Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 169. As the decisions of this Court plainly indicate, this does not mean that discontinuance is prohibited unless intrastate passenger and freight service considered together show a net loss or overall profits are substantially impaired. Colorado v. United States, supra; Transit Comm'n v. United States, 284 U.S. 360. Rather, freight profits and overall profits are merely factors to be considered by the Commission in determining whether the particular passenger loss constitutes an unjust and undue burden on interstate commerce when balanced against the public need. Such profits may not be the controlling factors but, when presented, they are to be considered.

The power of the Commission to control the abandonment of intrastate branches of interstate carriers stems from the power of Congress to protect interstate commerce from undue burdens or discriminations. Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153; Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S. 360; Purcell v. United States, 315 U.S. 381. And see United States v. Hubbard, 266 U.S. 474, for an application of the doctrine of the Shreveport case ( Houston, E. W.T.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342) to the intrastate rates of interurban electric railroads. The exemptions contained in § 1 (22) do not necessarily reflect the lack of constitutional power to deal with the excepted phases of railroad enterprise.

Clear recognition that "public convenience and necessity" includes the consideration of effects on the national transportation system of a proposed abandonment appears in the decision of this Court in Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153. There, Mr. Justice Brandeis, although stating that "public convenience and necessity" was the sole criterion for determining whether or not an abandonment should be allowed, nevertheless considered the effect of the proposed abandonment in a much broader sphere than the immediate locality and population served by the trackage to be abandoned. See also Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S. 360. And if national interests are to be considered in connection with an abandonment, there is nothing in the Act to indicate that the national interest in purely financial stability is to be determinative while the national interest in the stability of the labor supply available to the railroads is to be disregarded. On the contrary, the Lowden case recognizes that the unstabilizing effects of displacing labor without protection might be prejudicial to the orderly and efficient operation of the national railroad system.

When Congress occupies the field it precludes all inconsistent state regulation, unless specific reservations of state powers are made. Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 162-166; Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S. 360; and see New York v. United States, 257 U.S. 360; American Brake Shoe Foundry Co. v. I.R.T., 10 F. Supp. 512; affirmed, 76 F.2d 1002, cert. denied, New York City v. Murray, 295 U.S. 760. The power of an equity court to protect property in its custody, In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164; Wabash Railroad v. Adelbert College, 208 U.S. 94, was recognized in cases under the Bankruptcy Act prior to the enactment of § 77. Murphy v. Hofman Co., 211 U.S. 562; Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie T. Co., 282 U.S. 734. Compare Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U.S. 610; Continental Bank v. Rock Island Ry., 294 U.S. 648; Board of Directors St. Francis Levee Dist. v. Kurn, 91 F.2d 118; 98 F.2d 394; Crawford v. Duluth Street Ry. Co., 60 F. 212; Iowa v. Old Colony Trust Co., 215 F. 307.

The difference between the engineering and traffic considerations for making a highway safe and convenient for commercial business thereon, and a legitimate exercise of the police power, has been recognized in several recent cases. Chicago N.W. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 205 Wis. 506; Sidney v. Wabash Ry. Co., 333 Ill. 126; In re Elimination of Grade Crossings, 124 Ohio St. 406; Transit Comm'n v. United States, 284 U.S. 360; Chicago, St. P., M. O. Ry. Co. v. Holmberg, 282 U.S. 162. This Court and state courts have, in the past, frequently held that a railroad could be required to separate a grade crossing at its sole expense.

" Colorado v. United States, supra, p. 165. See Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S. 360, 367, 368; Transit Commission v. United States, 289 U.S. 121, 127; Florida v. United States, ante, p. 1. In the present case, the findings of the Commission, setting forth undisputed facts, leave no doubt that the provision of the lease permitting the abandonment, or removal from the State, of general offices and shops of the lessor has direct relation to economy and efficiency in interstate operations and to the achievement of the purpose which the Congress had in view in its grant of authority.

The same principles and the same needs might equally require the building of a new line as the extension of an existing one, unless, indeed, Congress recognized a radical difference between compelling embarkation in a new venture and ordering a mere extension of facilities required as the natural concomitant and complement of those presently used for the rendition of the service to which the carrier has committed itself. See Texas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gulf, C. S.F. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 266, 277; Chesapeake O. Ry. Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 35, 42. Compare Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S. 360. That paragraph 21 refers to the service the carrier has bound itself to render is further emphasized by the omission to make the future public convenience a factor to be considered. A presently existing public need is expressly stated as prerequisite to the compulsory extension of a line.

Texas v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 258 U.S. 204, 213, 217. Considering Texas v. Eastern R. Co., supra, Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, Western Pacific California R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 284 U.S. 47, and Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S. 360, it must be held that appellant is a "party in interest" within the meaning of the statute capable of instituting the present proceeding. The bill disclosed that the proposed and permitted action might directly and adversely affect its welfare by changing the transportation situation.

"Sole jurisdiction in bankruptcy is by the Constitution lodged in the National Government. That power, when given expression in legislation by Congress is paramount and transcends and supersedes all inconsistent state laws. State of Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 162-166, 46 S.Ct. 452, 70 L.Ed. 878; Transit Commission of State of New York v. United States, 284 U.S. 360, 52 S.Ct. 157, 76 L.Ed. 342; State of New York v. United States, 257 U.S. 591, 42 S.Ct. 239, 66 L.Ed. 385; American Brake Shoe Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., D.C., 10 F. Supp. 512; affirmed, 2 Cir., 76 F.2d 1002, certiorari denied New York City v. Murray, 295 U.S. 760, 55 S.Ct. 923, 79 L.Ed. 1702. "Congress has not thus far attempted to reach the utmost horizon of the power.

' Even explicit charter provisions must yield to the paramount regulatory power of the Congress. State of New York v. United States, 257 U.S. 591, 601, 42 S.Ct. 239, 66 L.Ed. 385. Obligations assumed by the corporation under its charter of providing intrastate service are subordinate to the performance by it of its federal duty, also assumed, `efficiently to render transportation services in interstate commerce.' Colorado v. United States, supra, 271 U.S. at page 165, 46 S.Ct. at page 455, 70 L.Ed. 878. See Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S. 360, 367, 368, 52 S.Ct. 157, 76 L.Ed. 342; Transit Commission v. United States, 289 U.S. 121, 127, 53 S.Ct. 536, 77 L.Ed. 1075; State of Florida v. United States, 292 U.S. 1, 54 S.Ct. 603, 78 L.Ed. 1077. "* * * As thus construed, we find no ground for concluding that the approval of the provision in the lease was beyond the Commission's authority. There is no interference with the supervision of the state over the lessor in matters essentially of state concern, as distinguished from the operations which in their effect upon interstate commerce are of national concern."