Opinion
2019–07435 Index No. 611224/15
04-13-2022
Binhlan TRAN, appellant, v. Glen MUELLER, respondent.
Dell & Dean, PLLC (Joseph G. Dell and Mischel & Horn, P.C., New York, NY [Scott T. Horn and Christen Giannaros], of counsel), for appellant. Gentile & Tambasco (Jon M. Kessel and James G. Bilello, Hicksville, NY [Jill Dabrowski], of counsel), for respondent.
Dell & Dean, PLLC (Joseph G. Dell and Mischel & Horn, P.C., New York, NY [Scott T. Horn and Christen Giannaros], of counsel), for appellant.
Gentile & Tambasco (Jon M. Kessel and James G. Bilello, Hicksville, NY [Jill Dabrowski], of counsel), for respondent.
BETSY BARROS, J.P., REINALDO E. RIVERA, PAUL WOOTEN, DEBORAH A. DOWLING, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Denise F. Molia, J.), entered June 10, 2019. The order granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on November 20, 2012. Thereafter, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident. The Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion, and the plaintiff appeals.
The defendant met his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 ; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176 ). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine and to her hands did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v. Yshua, 59 A.D.3d 614, 874 N.Y.S.2d 180 ). The defendant also demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180–day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see John v. Linden, 124 A.D.3d 598, 599, 1 N.Y.S.3d 274 ; Marin v. Ieni, 108 A.D.3d 656, 657, 969 N.Y.S.2d 165 ; Richards v. Tyson, 64 A.D.3d 760, 761, 883 N.Y.S.2d 575 ). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Nicholson v. Kwarteng, 180 A.D.3d 695, 696, 115 N.Y.S.3d 707 ; Radoncic v. Faulk, 170 A.D.3d 1058, 1060, 96 N.Y.S.3d 352 ).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
BARROS, J.P., RIVERA, WOOTEN and DOWLING, JJ., concur.