Opinion
# 2014-041-051 Claim No. 124461 Motion No. M-85285
09-17-2014
REGINALD TRAMMELL v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
REGINALD TRAMMELL Pro Se HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Paul F. Cagino, Esq. Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claim alleging that defendant violated inmate/claimant's state constitutional rights by denying admission to protective custody is dismissed where claimant had adequate alternative remedy in CPLR Article 78; CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss inmate lost property claim for failure to state a cause of action based on failure of claimant to exhaust his administrative remedy is denied where claimant submits sworn proof that he complied with administrative remedy requirement.
Case information
| UID: | 2014-041-051 |
| Claimant(s): | REGINALD TRAMMELL |
| Claimant short name: | TRAMMELL |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 124461 |
| Motion number(s): | M-85285 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | FRANK P. MILANO |
| Claimant's attorney: | REGINALD TRAMMELL Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Paul F. Cagino, Esq. Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | September 17, 2014 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Defendant moves to dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action and lack of personal jurisdiction. Claimant, presently an inmate at Southport Correctional Facility, opposes the defendant's motion.
The claim alleges that defendant violated claimant's constitutional due process and equal protection rights by denying him assignment to the Assessment and Program Preparation Unit (APPU) at Clinton Correctional Facility (Clinton), by imposing cruel and unusual conditions of confinement and by intentionally destroying claimant's personal property.
"The APPU, an alternative to protective custody housing, is a special unit for 'victim prone' inmates who must be segregated from the general inmate population" (Matter of Graziadei v Clinton Correctional Facility, 256 AD2d 697, 698 [3d Dept 1998]). In particular, claimant alleges that he made "more than four" requests to the Clinton Superintendent to be placed in APPU because claimant feared retaliation from fellow inmates and further alleges that "White Americans" were admitted to APPU while he, a "Black," was "denied Admission." Claimant alleges that defendant's "Failure" to assign him to APPU caused him to suffer depression requiring psychiatric care.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is invoked where money damages are the essential object of the claim, unlike an instance where the principal claim is equitable in nature (such as to review action or inaction by a state agency), with monetary relief being incidental to the principal claim (see Harvard Fin. Servs. v State of New York, 266 AD2d 685, 685 [3d Dept 1999]; Matter of Gross v Perales, 72 NY2d 231, 236 [1988]).
In City of New York v State of New York (46 AD3d 1168, 1169-1170 [3d Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 705 [2008]), the court explains that:
"Two inquiries must be made to determine if the Court of Claims has subject matter jurisdiction. As that court has 'no jurisdiction to grant strictly equitable relief' (Psaty v Duryea, 306 NY 413, 416 [1954]), but may grant incidental equitable relief so long as the primary claim seeks to recover money damages in appropriation, contract or tort cases (see Ozanam Hall of Queens Nursing Home v State of New York, 241 AD2d 670, 671 [1997]), 'the threshold question is "[w]hether the essential nature of the claim is to recover money, or whether the monetary relief is incidental to the primary claim"' (Madura v State of New York, 12 AD3d 759, 760 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 704 [2005], quoting Matter of Gross v Perales, 72 NY2d 231, 236 [1988]). The second inquiry, regardless of how a claimant categorizes a claim, is whether the claim would require review of an administrative agency's determination--which the Court of Claims has no subject matter jurisdiction to entertain (see Hoffman v State of New York, 42 AD3d 641, 642 [2007]), as review of such determinations are properly brought only in Supreme Court in a CPLR article 78 proceeding (see Matter of Scherbyn v Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 77 NY2d 753, 757 [1991])."
Here, claimant challenges the administrative act of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) in allegedly denying him access to APPU. The appropriate remedy for such a challenge is a CPLR article 78 proceeding (see Graziadei, 256 AD2d at 698).
With respect to claimant's federal constitutional right to due process and equal protection, respectively, the law is settled that "claims for damages against the State based on alleged deprivations of rights under the US Constitution are beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims" (Shelton v New York State Liqu. Auth., 61 AD3d 1145, 1151 [3d Dept 2009]; see Matter of Gable Transp., Inc. v State of New York, 29 AD3d 1125 [3d Dept 2006]; Welch v State of New York, 286 AD2d 496, 498 [2d Dept 2001]; Zagarella v State of New York, 149 AD2d 503 [2d Dept 1989]; Davis v State of New York, 124 AD2d 420, 423 [3d Dept 1986]).
The Court of Appeals has recognized a narrowly defined cause of action for a state constitutional tort in the Court of Claims with respect to "violation of the Equal Protection and Search and Seizure Clauses of the State Constitution" (Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172, 188 [1996]).
Subsequent decisional law instructs that "no such claim will lie where the claimant has an adequate remedy in an alternate forum" (Shelton, 61 AD3d at 1150; see Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 83-84 [2001]; Waxter v State of New York, 33 AD3d 1180, 1181 [3d Dept 2006]; Augat v State of New York, 244 AD2d 835, 837 [3d Dept 1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 814 [1998]).
Claimant could have brought an action in Federal District Court pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 for a claimed violation of his rights under the United States Constitution.
Further, claimant could have raised state constitutional claims in the context of an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court (see Bullard v State of New York, 307 AD2d 676, 678-679 [3d Dept 2003]) where incidental money damages were potentially available (see Gross v Perales, 72 NY2d at 237; CPLR § 7806).
The claim fails to state a cause of action in the Court of Claims for violation of claimant's state constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law, respectively.
Assuming claimant intended a negligence cause of action based upon DOCCS's alleged "Failure" to assign claimant to APPU, it is evident that custody and control of inmates is a governmental function. In McLean v The City of New York (12 NY3d 194, 203 [2009]), the Court of Appeals recited the law as to when the state may be held liable for the negligent performance of a governmental function:
"Government action, if discretionary, may not be a basis for liability, while ministerial actions may be, but only if they violate a special duty owed to the plaintiff, apart from any duty to the public in general."
Whether or not to grant a particular inmate admission to the APPU is a discretionary governmental action and defendant is immune from negligence liability.
Defendant correctly points out that the purported cause of action for cruel and unusual conditions of confinement fails to set forth the nature of the purported cause of action as required by Court of Claims Act § 11 (b), thus depriving the Court of jurisdiction over such a cause of action.
Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) provides that:
"The claim shall state the time when and place where such claim arose, the nature of same, the items of damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained and, except in an action to recover damages for personal injury, medical, dental or podiatric malpractice or wrongful death, the total sum claimed."
A claim against the State is permissible only as a result of the State's waiver of sovereign immunity and the statutory requirements conditioning suit must therefore be strictly construed (Kolnacki v State of New York 8 NY3d 277, 280 [2007]). The Kolnacki court noted that the requirements of section 11 (b) are "'substantive conditions upon the State's waiver of sovereign immunity'" (quoting Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 NY3d 201, 207 [2003]) and that the failure to satisfy any of the conditions is a jurisdictional defect (Kolnacki, 8 NY3d at 280-281). The Kolnacki decision stresses that "nothing less than strict compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the Court of Claims Act is necessary" (Kolnacki, 8 NY3d at 281).
The claim fails to allege facts sufficient to state the nature of the cause of action for cruel and unusual conditions of confinement and the cause of action is dismissed.
Finally, defendant also moves to dismiss the claimant's cause of action for loss of personal property because claimant failed to exhaust his administrative remedy prior to filing and serving his claim.
Court of Claims Act § 10 (9) provides as follows:
"A claim of any inmate in the custody of the department of correctional services for recovery of damages for injury to or loss of personal property may not be filed unless and until the inmate has exhausted the personal property claims administrative remedy, established for inmates by the department. Such claim must be filed and served within one hundred twenty days after the date on which the inmate has exhausted such remedy."
An inmate seeking damages for lost property must exhaust the administrative remedy established by Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, which constitutes a non-waivable jurisdictional filing requirement (Williams v State of New York, 38 AD3d 646, 647 [2d Dept 2007]).
In support of the motion, defendant offers the affidavit of a Clinton employee who reviewed the facility records and determined that:
"3. Pursuant to a request from the Office of the Attorney General, I have personally reviewed our records, which show that inmate Reginald Trammell (DIN #09-A-3936) did not file an inmate property claim at this facility, in or around March 2014, regarding the destruction of his personal property after the incident that allegedly occurred on or around February 26, 2014."
The filed claim, verified under oath, alleges that a "property claim" was submitted to the facility superintendent on March 1, 2014, and that no response was received. Additionally, claimant swears, in his affidavit in opposition to defendant's motion, that he filed an inmate personal property claim on March 1, 2014, and further swears that the superintendent "acknowledge receipt of" such claim.
On a motion to dismiss a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must assume the allegations to be true and resolve all inferences reasonably flowing therefrom in favor of the claimant (Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Stone Ridge Country Props. Corp. v Mohonk Oil Co., Inc., 84 AD3d 1556 [3d Dept 2011).
Assuming, as the Court must for purposes of this motion, claimant's sworn allegations as to filing a lost personal property claim with the facility superintendent to be true, the defendant's motion to dismiss the lost personal property cause of action is denied.
The defendant's motion to dismiss the claim's causes of action for violation of claimant's constitutional rights and for imposing on claimant cruel and unusual conditions of confinement, respectively, is granted. The defendant's motion to dismiss the claim's cause of action for destruction of claimant's personal property is denied.
September 17, 2014
Albany, New York
FRANK P. MILANO
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Considered:
1. Defendant's Notice of Motion to Dismiss, filed June 19, 2014;
2. Affirmation of Paul F. Cagino, dated June 17, 2014, and annexed exhibits, including affidavit of Amy Islas, sworn to June 12, 2014;
3. Affidavit of Reginald Trammell, sworn to June 30, 2014.