Texas v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 258 U.S. 204, 213, 217. Considering Texas v. Eastern R. Co., supra, Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, Western Pacific California R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 284 U.S. 47, and Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S. 360, it must be held that appellant is a "party in interest" within the meaning of the statute capable of instituting the present proceeding. The bill disclosed that the proposed and permitted action might directly and adversely affect its welfare by changing the transportation situation.

" In Transit Comm. v. U.S. 284 U.S. 360, 367, 52 S.Ct. 157, 159, 76 L. ed. 181, involving the same statute, the court said: "The finding was that continued operation would result in a serious and increasing depletion of revenue, due to the competition by the city's rapid transit lines and their probable extension, which would entail an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce."

The same principles and the same needs might equally require the building of a new line as the extension of an existing one, unless, indeed, Congress recognized a radical difference between compelling embarkation in a new venture and ordering a mere extension of facilities required as the natural concomitant and complement of those presently used for the rendition of the service to which the carrier has committed itself. See Texas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gulf, C. S.F. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 266, 277; Chesapeake O. Ry. Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 35, 42. Compare Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S. 360. That paragraph 21 refers to the service the carrier has bound itself to render is further emphasized by the omission to make the future public convenience a factor to be considered. A presently existing public need is expressly stated as prerequisite to the compulsory extension of a line.

" Colorado v. United States, supra, p. 165. See Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S. 360, 367, 368; Transit Commission v. United States, 289 U.S. 121, 127; Florida v. United States, ante, p. 1. In the present case, the findings of the Commission, setting forth undisputed facts, leave no doubt that the provision of the lease permitting the abandonment, or removal from the State, of general offices and shops of the lessor has direct relation to economy and efficiency in interstate operations and to the achievement of the purpose which the Congress had in view in its grant of authority.

We think without it the Commission might find that the short branch of the Raquette Lake Railway, which always showed a large deficit in operation, has lost 50 per cent. of its former business and is now paralleled by a state road, traversed by automobiles and buses, should be abandoned without any improper sacrifice of public convenience. State of Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 46 S. Ct. 452, 70 L. Ed. 878; Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S. 360, 52 S. Ct. 157, 76 L. Ed. 342; United States Feldspar Corporation v. United States (D.C.) 38 F.2d 91. It must be remembered that testimony as to loss people may suffer from a change in their habits of doing business is likely to present an exaggerated picture and that the seriousness and extent of such loss was a matter wholly for the decision of the Commission. The findings of the Commission made after a fair hearing are conclusive, and the courts will not weigh the evidence nor consider the wisdom of its action.

The difference between the engineering and traffic considerations for making a highway safe and convenient for commercial business thereon, and a legitimate exercise of the police power, has been recognized in several recent cases. Chicago N.W. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 205 Wis. 506; Sidney v. Wabash Ry. Co., 333 Ill. 126; In re Elimination of Grade Crossings, 124 Ohio St. 406; Transit Comm'n v. United States, 284 U.S. 360; Chicago, St. P., M. O. Ry. Co. v. Holmberg, 282 U.S. 162. This Court and state courts have, in the past, frequently held that a railroad could be required to separate a grade crossing at its sole expense.

The rates thus fixed are, therefore, regulated by a competent tribunal. There is no delegation of legislative authority, for the rate prescribed is one not dependent upon schedules filed by another railroad corporation as in Washington, P. C. Ry. Co. v. Magruder (198 Fed. 218); but upon the rates fixed by a commission to which authority has been legally delegated, and to which defendant has heretofore resorted for relief. ( Transit Commission v. U.S., 284 U.S. 360.) The rates thus fixed may not be changed except by legal authority. Under the authority exercised by the Interstate Commerce Commission the defendant has enjoyed for sixteen years a rate in excess of that fixed by the laws of this State. Now the power to fix rates as to this defendant has again become vested in the State and the existing laws are effective. The method adopted of fixing the rates was not, on its face, illegal or invalid. ( People v. Fire Association of Philadelphia, 92 N.Y. 311; affd., 119 U.S. 110.) The statute on its face is not invalid because it constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable classification and is discriminatory; nor does it otherwise deny to defendant the equal protection of the laws. Its constitutionality will be presumed until such time as on a trial it shall be declared invalid as confiscatory, or proof shall be made that the rates fixed are in fact arbitrary and unreasonable.

No more cogent is the argument that a line must be considered by the Commission as a whole on a question of abandonment merely because the entire line has been constructed under the franchise of a single charter. In Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S. 360, 52 S.Ct. 157, 76 L.Ed. 342, the Supreme Court expressly approved an order permitting the abandonment of a portion of a line; and a similar order was approved in United States Feldspar Corporation v. United States, D.C., 38 F.2d 91, 94. In the case last cited Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the special court of three judges, said: "In the case at bar the railway continued upon the remainder of its line to carry on interstate commerce.

When Congress occupies the field it precludes all inconsistent state regulation, unless specific reservations of state powers are made. Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 162-166; Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S. 360; and see New York v. United States, 257 U.S. 360; American Brake Shoe Foundry Co. v. I.R.T., 10 F. Supp. 512; affirmed, 76 F.2d 1002, cert. denied, New York City v. Murray, 295 U.S. 760. The power of an equity court to protect property in its custody, In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164; Wabash Railroad v. Adelbert College, 208 U.S. 94, was recognized in cases under the Bankruptcy Act prior to the enactment of § 77. Murphy v. Hofman Co., 211 U.S. 562; Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie T. Co., 282 U.S. 734. Compare Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U.S. 610; Continental Bank v. Rock Island Ry., 294 U.S. 648; Board of Directors St. Francis Levee Dist. v. Kurn, 91 F.2d 118; 98 F.2d 394; Crawford v. Duluth Street Ry. Co., 60 F. 212; Iowa v. Old Colony Trust Co., 215 F. 307.

In reaching its determination on this issue it is not necessary that the Commission "determine with mathematical exactness the extent of the burden imposed upon interstate commerce by the operation of a branch line." Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S. 360, at page 370, 52 S. Ct. 157, at page 159, 76 L.Ed. 342. Rather the Act contemplates that the Commission shall make a considered balance of the respective conflicting interests, its "effort being to decide what fairness to all concerned demands." Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 46 S.Ct. 452, 456, 70 L.Ed. 878.