Opinion
# 2017-041-033 Claim No. 123810 Motion No. M-89695 Cross-Motion No. CM-90067
05-18-2017
REGINALD TRAMMELL v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
REGINALD TRAMMELL Pro Se HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Michael T. Krenrich, Esq. Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claimant's motion for summary judgment as to defendant's liability for wrongfully confining the inmate/claimant and defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing claim are each denied where triable issues of material fact exist as to claimant's proper release date after a series of disciplinary proceedings involving separate incidents and charges and after a series of administrative reviews and re-hearings of the various incidents and charges.
Case information
| UID: | 2017-041-033 |
| Claimant(s): | REGINALD TRAMMELL |
| Claimant short name: | TRAMMELL |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 123810 |
| Motion number(s): | M-89695 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | CM-90067 |
| Judge: | FRANK P. MILANO |
| Claimant's attorney: | REGINALD TRAMMELL Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Michael T. Krenrich, Esq. Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | May 18, 2017 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant moves for summary judgment on his "Fourth Cause Of Action" alleging defendant's liability for wrongful confinement. Defendant opposes claimant's motion and cross-moves for summary judgment dismissing the claim. Claimant opposes the defendant's cross-motion to dismiss the claim.
The claim was served on defendant on January 15, 2014 and defendant served its answer on February 24, 2014. The defendant thereafter moved to dismiss the claim in its entirety and the "First And Second Cause Of Action" and the "Third Cause Of Action" were dismissed by the Court's Decision and Order, filed on June 10, 2016. The claimant's "Fourth Cause Of Action" was not dismissed by the Court's Decision and Order of June 10, 2016.
The claimant's "Fourth Cause Of Action" alleges wrongful excessive confinement as a result of DOCCS allegedly miscalculating claimant's release from confinement date after a series of overlapping disciplinary hearing determinations involving claimant were issued.
To establish that he was wrongfully confined, claimant must prove the following elements "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]; Krzyzak v Schaefer, 52 AD3d 979 [3d Dept 2008]).
The element most often contested in a prison disciplinary wrongful confinement claim is whether claimant can show that the confinement was not "otherwise privileged."
With respect to whether a confinement is privileged, Holmberg v County of Albany (291 AD2d 610, 612 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 604 [2002]), instructs that: "Generally, where a facially valid order issued by a court with proper jurisdiction directs confinement, that confinement is privileged . . . and everyone connected with the matter is protected from liability for false imprisonment."
In the context of confinement pursuant to a prison disciplinary proceeding, such confinement is "privileged to the extent that it was under color of law or regulation, specifically in accordance with [inmate misbehavior] regulations" (Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 402 [Ct Cl 1986]).
Summary judgment is "a drastic remedy" (Lebanon Val. Landscaping, v Town of Moriah, 258 AD2d 732, 733 [3d Dept 1999]). It "is the procedural equivalent of a trial . . . and should be granted only when it has been established that there is no triable issue of material fact" (Harris v State of New York, 187 Misc 2d 512, 517 [Ct Cl 2001]; see Paulin v Needham, 28 AD3d 531 [2d Dept 2006]).
Claimant alleges that DOCCS violated its own regulations regarding calculation of inmate disciplinary confinement. In particular, it appears that claimant is alleging that, after a series of disciplinary proceedings held in August and September of 2012 involving separate incidents and charges and after a series of administrative reviews and re-hearings of the various incidents and charges, defendant was lawfully required to release him from confinement on June 27, 2013 but did not do so until December 27, 2013, and that, accordingly, he "was wrongfully and excessively confined to cell confinement for close to six (#6) months."
In opposition to claimant's summary judgment motion, defendant offers the affidavit of a Correctional Facility Operations Specialist (CFOS) employed by defendant who is "familiar with the records and procedures of DOCCS specifically as they relate to the release of inmates from 'keeplock:' [sic] and/or the Special Housing Unit."
Defendant'S CFOS states in her affidavit that she has "personally reviewed the disciplinary history of inmate Reginald Trammell" and describes in detail the effect of the various hearings, appeals and re-hearings which resulted in claimant's confinement and his ultimate release on December 27, 2013.
Claimant's motion for summary judgment as to defendant's liability for wrongfully confining him is denied on the basis of triable issues of material fact raised in the affidavit of defendant's CFOS.
Defendant cross-moves for summary judgment dismissing the claimant's cause of action for wrongful confinement to SHU as untimely pursuant to Court of Claims Act 10 (3) and (3-b). A claim for wrongful confinement accrues on "the date on which [claimant's] confinement terminated" (Santiago v City of Rochester, 19 AD3d 1061, 1062 [4th Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 710 [2005]; Davis v State of New York, 89 AD3d 1287, 1287 [3d Dept 2011]). Court of Claims Act 10 (3) and (3-b) require that the claim be served within ninety days of accrual of the claim.
Defendant argues that claimant was released from SHU on September 27, 2013, while acknowledging that claimant was immediately further confined to keeplock until December 27, 2013. The claim was served on January 15, 2014, within ninety days of claimant's release from his then most recent type of confinement but more than ninety days after claimant was released from SHU on September 27, 2013, the date asserted by defendant as the accrual date for purposes of defendant's cross-motion.
Defendant's cross-motion rests upon the Court agreeing with defendant's contention that claimant's "Fourth Cause of Action" for wrongful confinement should be split into two causes of action: The first consisting of the period claimant was confined in SHU and the second comprised of the period claimant was confined in keeplock.
The Court declines to do so on this record. The record does not clearly show, as a matter of law, that the overlapping disciplinary hearings, appeals and sentences which resulted in continuous confinement of claimant (whether in SHU or keeplock) from December 16, 2012 until December 27, 2013 can be split into separate causes of action.
Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the "Fourth Cause Of Action" cause of action is denied.
May 18, 2017
Albany, New York
FRANK P. MILANO
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Considered:
1. Claimant's Notice of Motion For Summary Judgment, filed December 27, 2016; 2. Affidavit of Reginald Trammell, sworn to December 19, 2016, and attached exhibits; 3. Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion, filed March 10, 2017; 4. Affirmation of Michael T. Krenrich, dated March 10, 2017, and attached exhibits; 5. Affidavit of Jennifer Booth, sworn to March 8, 2017, and attached exhibits; 6. Reply Affidavit of Reginald Trammell, sworn to March 15, 2017.