Opinion
Civ. No. 16-786-GMS
12-02-2016
NICHOLAS KENNETH TRAMMELL, Plaintiff, v. AMAZON CORPORATION, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff, Nicholas Kenneth Trammell ("Trammell"), an inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center ("VCC"). Smyrna, Delaware, filed this lawsuit on September 6, 2016, raising federal claims of discrimination of public health and welfare and violation of equal opportunity employment trademark, as well as supplemental state claims. (D.I. 3.) He appears pro se and was granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (D.I. 5.) The court proceeds to review and screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(a).
I. BACKGROUND
Trammell invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (discrimination by reason of disability) of the Americans with Disabilities Act and appears to allege that the defendant Amazon Corporation ("Amazon") will discriminate against him in the future - more particularly November 19, 2016 through December 8, 2016. In the next sentence, Trammell alleges that he was terminated by Amazon and it has yet to fully advance Trammell his full paycheck. He also references 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983. Trammell raises other various and sundry claims including free speech violations. Trammell seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as the right to make certain purchases, eat certain food, and wear certain clothing while in the custody of the VCC.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) if "the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because Trammell proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); see, e.g., Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an inmate's pen and refused to give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the court must grant Trammell leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, ___U.S.___, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A complaint may not dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See id. at 346.
Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts in the complaint "show" that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
III. DISCUSSION
To the extent Trammell seeks to raise an employment discrimination claim under the ADA by reason of disability or for the denial of services, programs or activities, the claims fail. Trammell appears to invoke Title I and II of the ADA. Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (employment discrimination), provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (public services), provides that "[s]ubject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Trammell's allegations do not indicate what, if any, disability Trammel has. Nor do the allegations indicate when the alleged discrimination occurred. Notably, the allegations speaks to a future date when the discrimination will occur in November and December of this year.
To the extent, Trammel seeks to raise a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the claim fails because Amazon is not a state actor. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (When bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law. The complaint also refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section § 1981 forbids discrimination on the basis of race in the making of public and private contracts. See St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609 (1987); Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem'l Hosp., 192 F.3d 378, 385 (3d Cir. 1999). The complaint contains no such allegations. After thoroughly reviewing the complaint and applicable law, the court draws on its judicial experience and common sense and concludes that the claims raised by Trammell are frivolous. Therefore, the court will dismiss the complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1).
Finally, to the extent Trammell attempts to raise supplemental state claims, because the complaint fails to state federal claims, the court declines to exercise jurisdiction over any supplemental state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 309 (3d Cir. 2003).
IV. CONCLUSION
The court will dismiss the complaint as legally frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1) and will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In light of the nature of Trammell's claims, the court finds that amendment would be futile. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2004); Grayson, 293 F.3d at 111; Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976).
An appropriate order will be entered.
/s/_________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE December 2, 2016
Wilmington, Delaware