employed as general counsel for the defendant from July 2021 until her employment termination in December 2021 (doc. 1-1, compl. ¶¶ 6, 9, 18). The plaintiff was required to sign an employment agreement as an express condition of accepting employment with the defendant, and she signed the agreement on June 30, 2021 (docs. 6-1 at 1-12; 11-2, Trantham aff. ¶ 5). The employment agreement contains an arbitration provision, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
10. Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate
In recognition of the fact that differences may arise between Omni and the Employee related to the Employee's employment, and in the recognition of the fac[t] that resolution of any differences in the courts is rarely time or cost effective for either party, Omni and Employee agree to the following terms in order to establish and gain the benefits of a speedy, impartial and cost-effective dispute resolution procedure:
(a) Employee and Omni each agree to arbitrate before a single neutral arbitrator, in accordance with the National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), any dispute arising out of or relating to the Employee's employment and/or termination, including, without limitation, any and all claims, rights or causes of action which may ever arise or be asserted under any federal, state, local or foreign statutory, regulatory or common law, including without limitation, claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act and any state statutory or common law claims, including, without limitation, all claims of discrimination, retaliation, wrongful discharge or termination, breach of contract, tort (such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, slander, wrongful invasion of privacy or personal injury). All of the foregoing types of matters, claims, rights and obligations subject to these arbitration provisions are herein called "Subject Claims."
(b) Employee shall pay for the costs of the initial arbitration filing. Employee shall also pay for his/her travel expenses associate with the arbitration, unless it is otherwise determined by the arbitrator. Omni shall pay for any other expenses that Employee would not be required to bear if he/she were free to bring the dispute or claim in court. Each party shall bear its own attorneys' fees, unless otherwise required by law. The arbitration shall take place in New Rochelle, New York, where President, Chief Financial Officer and human resources team are located. The arbitrator shall apply the law of the state in which Employee worked for Omni to the Subject Claims, without reference to rules of conflicts of law, to the resolution of any dispute. . . . ...
(f) The Employee and Omni each understand and agree that the arbitration of any Subject Claims shall be instead of a hearing or trial before a court or jury. Employee and Omni each understand that the Employee and Omni are expressly waiving any and all rights to hearing or trial before a court or jury regarding any Subject Claims which they may have in the future. . . . ...(Doc. 6-1 at 6-7).
The plaintiff alleges in her complaint that she mainly worked for the defendant remotely in Greenville, South Carolina, but she traveled once to the defendant's headquarters in Nevada and once to the defendant's location in North Carolina (docs. 1-1, compl. ¶ 9; 11-2, Trantham aff. ¶ 6). The plaintiff submits that she was not directed to perform any substantive work during these visits, but the defendant asked her to travel to these locations and informed her that the purpose of the visits was to meet with other employees and to observe and learn more about the defendant's operations (doc. 11-2, Trantham aff. ¶ 6).
After her termination of employment, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant in the Greenville County Court of Common Pleas on March 27, 2023, alleging claims of breach of contract, breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), violation of South Carolina Code Annotated § 1-13-80, defamation, violation of South Carolina Code Annotated § 41-10-10, et seq., fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud, wrongful termination, and discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA") (doc. 1-1). The defendant removed the matter to this court on May 11,2023 (doc. 1). Also on May 11, 2023, the defendant filed the instant motion to compel arbitration or, in the alternative, to dismiss (doc. 6). The defendant also requests sanctions against the plaintiff in the form of costs and fees associated with bringing the motion (id.). The plaintiff filed a response on June 8, 2023 (doc. 11), and the defendant filed a reply on June 15, 2023 (doc. 13). Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for review.
APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act
The plaintiff argues that arbitration should not be compelled because the arbitration provision in her employment agreement does not contain the notice required by the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act ("SCUAA") (doc. 11 at 4-5). The SCUAA provides in relevant part that "notice that a contract is subject to arbitration pursuant to this chapter shall be typed in underlined capital letters, or rubber-stamped prominently, on the first page of the contract." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10(a). Further, "unless such notice is displayed thereon the contract shall not be subject to arbitration." Id. The defendant does not argue that the arbitration provision at issue comports with the notice requirements of the SCUAA but rather argues that the plaintiff's claims are subject to arbitration because the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), which does not contain the same notice requirements, governs the instant matter (doc. 13 at 9).
It is well-settled that if an arbitration provision is covered by the FAA, then the FAA preempts the SCUAA. See Low Country Rural Health Educ. Consortium, Inc. v. Greenway Med. Techs., Inc., C/A No. 9:14-cv-00874-DCN, 2014 WL 5771850, at *4-7 (D.S.C. Nov. 5, 2014); In Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,686-87 (1996) (finding that the FAA preempts state laws that render arbitration provisions unenforceable for lack of compliance with special notice requirements). Under the FAA,
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.9 U.S.C. § 2. "Commerce" is defined as "commerce among the several States or with foreign nations...." Id. § 1. According to the Supreme Court of the United States, the FAA extends to the bounds of Congress's commerce clause power. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (expanding the limits of the FAA and holding that the FAA applies to all contracts involving interstate commerce, even if the parties did not contemplate an interstate commerce connection). Moreover, the Supreme Court has "interpreted the term 'involving commerce' in the FAA as the functional equivalent of the more familiar term 'affecting commerce' - words of art that ordinarily signal the broadest permissible exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power." Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003).
The undersigned finds that the transaction at issue involves interstate commerce. The defendant is a corporation that is organized under the laws of Nevada and does business in South Carolina (doc. 1-1, compl. ¶ 2). Moreover, the plaintiff worked remotely for the defendant in Greenville, South Carolina (id. ¶ 9). During her employment, the defendant asked the plaintiff to visit its headquarters in Nevada and one of its locations in North Carolina, and the plaintiff traveled to those locations (id.; doc. 11-2, Trantham aff. ¶ 6). Although the plaintiff claims that she was not directed to perform any substantive work during these visits, she was informed that the purpose of those visits was to meet with other employees and to observe and learn more about the defendant's operations (doc. 11-2, Trantham aff. ¶ 6).
Additionally, the plaintiff served as general counsel for the defendant in South Carolina despite the defendant not having any offices located in South Carolina. Further, the plaintiff recognizes in her complaint that she reported concerns to the defendant that it was violating various state laws, including Tennessee statutory law (docs. 1-1, compl. ¶ 17; 11-3). See, e.g., Ruiz v. Margolin, C/A No. 622-058, 2023 WL 2587488, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2023) (recognizing that a retainer agreement for performance of legal services "certainly involved interstate commerce, especially considering [the plaintiff] was engaging in business in Georgia and [the defendant] was in California; thus, it is governed by the FAA"); Starnes v. Conduent Inc., C/A No. 1:17-cv-495, 2018 WL 3466951, at *8 (M.D. N.C. July 18, 2018) ("The nature of the employment agreement itself reflects an effect on interstate commerce, as Plaintiff, a North Carolina resident, was employed to work from his home in a remote tech support capacity for a company serving facilities and people inside and outside North Carolina utilizing interstate mail and travel systems.") (internal citations omitted).
Further, the plaintiff testifies in her affidavit that she used technology remotely in Greenville, South Carolina that the defendant sent her through an Amazon package (doc. 11-2, Trantham aff. ¶ 5 & ex. 1). See, e.g., Swane Co. v. Berkeley Cnty. S.C., C/A No. 2:15-cv-02586, 2015 WL 6688072, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2015) ("[I]t is clear that an otherwise intrastate transaction involves interstate commerce when the parties perform their agreement using supplies acquired through interstate commerce. . . . Plaintiff, for its part, performed the Agreement using trucks, equipment, and fuel produced outside of South Carolina."); McCutcheon v. THI of S.C. at Charleston, LLC, C/A No. 2:11-cv-02861, 2011 WL 6318575, at *5 (D.S.C. Dec. 15, 2011) (finding that a nursing care provider's operations affected interstate commerce because food and other supplies were shipped across state lines to reach the nursing care facilities).
The plaintiff also brings various claims against the defendant under Title VII and the EPA, which only apply to an employer engaged in commerce. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), (g), (h) (Title VII); 29 C.F.R. § 1620.2 (EPA). Courts within this district have found that a plaintiff bringing claims under such federal statutes in effect concedes the interstate nexus to her employment. See Cox v. Assisted Living Concepts, Inc., C/A No. 6:13-00747-JMC, 2014 WL 1094394, at *11 (D.S.C. Mar. 18, 2014); Rum v. DARCARS of New Carrollton, Inc., C/A No. DKC 12-0366, 2012 WL 2847628, at *3 (D.Md. July 10, 2012). Moreover, the plaintiff recognizes in her response to the defendant's instant motion that she does not dispute that the defendant's business involves interstate commerce (doc. 11 at 8-9). See Cox, 2014 WL 1094394, at *11 ("Courts construing the language of section 2 [of the FAA] in the context of an employment relationship have generally focused on the nature of the defendant employer's business, not the employee's individual duties.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); McElveen v. Mike Reichenbach Ford Lincoln, Inc., C/A No. 4:12-874-RBH-KDW, 2012 WL 3964973, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Aug. 22, 2012) (holding that an employee who works in an area of its employer's business that involves interstate commerce is equally involved in interstate commerce), R&R adopted by 2012 WL 3965139 (D.S.C. Sept. 11, 2012).
The plaintiff argues that the SCUAA should nevertheless apply because the arbitration provision explicitly states that “[t]he arbitrator shall apply the law of the state in which [the plaintiff] worked for [the defendant]” (doc. 11 at 4). However, this provision does not mandate that the SCUAA governs instead of the FAA. Moreover, “even where an arbitration agreement specifically states that the SCUAA is applicable, if the arbitration agreement is covered by the FAA, the FAA preempts the state law.” Cox, 2014 WL 1094394, at *11 (citations omitted). In concert, the above factors show that the transaction at issue involves interstate commerce under the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the FAA. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the FAA applies to the arbitration provision at issue, and the notice requirements of the SCUAA will not prevent its enforcement.
Federal Arbitration Act
Section 4 of the FAA provides that "[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 4. Section 4 also states that, when presented with such a petition, "the court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement." Id.
Notably, "the Supreme Court has consistently encouraged a 'healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.'" Levin v. Alms & Assocs., Inc., 634 F.3d 260, 266 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). However, "even though arbitration has a favored place, there still must be an underlying agreement between the parties to arbitrate." Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rowland v. Sandy Morris Fin. & Est. Plan. Servs., LLC, 993 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 2021) ("It must be remembered that mandatory arbitration is not the default form of dispute resolution but rather is permitted only when the parties agree to it."). A party can compel arbitration under the FAA if it establishes: (1) the existence of a dispute between the parties; (2) a written agreement that includes an arbitration provision purporting to cover the dispute that is enforceable under general principles of contract law; (3) the relationship of the transaction, as evidenced by the agreement, to interstate or foreign commerce; and (4) the failure, neglect or refusal of a party to arbitrate the dispute. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Wood, 429 F.3d 83, 87 (4th Cir. 2005); Whiteside v. Teltech Corp., 940 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir.1991).
Here, the first and fourth elements are satisfied, as there is undoubtedly a dispute between the parties, and the plaintiff has refused to participate in arbitration. Moreover, as discussed herein, the third element is met because there is a relationship between the transaction and interstate commerce. Therefore, all that remains at issue is the second element.
The plaintiff does not argue that her instant claims are not covered by the arbitration provision (see doc. 11). Moreover, as set out above, the plaintiff has brought claims for breach of contract, breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, discrimination and retaliation in violation of the ADA, discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, violation of South Carolina Code Annotated § 1-13-80, defamation, violation of South Carolina Code Annotated § 41-10-10, et seq., fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud, wrongful termination, and discrimination and retaliation in violation of the EPA (doc. 1-1). Further, the arbitration provision at issue provides that it covers "any dispute arising out of or relating to [the plaintiff's] employment and/or termination, including, without limitation, any and all claims . . . [,] which may ever arise or be asserted under any federal, state, local or foreign statutory, regulatory or common law[;]" claims under Title VII, the ADA, and the Fair Labor and Standards Act; and "any state statutory or common law claims, including, without limitation, all claims of discrimination, retaliation, wrongful discharge or termination, breach of contract, [and] tort . . . ." (doc. 6-1 at 6-7). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that each of the plaintiff's claims are covered by the arbitration provision.
The plaintiff, however, argues that the arbitration provision is not enforceable under general contract principles (doc. 11 at 9-14). Specifically, the plaintiff argues that there is an unenforceable non-compete provision within the employment agreement; the arbitration provision makes arbitration prohibitively expensive for her; and the employment agreement is unconscionable based on various provisions and because it is a contract of adhesion that was not open to negotiation and has one-sided terms (id.). The defendant argues that the arbitration provision is not unconscionable and the plaintiff's arguments about unrelated provisions of the employment agreement are not substantively relevant to the enforceability of the arbitration provision (doc. 13 at 3-5).
The undersigned finds that the plaintiff's argument that arbitration should not be compelled based on the validity of the employment agreement as a whole, as well as based on provisions within the employment agreement that are completely separate from the arbitration provision, are without merit. As stated by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit:
The law is well settled in this circuit that, if a party seeks to avoid arbitration and/or a stay of federal court proceedings pending the outcome of arbitration by challenging the validity or enforceability of an arbitration provision on any grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract, 9 U.S.C. § 2, the grounds must relate specifically to the arbitration clause and not just to the contract as a whole.Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 636 (4th Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006) ("[A]s a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the contract . . . unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract's validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance."); Jeske v. Brooks, 875 F.2d 71, 75 (4th Cir. 1989) (refusing to consider a party's arguments that an arbitration clause must be declared invalid on grounds that a customer's agreement as a whole was invalid due to overreaching, unconscionability, fraud, and lack of consideration, because the alleged defects pertained to the entire contract, rather than specifically to the arbitration clause); Huskins v. Mungo Homes, LLC, 887 S.E.2d 534, 539 (S.C. Ct. App. 2023) ("Arbitration clauses are separable from the contracts in which they are imbedded. . . . [T]he issue of [the arbitration clause's] validity is distinct from the substantive validity of the contract as a whole.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Doe v. TCSC, LLC, 846 S.E.2d 874, 876-77 (S.C. Ct. App. 2020) ("Because an arbitration provision is often one of many provisions in a contract covering many other aspects of the transaction, the first task of a court is to separate the arbitration provision from the rest of the contract."). Accordingly, the undersigned declines to address the validity of the employment agreement as a whole or unrelated provisions within the employment agreement and has solely addressed the plaintiff's arguments regarding the validity of the arbitration provision below.
The plaintiff argues that the arbitration provision is unconscionable and unenforceable because she “believe[s]” that it makes arbitration prohibitively expensive for her (docs. 11 at 10, 13-14; 11-2, Trantham aff. ¶ 9). In particular, the plaintiff highlights that the arbitration provision requires her to pay the costs of traveling to the place of the defendant's choosing for arbitration - New York (id.). The plaintiff also testifies in her affidavit that she has not been employed on a full-time basis since her employment with the defendant was terminated (doc. 11-2, Trantham aff. ¶ 7). As a result, she has struggled to pay her bills since that time (id.).
South Carolina courts have defined unconscionability "as the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one party due to one-sided contract provisions, together with terms [that] are so oppressive that no reasonable person would make them and no fair and honest person would accept them." Fanning v. Fritz's Pontiac-Cadillac-Buick, Inc., S.E.2d 242, 245 (S.C.1996). As set out above, the arbitration provision provides as follows:
Employee shall pay for the costs of the initial arbitration filing. Employee shall also pay for his/her travel expenses associated with the arbitration, unless it is otherwise determined by the arbitrator. Omni shall pay for any other expenses that Employee would not be required to bear if he/she were free to bring the dispute or claim in court. Each party shall bear its own attorneys' fees, unless otherwise required by law. The arbitration shall take place in New Rochelle, New York, where President, Chief Financial Officer, and human resources team are located. . . .(Doc. 11-1 at 6).
The defendant asserts that the plaintiff's argument is now moot, because it has addressed her concern regarding the cost of arbitration by notifying her that it would waive the provision requiring arbitration to take place in New York and agree to arbitrate in Greenville, South Carolina (docs. 13 at 5; 13-1 at 1). The undersigned agrees. Further, to the extent that the plaintiff argues that having to pay the initial arbitration filing and her attorney's fees is cost-prohibitive, she has failed to state with any particularity the total of these costs, her ability to pay any costs, or the difference between these costs in arbitration as opposed to litigation. See Muriithi v. Shuttle Exp., Inc., 712 F.3d 173, 181 (4th Cir. 2013) ("We analyze issues regarding prohibitive arbitration costs on a case-by-case basis, focusing on a number of factors that include the fees and costs of arbitration, the claimant's ability to pay, the value of the claim, and the difference in cost between arbitration and litigation. . . . [T]he party seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement on this basis bears the substantial burden of showing a likelihood of incurring prohibitive arbitration costs.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The plaintiff additionally argues that the arbitration provision is unconscionable because subsection 10(e) allows the defendant to seek an injunction against an employee but prohibits an employee from having similar rights (doc. 11 at 1314). Subsection 10(e) of the arbitration provision provides as follows:
(e) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the parties may apply to any court of competent jurisdiction for preliminary or interim equitable or injunctive relief, or to compel arbitration in accordance with this Agreement, without breach of this Agreement. Specifically, nothing herein will prevent Omni from obtaining preliminary injunctive relief in a court of law for any violation by Employee of his obligations of Sections 6, 7 or 8.(Doc. 11-1 at 7). The undersigned finds that this subsection is not unconscionable, as it clearly provides that either party may apply to a court for injunctive relief. Moreover, the plaintiff is a trained attorney, and it is well-settled that “a person signing a document is responsible for reading the document and making sure of its contents. Every contracting party owes a duty to the other party to the contract and to the public to learn the contents of a document before [she] signs it.” Carter v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys., Inc., C/A No. 6:17-cv-02457-DCC-JDA, 2018 WL 4560581, at *8 (D.S.C. Mar. 15, 2018) (citations omitted), R&R adopted in relevant part by 2018 WL 3216107 (D.S.C. July 2, 2018); Swanson v. Prof' Serv. Indus., Inc., C/A No. 2:11-cv-2880-RMG-BM, 2012 WL 1130664, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 4, 2012) (“[A]bsent evidence that Plaintiff was willfully misled or misinformed by the Defendant as to the contents of the arbitration agreement, she is deemed to have signed the acknowledgment with full knowledge and assent as to what was contained therein.”), R&R adopted by 2012 WL 1130675 (D.S.C. Apr. 4, 2012).
Stay or Dismissal
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the district court compel arbitration. Further, when an issue in a judicial proceeding is referable to arbitration, the FAA requires the court, upon the motion of a party, to stay the proceedings until that issue is arbitrated. 9 U.S.C. § 3; see EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2001). "[Dismissal is a proper remedy," however, "when all of the issues presented in a lawsuit are arbitrable." Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707, 709-10 (4th Cir. 2001). As all of the issues presented in the plaintiff's complaint are arbitrable, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss the instant action. The defendant also requests that the court issue sanctions in the form of fees and costs associated with bringing its motion to compel (doc. 6-3 at 1). Should the district court adopt the undersigned's recommendation, the undersigned further recommends that the defendant's request for sanctions be denied.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the district court grant the defendant's motion to compel arbitration (doc. 6) and dismiss the instant action. The undersigned further recommends that the defendant's request for sanctions be denied.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).