Opinion
CV 497-45
June 16, 2000
A. Lee Parks, K. Lee Adams, Parks, Chesin Miller, PC, Atlanta, GA; Matthew C. Billips, Zimring Ellin, PC, Atlanta, GA, for MICHAEL C. WOODEN, Dr. TERRY BRATCHER, RUTH HARRIS, TOM JARVIS, plaintiffs.
John M. Tatum, Hunter, Maclean, Exley Dunn, Savannah, GA; A. Lee Parks, K. Lee Adams, Parks, Chesin Miller, PC, Atlanta, GA; Matthew C. Billips, Zimring Ellin, PC, Atlanta, GA, for KIRBY TRACY, plaintiff.
John M. Tatum, Hunter, Maclean, Exley Dunn, Savannah, GA. for CRAIG GREEN, plaintiff.
Dennis R. Dunn, Atlanta, GA; Alfred L. Evans, Jr., Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen. Atlanta, GA, for BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA, STEPHEN R. PORTCH, Dr., in his individual and official capacities, defendants.
John Mell Clark, Elberton, GA; E. Ronald Garnett, Augusta, GA; Dennis D. Parker, David T. Goldberg, Victor A. Bolden, Theodore M. Shaw, NAACP Legal Defense Educational Fund, Inc., New York, NY Ivory Kenneth Dious, Kenneth Dious Assoc., Athens, GA, for GEORGIA STATE CONFERENCE NAACP, SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, NESHANTA JOHNSON, by and through her parent, DEBORAH FANNING, NATALIE PLOWDEN, by and through her parent, NATHANIEL PLOWDEN, NICOLE SHEATS, by and through her parent, ALVIN SHEATS, TRAVIS THORNTON, by and through his parent, OVITA THORNTON, LA'DRECA WELLS, by and through her parent, LARRY WAKEFIELD, MIRANDA WILSON, by and through her parent, LARIE WILSON, KENNITA BELL, CHADAFI BETTERSON, LAURETHA BUTLER, TRACEY FORD, DERRICK GERVIN, VALERIE WARREN, CARON YANCEY, intervenor-defendants.
ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983 and 2000d ("Title VI"), the plaintiffs brought this case to challenge the "continued segregation" of Georgia's University System. Doc. # 1. They made their assault on two fronts. One group of plaintiffs (consisting of Kirby Tracy, Ashley Davis, and Craig Green) contended that the defendants, by establishing a race-conscious "affirmative action" admissions program at the University of Georgia (UGA), discriminated against them on the basis of their race (white) when they unsuccessfully applied for admission to UGA's freshman class. See id.; doc. # 200. A second group sought to abolish many of the defendants' practices and policies in operating Georgia's historically black public institutions (HBIs). See doc. # 1; # 241 at 1-2.
Prior orders detail the procedural history of this case. See Wooden v. Board of Regents, 32 F. Supp.2d 1370, 1372-75 (S.D.Ga. 1999) (" Wooden"); doc. # 241; Tracy v. Board of Regents, 59 F. Supp.2d 1314, 1315-17 (" Tracy"). The Court held that the HBI challengers lacked standing to pursue their claims, because they suffered no "injury in fact" and asserted only a "generalized grievance." Doc. # 241 at 10-16. Davis lacked standing since UGA denied her application because of her grades and test scores, without considering her race. Wooden, 32 F. Supp.2d at 1375. And, even though Green went through the race-conscious portion of UGA's admissions process, he also lacked standing because he was, as a result of his objective qualifications, unable to say that he was prevented from competing "on an equal footing" with non-whites. Tracy, 59 F. Supp.2d at 1317-21.
In contrast, the Court granted Tracy partial summary judgment on his damages claim; UGA denied him admission under its majority admissions standards even though he met the minimum standards required of minority applicants. Wooden, 32 F. Supp.2d at 1373-84. Yet, because unrebutted evidence demonstrated that Tracy would not have been admitted even under a color-blind process, the Court awarded Tracy only nominal damages. Doc. # 255 at 5-7. It also noted that Tracy's transfer admission to UGA mooted his prospective injunctive relief claim. Id. at 8.
After plaintiffs appealed, see doc. # 259, the Supreme Court issued Texas v. Lesage, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 467 (1999), which "clarified the standing requirements for plaintiffs challenging race-based admissions policies." Tracy v. Board of Regents, 208 F.3d 1313, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000) (" Tracy II"). Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit vacated this Court's summary judgment and remanded the case "for further consideration in light of Lesage." Id. This Order provides that further consideration.
II. BACKGROUND
From 1990 to 1995, UGA divided its incoming freshman applicants into "first notice" and "final notice" categories. Wooden, 32 F. Supp.2d at 1373. Students with a high Academic Index (AI), a statistic calculated solely from an applicant's high school GPA and SAT score, were offered admission through first notice admission. Id. at 1374. Applicants with lower AIs advanced to the final notice stage, where UGA officials filled out the remainder of the class by considering enrollment needs such as size, academic quality, and racial diversity. Id.
During the 1990-95 period UGA employed a "dual-track" admissions policy that set different minimum standards for black and non-black applicants. So in 1995, for example, black applicants needed only a minimum 800 SAT score, 2.0 GPA, and 2.0 AI, while non-blacks had to attain a 980 SAT, 2.5 GPA, and 2.4 AI. Id.
Tracy applied to UGA in 1995 with a 3.47 GPA and 830 SAT. Although he met the minimum standards required of black applicants, UGA denied him admission because his SAT score was below the non-black minimum. Id. He then attended Georgia College, and transferred to UGA in 1997. Id.
In 1996, UGA revised its admissions process to employ a three-tiered system. Tracy, 59 F. Supp.2d at 1316. In the first level, UGA again calculated applicants' AIs from their high school GPAs and SAT scores, then admitted those with AIs above a set number. Id. Applicants with AIs below a minimum score were rejected outright. Those with AIs between these two values proceeded to the next stage of the process, the Total Student Index (TSI). Id.
The TSI phase took each applicant's AI, then added "bonus points" for various characteristics, including a challenging high school curriculum, extracurricular activities, Georgia residency, alumni relatives, and minority race. Id. Again, UGA admitted those with TSIs above a certain value automatically, while denying admission outright to those with TSIs below a minimum value. Id. at 1316-17. It then sent applicants with intermediate TSI values to the third and final stage, the "edge read" (ER). Id. at 1317.
At the ER stage UGA admissions officials individually read the application files and evaluated the candidates for "qualities that might not have been apparent at the AI and TSI stages." Id. They assigned applicants a numerical score, admitting those above a set value and rejecting those below it. Id. They did not consider race at the ER stage. See id. at 1318 n. 2.
Davis applied to UGA in 1996. Because her AI was below the minimum required for either admission or for further consideration at the TSI phase, UGA denied her admission at the first stage. Wooden, 32 F. Supp.2d at 1375. She then enrolled at the University of Tennessee, and "disclaimed any interest in transferring to UGA." Id. As noted above, this Court found that Davis lacked standing because UGA denied her application without considering her race. Id.
Green applied to UGA in 1997. Tracy, 59 F. Supp.2d at 1316. His AI did not earn him automatic admission, but did not disqualify him summarily. Id. at 1317. At the TSI phase, UGA did not give him the minority bonus points, and he again achieved an intermediate score. Id. However, even with the racial bonus points, he would have been in this middle ground between automatic acceptance and denial. See id. His application thus proceeded to the ER stage, where it was denied. Id. He enrolled at Dalton College, intending to transfer to UGA. Id. The Court likewise found that he lacked standing. Id. at 1317-21.
III. ANALYSIS A. The Lesage Case
In Lesage, the plaintiff, who is white, brought an action for money damages and injunctive relief after unsuccessfully applying to a Ph.D. program at the University of Texas (UT). 120 S.Ct. at 467. Although UT admitted that it considered an applicant's race, the district court granted UT summary judgment because Lesage would not have been admitted even were UT's admissions process race-neutral. Id. at 467-68. Reversing the district court, the Fifth Circuit held that Lesage's chances under a color-blind admissions scheme were irrelevant because Lesage, by being rejected at a stage of the admissions process that considered race, alleged sufficient injury: UT denied him the ability to compete on an equal footing with non-whites. Id. at 468 (citing Lesage v. Texas, 158 F.3d 213, 222(5th Cir. 1998)).
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, reasoning that "where a plaintiff challenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on an impermissible criterion and it is undisputed that the government would have made the same decision regardless, there is no cognizable injury warranting relief under § 1983." Id. However, the Court went on to distinguish between the requisite injury for seeking damages and that necessary to seek prospective relief:
Of course, a plaintiff who challenges an ongoing race-conscious program and seeks forward-looking relief need not affirmatively establish that he would receive the benefit in question if race were not considered. The relevant injury in such cases is "the inability to compete on an equal footing." Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993). See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe[n]a, 515 U.S. 200, 211, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995). But where there is no allegation of an ongoing or imminent constitutional violation to support a claim for forward-looking relief, the government's conclusive demonstration that it would have made the same decision absent the alleged discrimination precludes any finding of liability.Id. at 468-69.
The Lesage Court concluded that its Mt. Healthy "framework for analyzing such claims" mandated summary judgment against Lesage's damages claim. 120 S.Ct. at 468 (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286-87 (1977) (holding that school board that fired teacher for protected expression, among other reasons, could escape liability by showing it would have fired him regardless)). However, it could not determine whether Lesage had abandoned his injunctive relief claim, so the Court remanded on that issue. 120S.Ct. at 469. And, it explicitly left open the issue of whether Lesage's Title VI or § 1981 claims remained. Id.
B. The Meaning of Lesage
It's been argued that Lesage has injected more uncertainty and tension into this area of law. See S. Nahmod, Mt. Healthy and Causation-in-Fact: The Court Still Doesn't Get It!, 51 Mercer L.Rev. 603 (2000); C.B. Whitman, An Essay on Texas v. Lesage, 51 Mercer L.Rev. 621 (2000). For starters, it is not entirely clear that Lesage is a standing case at all — the opinion fails to even mention the term. See Lesage, 120 S.Ct. at 468-69; Nahmod, 51 Mercer L.Rev. at 617 (positing that Lesage may be a "disguised standing case," even though the Supreme Court "has never hinted that Mt. Healthy's burden shift raises standing issues").
Indeed, the opinion speaks in terms of "defeat[ing] liability," 120 S.Ct. at 468, rather than a plaintiff's standing to sue. Yet, there is much to suggest that it is a decision on standing. The Court states, for example, that when the defendant makes an undisputed "same-decision showing" (i.e., that the applicant would have been rejected even if race were not considered), "there is no cognizable injury." Id.
The Court then cites clear standing decisions in contrasting its result regarding damages claims with cases in which the plaintiff seeks to prospectively enjoin an ongoing violation. Id. at 468-69 (holding that there, the "relevant injury . . . is the inability to compete on an equal footing") (citing Jacksonville, 508 U.S. at 666; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 211) (internal quotes omitted). If Lesage's result is not a matter of standing doctrine, why couch it in terms of the plaintiff's "injury," and why cite standing cases for a limitation on the holding?
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit obviously views Lesage as a standing case. See Tracy II, 208 F.3d at 1314 ("the Supreme Court in [ Lesage] clarified the standing requirements for plaintiffs challenging race-based admissions policies"). Therefore, despite the Supreme Court's imprecise writing, this Court will proceed on the premise that Lesage enunciates a standing requirement.
Lesage's second major point of uncertainty derives from its tension with Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). The Carey Court held that students who sued under § 1983 after being suspended from public schools without procedural due process were entitled to recover nominal, but not compensatory, damages if the defendants proved the suspensions were substantially justified. Id. at 259-67. By insisting that some damage award (albeit nominal) be available, the Carey Court in effect was upholding the individual's right to vindicate violations of his purely procedural rights (e.g., the right to a hearing).
But under Lesage, once the defendant makes its "same-decision" showing, the plaintiff has suffered no injury and cannot recover even nominal damages under § 1983. 120 S.Ct. at 468. The Lesage Court is thus declaring that no procedural, let alone substantive, right is violated (at least for purposes of vindication through § 1983) if the government shows that the plaintiff would have obtained the same result even were the racial component of the challenged governmental scheme removed. Id. Whether the Lesage Court meant to overrule Carey is a valid question, since Lesage, a per curiam opinion issued with no oral argument or even briefing, see Nahmod, 51 Mercer L.Rev. at 610, failed to even cite Carey.
Hampered by tenebrous language, the latter half of the Lesage opinion cites to and essentially reiterates the Court's earlier holding in Jacksonville, 508 U.S. at 666, that
[w]hen the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for the barrier in order to establish standing. The "injury in fact" in an equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit. . . . [T]he "injury in fact" is the inability to compete on an equal footing in the bidding process, not the loss of a contract.Id. (cites omitted).
Hence, those who can show that they were deprived of the chance to compete on an equal footing (e.g., in the government contracts arena, that there is an otherwise even chance that a contractor's bid might, but for the bid-sifter's racialism, prevail) will have standing, and courts will not force the contractor to go through the expense of bidding for the government's business. See Tracy, 59 F. Supp.2d at 1319-20. Those student applicants who can show that they were "otherwise qualified" (hence, stood on an equal footing) but were prevented from competing equally with other applicants because of their skin color therefore can meet the Lesage/ Jacksonville requirements.
Whatever Lesage's implications are, its core mandate (whether or not technically binding) is quite plain: a university is entitled to summary judgment against a plaintiff's § 1983 damages claim, even if its admission program sorts students based on their skin color, if it can show that the plaintiff would have been rejected under a race-neutral program. But, a plaintiff may seek a prospective injunction against an ongoing race-conscious program merely by showing a " Jacksonville" inability-to-compete-equally injury.
Note that the entire Lesage opinion can be viewed as dicta. The opinion purports to reverse the Fifth Circuit's holding "that summary judgment was inappropriate on Lesage's § 1983 action seeking damages. . . ." 120 S.Ct. at 468. But the Fifth Circuit simply made no such holding. That court noted that, "at an early stage in the proceedings the district court dismissed Lesage's claims to the extent that he sought monetary relief under §§ 1981 and 1983." 158 F.3d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 1998). It did not disturb that holding on appeal. Rather, it held that the lower court correctly refused to dismiss Lesage's Title VI claims. See id. at 215-19.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit's holding — that a same-decision showing would not necessitate summary judgment for the defendants, id. at 222 — applied only to Lesage's remaining, Title VI damages claim, an issue the Supreme Court did not reach. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit on an issue — whether a same-decision showing defeats § 1983 liability — that the latter court did not decide (again, the Supreme Court expressly reserved for remand the issue of whether Lesage's Title VI claim remained). 120 S.Ct. at 469. This renders Lesage's precedential value questionable.
C. Applying Lesage 1. Standing
As discussed above, this Court held that Davis and Green lacked standing to pursue their claims, but that Tracy did have sufficient standing. See Wooden, 32 F. Supp.2d at 1375-77; Tracy, 59 F. Supp.2d at 1317-21. Lesage does not alter the result for Davis. She was denied admission at the AI stage, which does not consider race, and therefore never faced a race-conscious admissions process. Wooden, 32 F. Supp.2d at 1375. Thus, she would have been denied admission even if no part of UGA's admissions policy considered race.
Since Lesage dealt only with the standing requirement for unsuccessful applicants challenging allegedly discriminatory admissions policies, see Lesage, 120 S.Ct. at 467-69; see also Tracy II, 208 F.3d at 1314, it does not apply to the HBI challengers. Even by analogy, the Court discerns no way in which Lesage renders these plaintiffs' attenuated grievances actionable.
Furthermore, even were the Jacksonville test applied, she would not meet its requirements; she simply cannot show that she was otherwise able to compete for admission on an equal basis with minority students but was prevented from doing so by a race-conscious admissions process. See Jacksonville, 508 U.S. at 666 ("To establish standing, therefore, a party challenging a set-aside program like Jacksonville's need only demonstrate that it is able and ready to bid on contracts and that a discriminatory policy prevents it from doing so on an equal basis") (emphasis added).
Nor does Lesage aid Green. True, he did go through the race-conscious phase of UGA's admissions process, but he would have been rejected even if UGA had given him racial bonus points. Tracy, 59 F. Supp.2d at 1317. Therefore, under Lesage he can obtain no damages under § 1983. 120 S.Ct. at 468. And, even if the more lenient Jacksonville standard were to apply to damage claims under Title VI, Green lacks standing to obtain retrospective relief.
Like Davis, Green simply cannot show he was otherwise qualified to compete for admission equally with minority applicants. See Tracy, 59 F. Supp.2d at 1317-21. For this reason, although Lesage leaves open the possibility of obtaining prospective injunctive relief, see 120 S.Ct. at 468-69, Green cannot avail himself of this remedy either.
Tracy, this Court held, was entitled to summary judgment on his Title VI damages claim, but could recover only nominal damages because UGA showed that he would not have been admitted even under a color-blind admissions policy. Wooden, 32 F. Supp.2d at 1378-84; doc. # 255 at 5-7. However, Tracy was not entitled to injunctive relief because he transferred to UGA in 1997, thereby insuring that he would never again face UGA's freshman admissions process. See Wooden, 32 F. Supp.2d at 1374.
The Court held, though, that the defendants are immune from liability for monetary damages (including nominal damages) under §§ 1981 and 1983. Wooden, 32 F. Supp.2d at 1377 (citing Powell v. Dep't of Human Resources, 918 F. Supp. 1575, 1578 (S.D.Ga. 1996), aff'd, 114 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir. 1997)).
In order to have standing to seek a prospective injunction, a potential plaintiff must assert "`an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'" Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). To show that his injury is sufficiently imminent, Tracy must demonstrate that "in the relatively near future" he will again be subjected to the challenged conduct. Id.; accord Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102-05 (1983).
Because Lesage reserved the question of whether the plaintiff's § 1981 and Title VI claims remained, 120 S.Ct. at 469, it does not speak to the issue in this case, i.e., whether Tracy is entitled to nominal damages for a Title VI violation, despite the defendants' same-decision showing. But according to pre- Lesage case law, Tracy has established that he is entitled to nominal damages under Title VI.
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1978), the plaintiff challenged his denial of admission to medical school under, inter alia, Title VI. The Supreme Court held that he had Article III standing to press this claim:
[E]ven if Bakke had been unable to prove that he would have been admitted in the absence of the special program, it would not follow that he lacked standing. . . . The trial court found . . . an injury, apart from the failure to be admitted, in the University's decision not to permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places in his class, simply because of his race. Hence the constitutional requirements of Art. III were met. The question of Bakke's admission vel non is merely one of relief.Id. at 280-81 n. 14 (cite emphasis omitted). The Court cited this language with approval in Jacksonville. 508 U.S. at 665. Moreover, the Court noted that this particular Bakke holding garnered the votes of five justices and was not otherwise rendered dicta. Id.at 665 n. 4.
It is important to note that Bakke had sued under Title VI for an injunction to remedy his past rejections, not to prospectively enjoin an ongoing violation. 438 U.S. at 277-78. The Lesage Court did not mention, much less overrule, Bakke's holding that he had standing to do so. On the contrary, Lesage cited approvingly to Jacksonville, which had, as noted above, reaffirmed Bakke's standing decision. See Lesage, 120 S.Ct. at 468-69. Because the Supreme Court has not explicitly overruled Bakke's holding that Article III permits a Title VI plaintiff to sue for the past race-based denial of the opportunity to compete equally for university admission, this Court is bound by it. See Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank N.A., 120 F.3d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir. 1997) ("Federal district courts. . . .must follow Supreme Court precedent that has direct application in a case, even if it appears that the reasoning of the Supreme Court precedent has been rejected in other cases[, because o]nly the Supreme Court has the prerogative of overruling its own decisions") (quotes and cites omitted); Florida League of Professional Lobbyists v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 462 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e are not at liberty to disregard binding case law that is so closely on point and has been only weakened, rather than directly overruled, by the Supreme Court"). Thus, Tracy has standing to seek Title VI damages.
Reading Lesage as a standing opinion does not necessarily render its holding inconsistent with Bakke's. In Bakke, the Court focused on the "constitutional element of standing." 438 U.S. at 280-81 n. 14. However, there are non-constitutional standing requirements, i.e., the so-called "prudential bars" to standing. These include prohibitions on third-party standing and generalized grievances, and the "zone of interests" test. See, e.g., J.M. King, Note, Standing in Garbage: Flow Control and the Problem of Consumer Standing, 32 Ga.L.Rev. 1227, 1234-36 (1998).
The zone of interests rule grants a plaintiff standing to sue only if "the interest sought to be protected by the complaint is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Id. at 1236 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)). In other words, the plaintiff "must be one of those whom the law was enacted to protect, or for whose benefit it was passed." Id. Lesage did not question the validity of Bakke or Jacksonville, and it expressly limited its holding to § 1983 claims, so the Court may well have been holding merely that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, § 1983 was not intended to benefit plaintiffs who, despite suffering racial discrimination, would not have received the benefit in question. So read, Lesage would not deny such plaintiffs Article III standing to sue under other statutes, such as Title VI.
2. Damages
Whether nominal damages are allowed under Title VI when a defendant has made a same-decision showing is a separate question, but one which ultimately must be answered affirmatively. Because the defendants made the same-decision showing, see doc. # 255 at 5, Tracy has shown no actual damages. Nominal damages, though, "are recoverable whenever there has been a breach of a legal duty or the invasion of a legal right and no actual damage resulted or was proved." 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 15 (1999) (footnotes omitted; emphasis added); see also Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994).
Moreover, there is a "general rule . . . that absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute." Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1992). This general rule is followed in Title VI cases, at least those, as here, where an intentional violation is shown. See id. at 70. Thus, nominal damages are available to Tracy for his Title VI damages claim. The Court's previous holdings as to Tracy, Green, and Davis therefore remain unchanged by Lesage.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court's previous grant of partial summary judgment to plaintiff Kirby Tracy, as well as its grants of summary judgment to defendants on the remaining plaintiffs' claims, see Wooden, 32 F. Supp.2d at 1384; Tracy, 59 F. Supp.2d at 1323; doc. ## 241, 255, are REINSTATED . SO ORDERED, this 16th day of June, 2000.
Since Wooden/ Tracy was filed, this Court has received four more lawsuits targeting the State-sponsored racialism illuminated in Tracy, 59 F. Supp.2d 1321-23 (" The Road Ahead"). See Johnson v. Board of Regents, No. 499CV169 (S.D.Ga. Complaint filed 8/10/99) (challenging UGA's 1999 admissions process); Bogrow v. Board of Regents, No. 499CV181 (S.D.Ga. Complaint filed 8/31/99) (same; consolidated with Johnson, see 499CV169 doc. # 55); Noble v. Board of Regents, No. 400CV133 (S.D.Ga. Complaint filed 5/23/00) (" Hopwood"-type challenge to UGA's law school admissions program); and Welsh v. Board of Regents, No. 400CV134 (S.D.Ga. Complaint filed 5/23/00) (challenging UGA's admissions policy and awarding of race-based scholarships). Promptly rendered, clear guidance would greatly assist the Court in navigating the murky jurisprudence enveloping this area.