The Commission may determine that substantial rehabilitation is needed for safe operation without setting forth an approximation of the expenses involved. As was said in Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S. 360, 370, 52 S.Ct. 157, 159, 76 L.Ed. 342, 348 (1932): [I]n the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity the Commission need not determine with mathematical exactness the extent of the burden imposed upon interstate commerce by the operation of a branch line; ... such burden might involve various elements, and ... if upon the whole proof the conclusion was warranted that continued operation would in fact unreasonably burden the interstate commerce of the carrier, the Commission was justified in authorizing abandonment.

The record amply supports the commission's finding that W OD's feeder value is de minimis. While the commission undoubtedly should consider this factor in determining whether abandonment is proper, it need not make a mathematical computation of feeder value when the facts supporting the conclusion that it is slight are apparent. Cf. Transit Commission of State of New York v. United States, 284 U.S. 360, 370, 52 S.Ct. 157, 76 L.Ed. 342 (1932). The plaintiffs challenge the finding of the examiner, adopted by the commission, that the break-even point for the railroad is 12,621 cars per year.

Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 169. As the decisions of this Court plainly indicate, this does not mean that discontinuance is prohibited unless intrastate passenger and freight service considered together show a net loss or overall profits are substantially impaired. Colorado v. United States, supra; Transit Comm'n v. United States, 284 U.S. 360. Rather, freight profits and overall profits are merely factors to be considered by the Commission in determining whether the particular passenger loss constitutes an unjust and undue burden on interstate commerce when balanced against the public need. Such profits may not be the controlling factors but, when presented, they are to be considered.

"We conclude that the continued operation of the applicant's line, even if confined to intrastate commerce, would constitute an undue burden upon interstate commerce." It is no longer open to doubt that where the operation of a railroad line, or a part of a line, vitally affects the revenues of an interstate carrier, the Commission may authorize abandonments not only of the interstate operations but also of the intrastate operations as well. Colorado v. United States, supra; Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S. 360, 52 S.Ct. 157, 76 L.Ed. 342 (1932). While not dealing with railroads, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942), a landmark case, makes this abundantly clear.

"Lack of express data necessary for such adjustments prevents us from making the computations; however, it is inconceivable that any further adjustments could reduce the figures more than $2,000 to $3,000, which would result in losses ranging from $15,000 to $27,000 for the named years." It is well settled that in a railway abandonment case the Commission need not determine with mathematical exactness the extent of the burden imposed upon interstate commerce by the operation of a branch line. Transit Commission of State of New York v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 360, 370, 52 S. Ct. 157, 76 L.Ed. 342. Such a burden may involve various elements and, if the whole proof sustains the conclusion of the Commission that the continued operation would in fact unreasonably burden interstate commerce, such conclusion will stand. Transit Commission v. United States, supra.

(2) However, if the operating losses suffered in rendering the particular local service are grossly disproportionate to the public convenience and necessity in regard to the service in question, then abandonment of such service should be permitted, notwithstanding the fact that the carrier's overall operation is enjoying substantial profits. In general support of this second rule, see Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S. 360, 367, 52 S.Ct. 157, 76 L.Ed 342, and other cases collected in Section 13 of the annotation in 10 A.L.R.2d 1121 at page 1149. Contained in this annotation are the following statements: "The fact that a public utility as a whole has large net earnings and is a profitable enterprise does not automatically deprive the utility of its right to abandon an unprofitable branch line if other circumstances warrant such a step."

"Sole jurisdiction in bankruptcy is by the Constitution lodged in the National Government. That power, when given expression in legislation by Congress is paramount and transcends and supersedes all inconsistent state laws. State of Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 162-166, 46 S.Ct. 452, 70 L.Ed. 878; Transit Commission of State of New York v. United States, 284 U.S. 360, 52 S.Ct. 157, 76 L.Ed. 342; State of New York v. United States, 257 U.S. 591, 42 S.Ct. 239, 66 L.Ed. 385; American Brake Shoe Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., D.C., 10 F. Supp. 512; affirmed, 2 Cir., 76 F.2d 1002, certiorari denied New York City v. Murray, 295 U.S. 760, 55 S.Ct. 923, 79 L.Ed. 1702. "Congress has not thus far attempted to reach the utmost horizon of the power.

The burden upon interstate commerce need not be determined with mathematical exactness. Transit Commission of State of New York v. U.S., 284 U.S. 360, at page 370, 52 S.Ct. 157, at page 159, 76 L.Ed. 342. The evidence showed and the Commission found that freight traffic had decreased on the Owego-Candor segment in the year preceding the hearing.

" Thus, the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which is a "commission or regulating body of the State * * * affected" within the terms of the statute and which participated in the proceedings before the Commission, clearly has standing to maintain this action. See Transit Commission v. United States, 1932, 284 U.S. 360, 52 S.Ct. 157, 76 L.Ed. 342. And since the State controls the Board and ultimately, as parens patriae, is as interested in the proceedings as the Board, the State has the necessary status as a "party in interest" to participate in this action along with its Board of Public Utility Commissioners. See State of Colorado v. United States, 1926, 271 U.S. 153, 46 S.Ct. 452, 70 L.Ed. 878. No challenge has been made to the right of the Transit Committee and Glezen to intervene as plaintiffs and the right of Hoboken and the Railroad to intervene as defendants. Section 2323, 28 U.S.C. provides that "* * * any party or parties in interest to the proceeding before the Commission, in which an order or requirement is made, may appear as parties of their own motion and as of right, * * * in any action involving the validity of such order * * * and the interest of such party" and that "Communities, associations, corporations, firms, and individuals interested in the controversy or question before the Commission, or in any acti

Now there can be no doubt that the Long Island Rail Road is a carrier subject to the Interstate Commerce Act. Transit Commission v. U.S. 1936, 284 U.S. 360, 52 S.Ct. 157, 76 L.Ed. 342; Transit Commission v. U.S. 1933, 289 U.S. 121, 53 S.Ct. 536, 77 L.Ed. 1075. Nor can there be any doubt that if the present application envisages the abandonment of the line, or 'any portion of a line' the relevant statute (supra) places the subject within the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission on the theory that so long as the railroad is subject to the Interstate Commerce Act it is a federal concern that interstate commerce be not burdened by the unreasonable expense of operating at a loss 'any portion of a line' of a railroad.