Opinion
LLIFA094008129
02-28-2017
Peter Tranquillo v. Tonya Tranquillo
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF'S POSTJUDGMENT MOTION FOR ORDER (#292) PLAINTIFF'S POSTJUDGMENT MOTION FOR CONTEMPT (#294) DEFENDANT'S POSTJUDGMENT MOTION FOR SOLE LEGAL CUSTODY (#295) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION (#299)
Kari A. Dooley, Judge.
Preliminary Statement
The parties' marriage was dissolved on September 14, 2011. The terms of their Separation Agreement were incorporated into the judgment of dissolution. The judgment included the provisions of a previously approved Custody and Parenting Plan dated July 28, 2011. Therein, the plaintiff was awarded sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the parties' three minor children. The defendant was given parenting time each week as well as every other weekend. Presently before the court are the following: (1) Plaintiff's Post Judgment Motion for Order in which he seeks, inter alia, an order that the defendant participate in individual counseling in an effort to improve her communication and co-parenting skills; (2) Plaintiff's Motion for Contempt arising out of the defendant's failure to adhere to various of this court's prior orders; (3) Defendant's Motion for Sole Legal Custody, or in the alternative, joint legal custody; and (4) Plaintiff's Motion to Modify in which he seeks an order regarding the minor children's attendance at summer camp for 2017 and into the future. A hearing on these motions was conducted over two days on December 8, 2016 and December 21, 2016. The court has reviewed the testimony of the witnesses, the documents submitted, the applicable statutory and appellate court authority and renders this decision based thereupon.
The motion was amended orally to include this alternative form of relief.
The court has reviewed and takes judicial notice of the content of this voluminous file. See, O'Connor v. Larocque, 302 Conn. 562, 568 n.6, 31 A.3d 1 (2011) (court records may be judicially noticed for their existence, content and legal effect).
While this high conflict dissolution action was pending, the court made a referral to Family Services for a full custody evaluation and recommendation. Although the plaintiff was in favor of a path to effective co-parenting, due largely to the defendant's inability to co-parent in a responsible and respectful manner, the recommendation from Family Services was that the plaintiff be awarded sole legal and physical custody of the three minor children. The defendant's anger and emotions regarding the divorce were deemed to be the source of her inability to appropriately or effectively co-parent. In addition, the recommendation included an observation that the defendant persisted in sharing adult issues with the minor children. The Family Services recommendation was accepted by the parties and became the basis of the July 28, 2011 Custody and Parenting Plan, which in turn was incorporated into the September 2011 dissolution judgment. Therein, the defendant was given parenting time each week on Thursdays and every other weekend. The judgment ordered that neither party would disparage the other or behave in such a fashion as to undermine the other parent's relationship with the minor children. The judgment further provided that neither party " shall discuss adult issues with the children or issues that relate to this divorce."
The Recommendation portion of the Family Services evaluation was attached to the July 28, 2011 Custody and Parenting Plan.
The court file reflects that, postjudgment, the parties' conflicts persisted on a variety of issues, all resulting in additional court involvement. The nature and outcome of those disputes are not germane to the present motions.
On June 2, 2014, the defendant filed a postjudgment motion for sole legal custody. Therein, she made a series of allegations regarding the plaintiff's conduct summarized as follows: (1) the plaintiff failed to advise the defendant of an orthodontic appointment; (2) the plaintiff is not responsive or cooperative in communicating with the defendant regarding the children; (3) the children's living arrangements are not appropriate; (4) a social worker had recommended one of the children for therapy and the defendant failed to inform the defendant and refused to allow the therapy; (5) plaintiff has moved around a lot; (6) plaintiff makes disparaging comments to the children about the defendant. This motion resulted in an agreement dated September 9, 2014. The court accepted the agreement and made it an order of the court. In essence, the agreement was another attempt to pursue effective co-parenting with an eye towards, eventually, a modification to joint legal custody of the three minor children. The Order provides in pertinent part:
1. Co-Parenting Counseling
The parties shall attend regular co-parenting counseling sessions, mutually agreed upon by the parties' attorneys, to address and attempt to resolve their communication issues regarding the children. The parties shall also use these sessions to discuss concerns about involving the children in adult issues, the disparagement of one party by the other or by third parties in front of the children and concerns as to the children's contact with certain third parties, including but not limited to Plaintiff's ex-girlfriend.
Each parent shall actively participate in the sessions, with the goal of establishing a respectful and lasting co-parenting relationship, the nature of which would facilitate a joint legal custody arrangement in the future . . .
The Order contemplated a nightly telephone call between the children and the non-custodial parent between 5 p.m. and 7 p.m. The defendant's parenting time was increased to include an additional weekday overnight. The defendant agreed that she would not leave the children in any third party's care without the plaintiff's consent. The Order required that each party list the other as the emergency contact on any forms or documents associated with the children's school or extracurricular activities. The Order included an acknowledgement that the defendant is entitled to information from any physician, dentist, consultant or specialist attending to the children and that she would be furnished reports provided by same. The defendant was also to have unfettered access to information from the school.
Lastly, the Order provided: " The parties shall report back to the Court in six months from this agreement, on March 13, 2015, for the purpose of reviewing the parties' progress in their co-parenting efforts and progress in moving forward a joint legal custody arrangement in the future."
In July 2015, following a June 25, 2015 status conference, and at the request of the court (Gallagher, J.T.R), the parties filed a joint status memorandum " re Defendant's post judgment motion for modification of custody." The parties advised the court that " the parties continue to struggle in being able to communicate productively or reach agreement on several routine matters concerning their three minor children." The parties requested a pretrial for the " purpose of making one final attempt at resolution in the matter, and if not possible, to set trial dates." The conflict persisted.
On October 30, 2015, the plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Order, Postjudgment (#292) in which he seeks an order that the defendant " immediately comply with the recommendations as set forth in the co-parenting counselor's written report, dated July 1, 2015" and that she provide an " appropriate and reliable means by which Plaintiff can correspond with her in matters regarding the children to ensure timely response (within twenty-four (24) hours)."
On December 18, 2015, the plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Contempt, Postjudgment in which he alleges, inter alia, that the defendant subjected the children to the issues surrounding the custody dispute; that the defendant continuously left the children in the care of third parties without the plaintiff's consent; that the defendant took the children on her school bus at times when the children were too sick to attend school; that the defendant has thwarted the plaintiff's nightly phone call; that the defendant does not consistently or reliably respond to the plaintiff's communications; that the defendant unreasonably withholds consent to extracurricular activities in order to avoid paying for same; and that the defendant did not pay her proportionate share of pre-existing extracurricular activities. The plaintiff seeks a finding of contempt, costs, attorneys fees, remedial orders and an order reinstating the original parenting plan dated July 28, 2011 and incorporated into the judgment of dissolution on September 14, 2011.
The defendant is employed as a school bus driver.
On January 6, 2016, the defendant filed the instant Postjudgment Motion for Sole Legal Custody of Minor Children. Therein, she alleges that the plaintiff has made orthodontic appointments for one or both of the children without informing the defendant; that the plaintiff would not give permission to enroll the children in a summer reading program; that the plaintiff continues to communicate with the defendant in a manner he knows is not likely to be received by the defendant in a timely fashion; that the plaintiff is impossible to work with regarding the children; that the plaintiff encumbers her ability to see or talk to the children at sporting or other public events; that the plaintiff failed to advise the defendant that a social worker had recommended therapy for one of the children; that the plaintiff abuses his position as the sole legal guardian to punish the defendant out of anger.
The instant motion is very similar to the defendant's June 2014 Motion for Sole Legal Custody. It is unclear whether the June 2014 motion was ever adjudicated and therefore whether this motion was even necessary. In any event, this decision addresses all outstanding issues.
As a result of the filing of these motions, the court referred the parties to Family Services for Intensive Case Management on January 28, 2016. On May 5, 2016, the referral was extended for an additional three months.
On June 30, 2016, the plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Modification (#299) along with an Ex Parte Emergency Request for Temporary Custody, in which he alleges that the defendant interfered with the children's attendance at sleepover summer camp. The plaintiff sought, and was granted, an ex parte order that the defendant not interfere with the children's attendance at their respective summer camps. On the date of the scheduled hearing, the parties entered into an agreement which resolved the remaining 2016 summer camp issues. The only remaining issue with respect to the Motion for Modification is the question of summer camp for 2017 and into the future.
Hearing dates for all of these outstanding motions were set and the court referred the matter to Family Services with a case management request: an update on the children's adjustment to the current parenting plan as well as a review of their academic progress. As indicated above, the hearing took place over the course of two days on December 8, 2016 and December 21, 2016.
The court does not attempt to include in this decision all of the evidence relied upon in the court's factual findings. The court has considered all of the evidence admitted and the reference to any subset of the evidence presented should not be construed as identifying the exclusive basis for the court's finding. Nor should the court's failure to identify or mention specific evidence give rise to an inference that such evidence has not been considered.
The court makes the following factual findings by a fair preponderance of the evidence unless otherwise stated.
A. The Children
The parties have three minor children, Ashlyn, Brayden and Clarissa, ages 12, 10 and 9. The children spend every other weekend with the defendant and every Wednesday and Thursday with the defendant. This shared parenting plan has been in place since September 9, 2014.
Gail Anderson, a Family Services Officer was assigned the task of assessing the children's adjustment to the current parenting plan as well as the children's academic progress. Her testimony was not challenged by either party and is credited in its entirety. Despite the parents' ongoing issues, the children are doing well. Each is doing well academically and their respective schools reported no concerns regarding the children, academically, socially or behaviorally.
Ms. Anderson was also able to meet with the children individually. Each reported that they like the current parenting plan. Brayden voiced his concern that the defendant does not always want to drive them to their games and practices during her parenting time and that he sometimes has to encourage her to do so. This concern was borne out by the evidence. The defendant admitted that for the Spring 2015 lacrosse season, she did not take the children to any of their practices or games if they fell during her parenting time. Her testimony that this was due to scheduling conflicts was not credible. She has improved in this area but she still resists taking the children to events for which they were enrolled by the plaintiff if they fall during her parenting time. On the issue of summer camp, the girls like the camp and expressed disappointment that they had not been able to attend the weeks that they had wanted.
In summary, the present custodial arrangement is working well for the children.
B. Post September 9, 2014 Events
Following the entry of the September 9, 2014 Order, the parties engaged a therapist, Stacy Caren, to assist with the co-parenting counseling. Early on, unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the defendant and the three minor children attended a therapy session with Caren. The plaintiff's testimony that he was not advised about this session, never consented to have the children participate in therapy with Caren, and would never have permitted such a session to occur, is credited. From the evidence presented, the court infers that the defendant arranged this session during her parenting time without the plaintiff's knowledge. First, that the defendant would want the therapist to meet with the children is consistent with the defendant's well documented persistence in involving the children in the parents' conflicts. Further, it is unlikely that a co-parenting counselor would need to speak to the children at issue or initiate a therapeutic session with the children at issue. In addition, the defendant's testimony that she overheard the therapist tell the plaintiff about the session is not credible. It was confusing, contradictory, improbable and it changed minute to minute during her testimony. Conversely, the court credits the plaintiff's testimony that he would never have permitted the children to attend such a therapy session had he been advised about it.
As a result, the plaintiff terminated Caren. The parties then engaged in co-parenting counseling with Chistine Downs, a marriage and family therapist. Ms. Downs engaged the parties in her five-week co-parenting curriculum. The parties had the benefit of all five sessions at which various topics and goals were identified and discussed. Both parents presented as wanting to overcome their communication issues so as to be better parents to their children. Unfortunately, as noted by Ms. Downs in her final recommendations, " [b]oth clients agreed at the final session that no progress had been made during the 5 weeks on their communication or co-parenting skills." (Emphasis added.)
Ms. Downs recommended that the parties continue co-parenting counseling with a more intensive curriculum that focuses on high-conflict individuals. Ms. Downs also recommended that the defendant engage in individual counseling to work on the ability to separate her emotions from her communication. The parties did not engage in further co-parenting counseling. The defendant has not pursued the recommended individual counseling. Her testimony that she does not recall receiving such a recommendation was not credible.
The court heard testimony and received into evidence many emails and text messages regarding the communication problems that continue to persist. The emails and/or text messages from the defendant are often self-serving, challenging, demanding, and unrelenting. Similarly, the plaintiff's communication can be harsh and/or dismissive. However, there were plenty of communications which were cordial and appropriate. Both parties could clearly do better. Neither party claims that the communication issues have been resolved.
Turning to the other allegations and complaints about the plaintiff, the court finds that they do not withstand scrutiny. This is largely due to the court's determination that much of the defendant's testimony was not reliable or credible. Although the defendant testified that the plaintiff routinely books medical appointments for the kids without advising her, the evidence does not support her testimony. To the contrary, there was ample evidence that the plaintiff does notify the defendant of appointments as well as their outcome when she does not attend. Nor was there evidence to support her assertion that the plaintiff impedes her access to the children's medical or educational information. For example, she testified that school personnel have refused to provide her with information and do not talk to her because the plaintiff told them not to provide her with information regarding the children. However, when pressed for details, she was vague on dates, times or locations. Eventually, she identified only one time that she was told she would " have to go through Pete" but she could not recall where, when, or on which issue she was given this directive. On cross examination, the defendant admitted that the one time she was turned away was at Brayden's school when she unilaterally tried to have Brayden's teacher changed without the plaintiff's knowledge. The court also credits the plaintiff's testimony that he has never tried to restrict the defendant's access to either educational or medical information.
On a different issue, involving a medical situation with Clarissa, her testimony changed dramatically between December 8, 2016 and December 21, 2016. On December 8, she testified that when Clarissa complained of pain and discomfort, because the children were to return to the plaintiff's care the next day, she simply told Clarissa to tell her father if it continued. She further testified that she did not notify the plaintiff because she did not see the need. She did not recall whether Clarissa went to the doctor or what the diagnosis may have been. She testified that she did not hear anything and did not follow up. However, on December 21, 2016, the defendant testified that she notified the plaintiff of Clarissa's complaint. She testified that she did follow up; she went to Clarissa's doctor appointment and thereafter called the lab to get the test results. She acknowledged that she was able to participate on such a level because the plaintiff kept her advised of the situation.
This testimony is contradicted by the electronic communications between the parties and is not credited.
Finally, during her testimony, the defendant parsed words and argued with plaintiff's counsel to avoid making admissions which might be viewed as unfavorable to her. At other times, she simply would not answer the question asked. Her testimony was replete with contradictions and demonstrably false statements. With this myriad of reasons to question the accuracy of her testimony, it is clear to the court that the defendant is not a reliable or credible historian.
The court also received evidence regarding the defendant's unwillingness to agree to extracurricular activities requested by the children and/or suggested by the plaintiff. She has, in large measure, refused to agree to any such activities, to include youth lacrosse, youth basketball and gymnastics. As a result, the plaintiff has borne the full expense of these activities. The defendant claims that she is not given timely notice; that the activities impede her parenting time; that the children want to do other things during her parenting time; or that her agreement is meaningless insofar as the plaintiff has sole legal custody of the children and he does not need her agreement. The evidence does not support her timeliness claim, nor her claim that the children prefer to do other things during her parenting time. Her other " reasons" are more akin to excuses. By consistently refusing to agree to extracurricular activities, activities chosen by the children, the defendant is able to place the entire financial burden for these chosen activities on the plaintiff. This, in turn, further strains their relationship.
Lastly, the court heard testimony and received evidence regarding the children's attendance at sleepover camps in the summer of 2016. In the summer of 2015, the children were able to attend sleepover camp on scholarship. The camp sessions would cost thousands of dollars otherwise and would likely be beyond the financial means of the parties to provide. The children enjoyed the camps immensely. As a result, in October 2015, when the plaintiff learned that scholarship participation would be available for 2016, he signed the children up. On October 26, 2015 the camp addressed an email confirmation of Ashlyn and Clarissa's registration to the plaintiff and the defendant. Unfortunately, the email was not sent to the defendant but was sent to the plaintiff's current spouse. Therefore, at that juncture, the plaintiff erroneously believed that the defendant was aware of the summer 2016 camp schedule.
In April 2016, the defendant learned of the children's enrollment in camp. In June 2016, the conflict between the defendant's parenting time and the children's enrollment in the camps came to the fore. The defendant would not agree to the children's participation at the sleepover camps as scheduled. Although the parties were engaged in Intensive Case Management with Family Services, no agreement was reached regarding the camp schedule. As a result, the defendant went to the camp and took the children (with their belongings) out of camp because her parenting time overlapped with the camp sessions in which the children were enrolled. The children were upset by these events. The court issued an ex parte order that the defendant return the children to camp and that she not further disrupt their camp sessions.
Discussion
Defendant's Motion for Sole Legal Custody or Alternatively, Joint Legal Custody
" The court has continuing jurisdiction over a custody decree . . . and the noncustodial parent retains the option to move to modify custody based on a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the children." Cookson v. Cookson, 201 Conn. 229, 236, 514 A.2d 323 (1986). However, the parties and the minor children have an interest in the finality of judgments which arises upon the entry of a custody order incident to a final dissolution decree. Hall v. Hall, 186 Conn. 118, 122-23, 439 A.2d 447 (1982). Therefore, " '[f]irst, modification of a custody award [must] be based upon either a material change of circumstances which alters the court's finding of the best interests of the child . . . or a finding that the custody order sought to be modified was not based upon the best interests of the child.' . . . Second, 'the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so may consider' several factors. General Statutes § 46b-56(c)." (Internal citations omitted.) Harris v. Hamilton, 141 Conn.App. 208, 219, 61 A.3d 542 (2013). A finding of a material change in circumstances must be based on circumstances that have arisen since the previous order of custody. Simons v. Simons, 172 Conn. 341, 342-43, 374 A.2d 1040 (1977). Finally, our appellate courts have made it clear that when determining the custody of minor children the ultimate test the court must apply is the best interests of the child. See e.g., Cookson v. Cookson, 201 Conn. 229, 241, 514 A.2d 323 (1986). In determining the best interests of the children, the court is also guided by the factors set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56(c).
With the above facts found, and with these principles in mind, the defendant's motion is denied. The defendant has not demonstrated any substantial change in circumstances. Indeed, to the contrary, it appears to the court that, unfortunately, there has been very little change in circumstances. These parties still cannot effectively co-parent their three minor children. By their own acknowledgment, there was " no progress" in their communication after five sessions with the co-parenting counselor. The hurdle to progress still appears to be the defendant's inability to change the manner in which she interacts with the plaintiff.
Nor would it be in the best interests of the children, to award the defendant either sole legal custody or joint legal custody. The defendant asserts that if the court awards the parties joint legal custody, they would be forced to communicate and co-parent in a responsible and hopefully respectful fashion. The court has little hope that giving the defendant additional legal rights with respect to the children will change the dynamic of the parties' interactions. To the contrary, such a decision would likely thrust these children into utter chaos because it would breathe new life into the parties' conflicts and dysfunction.
Finally, the court reiterates a finding made above--notwithstanding the issues which persist, the children like the current situation. The children are doing well academically and are, by all accounts, thriving under the present custodial arrangement.
Plaintiff's Motion for Order (#292)
The plaintiff seeks an order that the defendant engage in individual counseling as recommended by the co-parenting counselor and that the defendant provide a reliable means by which she can be reached for purposes of providing a timely response per the September 9, 2014 Order. As to the latter, this issue arose out of the defendant's claim that her email was not functioning properly. The testimony established that this issue was resolved during the Intensive Case Management.
However, the September 9, 2014 Order contemplated that the parties would communicate primarily through SquareHub. There was evidence that this was not a viable system of communication. The parties therefore opted for either email or texting. In order to minimize the potential for future miscommunication (and claims that the other parent is non-responsive), the court ORDERS as follows:
The parties shall communicate regarding routine matters involving the children through email. For those communications which request a response, the response shall be made within 24 hours. For more time sensitive communications, i.e. one of the children is home sick from school, the parties shall communicate via text messaging. The parties may, by agreement, communicate using alternative means and methods.
As to that portion of the motion which seeks an order that the defendant engage in individual counseling so as to assist her in separating her emotions from her communications, the motion is denied. While the defendant would likely benefit from such counseling, a court mandate at this juncture is not appropriate in light of the rulings made herein.
Plaintiff's Motion for Contempt (#294)
Contempt is a disobedience to the rules and orders of a court which has the power to punish for such an offense. Wilson v. Cohen, 222 Conn. 591, 596 n.5., 610 A.2d 1177 (1992). Before a determination of civil contempt may be made, the movant must demonstrate that there exists a clear court order proscribing the conduct under scrutiny. Dowd v. Dowd, 96 Conn.App. 75, 79, 899 A.2d 76 (first inquiry on review of judgment of contempt for failure to abide by separation agreement was whether agreement was clear and unambiguous), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 907, 907 A.2d 89 (2006); McCarthy v. Custom Design Services, Inc. 126 Conn.App. 274, 280, 11 A.3d 1094 (2011) (Civil contempt is committed when a person violates an order of court which requires that person in specific and definite language to do or refrain from doing an act or series of acts). However, " noncompliance alone will not support a judgment of contempt." Prial v. Prial, 67 Conn.App. 7, 787 A.2d 50 (2001). " A court may not find a person in contempt without considering the circumstances surrounding the violation to determine whether such violation was willful." Wilson v. Wilson, 38 Conn.App. 263, 275-76, 661 A.2d 621 (1995). Willful contempt must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Brody v. Brody, 315 Conn. 300, 316, 105 A.3d 887 (2015).
Judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings may be used to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court's order, to compensate the complainant for losses resulting from the contempt or both. DeMartino v. Monroe Little League, Inc., 192 Conn. 271, 278, 471 A.2d 638 (1984). Even in the absence of a finding of contempt, the court has broad discretion to make whole any party who has sustained a loss as a result of another party's failure to comply with the court's orders. Nelson v. Nelson, 13 Conn.App. 355, 367, 536 A.2d 985 (1988).
The plaintiff seeks a finding of contempt based upon the defendant's non-responsiveness to multiple communications regarding the children; her continued involvement of the children in the parental conflict and issues; her false claim that her email was not working properly; her use of third-party caregivers without the defendant's consent; her obstruction of the plaintiff's nightly phone call with the children; and her unreasonable withholding of consent for extracurricular activities.
The plaintiff did not offer evidence as to this particular ground for contempt.
The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant would oft times ignore inquiries from the plaintiff regarding the children, on a variety of topics. This is part and parcel of the defendant's inability to communicate effectively and cooperatively. Even the existence of the agreed-upon court order did little or nothing to change this dynamic. On this issue, the agreement provides: " The parties shall communicate on all routine matters regarding the children via Square Hub phone application or a like service and shall give each other a reasonable amount of time to respond, but such time should not exceed twenty-four hours." This provision is not so clear and unambiguous as to be a basis for a contempt finding on these facts. The order does not require a response within twenty-four hours. It appears to limit the inquiring party from acting too precipitously and there is an implication that a reasonable and timely response is expected, i.e. within twenty-four hours. It does not however make such a response an order of the court. As to this basis, the motion for contempt is therefore denied.
This is further support for the court's earlier conclusion that a joint legal custody award would not result in any improvement in terms of how the parties communicate and co-parent.
The evidence further supports the inference that the defendant was deceitful when she claimed that her email was not functioning properly, thereby aggravating the already difficult communications with the plaintiff. First, she was able to immediately solve the situation when told during Intensive Case Management that she would have to pay for MyFamilyWizard unless her email became operational. Second, there was evidence that she was using her email and receiving emails in other contexts during the time period she claimed it was not operating properly. Third, her testimony was generally not credible and she has demonstrated herself to be a deceitful person when it advances her position in the ongoing conflicts with the plaintiff. While the court finds these allegations proven for the reasons stated, they are proven only by a fair preponderance of the evidence. On this issue, the evidence was not clear and convincing. As to this basis, the motion for contempt is therefore denied.
The plaintiff also seeks a finding of contempt for the defendant's arranging and participating in a joint therapy session with the children and Caren, the first co-parenting counselor. The plaintiff relies upon " existing custody orders that the parties are not to subject the children to adult matters relating to custody disputes." The agreement incorporated into the judgment of dissolution provides as follows: " Neither parent shall discuss adult issues with the children or issues that relate to the divorce." There was little evidence as to the nature of the therapy session held with the children. The defendant testified only in the briefest of terms. While it seems likely that such a therapy session would include a discussion of the pending custodial disputes and other " adult issues, " the court cannot conclude by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in such discussions with the children. As to this basis, the motion for contempt is therefore denied.
The plaintiff further claims that this conduct was in blatant disregard of the parties' goals for co-parenting identified in the September 9, 2014 Order: " The parties shall also use these sessions to discuss concerns about involving the children in adult issues, . . ." However this language is not a court order that the parties not involve the children in adult issues. It is a clear recognition that such conduct had been and continued to be an issue as of September 9, 2014, but it is not a directive to cease and desist. The conduct does not therefore violate this provision of the court's order and could not be the basis of a finding of contempt.
With respect to the defendant's refusal to consent to any extracurricular activities suggested by the plaintiff, the September 9, 2014 Order provides: " For any new activities in which the child wishes to enroll, the parties shall share the cost equally if mutually agreed upon that child participate. If parties do not agree on the new activity for the child, the cost shall be the sole responsibility of the party who enrolls the child in such activity." This provision is simply a cost sharing agreement. It does not provide that a party's agreement will not be unreasonably withheld and places no restriction on either party as to the circumstances under which that party might or might not agree. Therefore, for purposes of the motion for contempt, the court need not decide whether the defendant's conduct in this regard was unreasonable. As to this basis, the motion for contempt is therefore denied.
The plaintiff also seeks an order from the court re-instating the parenting plan set forth in the dissolution judgment. Insofar as the parties made no progress towards the goal of joint legal custody, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant's additional day and the shared parenting plan set forth in the September 9, 2014 Order should be eliminated. The court does not agree. Whatever its genesis or purpose, the children like the shared parenting plan and are doing well physically, emotionally, and academically. The present plan has been in effect for almost two and one-half years. It would not be in the minor children's best interests to revert to the parenting plan contained in the dissolution judgment.
Finally, insofar as the motion for contempt is denied, no costs or attorneys fees are awarded.
Plaintiff's Motion for Modification (#299)
The last issue for the court must decide is the question of summer camp for the children. The unfortunate and unnecessary events of the summer of 2016 cannot be repeated. The defendant's conduct in enforcing her parenting time over the children's enjoyment of their sleepover camp, although consistent with her approach to co-parenting as reflected in the evidence, was detrimental to the children. Going forward, the plaintiff shall determine whether, when and for how long the children attend summer sleepover camp. However, he shall not register the children for more than four weeks of camp per summer without the consent of the defendant. He shall communicate the camp registration information to the defendant within twenty-four hours of registering the children. The time the children are at camp shall count equally towards each party's parenting time. If the camp schedule disproportionately impacts one party's parenting time over the other, the party less impacted shall give back parenting time.Summer vacations will be scheduled around sleepover camp in the same manner provided for in the dissolution judgment.
Conclusion
In the future, any motion to modify the custody arrangement shall be accompanied by a request for leave to file such a motion in compliance with the requirements of Practice Book Section 25-26(g).
All other orders previously entered which are not inconsistent herewith remain in full force and effect.
SO ORDERED.