ing of wells since mutual right of control was essential element for joint venture under Texas law); Blocker Exploration Co. v. Frontier Exploration, Inc., 740 P.2d 983, 988 (Colo. 1987) (no joint venture where nonoperating working interest owner merely invested funds and enjoyed right to receive data, to elect whether to continue participation and to have access to the site where there was no right of participation in management and control of operation); Archer v. Bill Pearl Drilling Co., Inc., 655 S.W.2d 338, 344 (Tex.App. 1983) (no joint venture in negligence action as a matter of law where proof showed that working interest owner merely invested in venture but exercised no right to participate in control or operation of drill site); Ayco Dev. Corp. v. G.E.T. Serv. Co., 616 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex. 1981) (no joint venture where proof merely showed that defendants invested by paying costs of drilling well but did not participate in actual drilling, operation and control of the well); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Mr. Charlie, 294 F. Supp. 1025, 1031 (E.D.La. 1968) (oil company could not recover from nonoperators where proof showed that operator, but not nonoperators, was negligent), rev'd on other grounds, 424 F.2d 684 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832, 91 S.Ct. 65, 27 L.Ed.2d 64 (1970); McAnally v. Cochran, 170 Okl. 368, 46 P.2d 955, 957 (1935) (no mining partnership where exclusive control over well was with operator who never consulted coowners about employing labor and purchasing materials). There being no evidence to support a joint venture, any negligence of the operator cannot be imputed to Burns on a theory of joint venture.
It follows that such an ambiguous contractual provision must be construed against the party which drafted the agreement (Rowan). Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Mobile Drilling Barge MR. CHARLIE, 294 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D.La. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd on other grounds, 424 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1970). Accordingly, the Court is unable to find that Sun Oil failed to fulfill its contractual duty to provide Rowan with a "guidepath" and access to the drilling site.
Where the master of the tug and owners of the barge, through her employees, were both guilty of negligence and the fault of each was a direct legal cause of the personal injuries sustained by Brown as well as the physical damage to the barge, contribution is allowed and damages may be equally divided. Horton v. Dyer, 428 F.2d 1131 (CA5-1970); Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (CA5-1970); Bilkay Holding Corp. v. Consol. Iron Metal Co., Inc., 330 F. Supp. 1313 (S.D.N.Y.-1971); See Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Mobile Drilling Barge or Vessel Mr. Charlie, 294 F. Supp. 1025 (D.C.), rev. 424 F.2d 684 (CA5-1970): White Oak Transp. Co. v. Boston, Cape Cod New York Canal Co., 258 U.S. 341, 42 S.Ct. 338, 66 L.Ed. 649 (1922). X.