Opinion
Case No. 5:99cv 123
August 31, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a civil action against the United States. Plaintiff's complaint seeks a refund of the $41,303.40 that plaintiff claims he "erroneously paid in 1994-1998 income taxes." On January 6, 2000, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (docket # 5). Plaintiff filed his response. (docket # 7). On June 6, 2000, the court found that defendant's exhibits in support of its motion had not been properly authenticated. The court provided defendant with an opportunity to authenticate the exhibits and notified the parties that defendant's motion would be converted to a summary judgment motion. The parties received additional time within which to supplement the exhibits and arguments pertaining to the motion. (docket # 8). Defendant submitted an affidavit authenticating the exhibits previously filed. Plaintiff elected not to supplement his response. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Applicable Standard
As the Sixth Circuit has noted, the federal courts have entered a "new era" in summary judgment practice. Cox v. Kentucky Dept of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995); Street v. J C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478-81 (6th Cir. 1989). While preserving the constitutional right of civil litigants to a trial on meritorious claims, the courts are now vigilant to weed out fanciful, malicious, and unsupported claims before trial. Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1009 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Sable v. General Motors Corp., 90 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1996); Payne v. Board of Education, 88 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is "whether `the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" See Adcox v. Teledyne, Inc., 21 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 251-52); see also, Crabbs v. Copperweld Tubing Products Co., 144 F.3d 85, 88 (6th Cir. 1997).
The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 403 (6th Cir. 1997). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, but need not support its motion with affidavits or other materials "negating" the opponent's claim. Moore v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 1993). Once defendants show that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," plaintiff has the burden of coming forward with evidence raising a triable issue of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To sustain this burden, plaintiff may not rest on the mere allegations of his pleadings. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995); Cox, 53 F.3d at 150. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment has the burden to come forth with requisite proof to support his legal claim, particularly where he has had an opportunity to conduct discovery. See Noble v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 1994); Street v. J. C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d at 1478-81; Booker v. Brown Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir. 1989). In so doing, plaintiff must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Mounts v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 198 F.3d 578, 580 (6th Cir. 2000); Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996); Brennan v. Township of Northville, 78 F.3d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1996).
Facts
The following facts are beyond genuine issue. In early 1999, plaintiff submitted five tax returns for the years 1994 to 1998. (docket # 5, Ex. 1-5). Plaintiff, an auto worker, signed each of the tax forms. The completed 1040A forms showed "$0.00" for "wages, salaries, tips, etc." for each tax year. Plaintiff's W-2 forms showed a total of $41,303.40 in federal taxes withheld for the tax years in question. Plaintiff attached a two page memorandum to each of his returns. Among other things, the memoranda contained the following arguments: (1) that "income" is limited to "a derivative of corporate activity" and that plaintiff's wages fall outside that definition; (2) that because the IRS did not "assess" income taxes for the years in question, the IRS is unlawfully retaining plaintiff's money; and (3) that the forms he submitted showing zero income qualify as tax returns and valid claims for refunds.
On May 14, 1999, the Internal Revenue Service issued a letter to plaintiff (Complaint, Ex. B) advising him that the information in his return was "frivolous" and that his position had no basis in law. The letter advised plaintiff to seek advice from competent tax counsel or an attorney qualified to practice in the State of Michigan. The IRS letter offered plaintiff an opportunity to correct his return. The IRS enclosed with its letter individual income tax forms for plaintiff's use. Plaintiff does not allege that he submitted any corrected return. The IRS letter advised plaintiff of possible penalties he faced if he did not correct his returns or if he submitted new documents asserting frivolous positions. The second page of the letter advised plaintiff that the IRS might issue a notice of deficiency. "A notice of deficiency is a legal notice stating the amount of tax increase and penalties and explaining your right to file a petition with the United States Tax Court."
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on November 8, 1999. Plaintiff paid the $150 filing fee rather than proceeding in forma pauperis. Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint was not subject to initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Discussion
The only defendant named in this lawsuit is the United States of America. The United States government and its agencies are immune from suit, unless that immunity has been expressly waived. See Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 260 (1999); United States v Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500-501 (1940). The United States, as a sovereign, cannot be sued without its prior consent. McGinness v. United States, 90 F.3d 143, 145 (6th Cir. 1996). Waivers of sovereign immunity are strictly construed. United States v. Ranger Electronic Communications, Inc., 210 F.3d 267, 631 (6th Cir. 2000). A limited waiver of sovereign immunity is found in 26 U.S.C. § 7422(f)(1) authorizing a civil action for a tax refund. However, 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) states that a duly filed claim for refund is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a civil action for a refund.
No suit prior to filing a claim for refund. No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations the Secretary established in the pursuance thereof.26 U.S.C. § 7422(a). "A refund claim with the I.R.S. is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a refund action in federal district court." Firsdon v. United States, 95 F.3d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1996); see Ruiz v. Internal Revenue Service, No. 96-4043, 1997 WL 328599, at * 1 (6th Cir. June 13, 1997). "The regulations promulgated pursuant to § 7422(a) state that `[t]he claim must set forth in detail each ground upon which a credit or refund is claimed and facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the exact basis thereof.' Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1). When a party fails to state with specificity the grounds for the refund, the court is without jurisdiction to entertain the action." McDonnell v. United States, 180 F.3d 721, 722 (6th Cir. 1999).
The federal courts have repeatedly found that suits such as plaintiff's are barred by sovereign immunity. Plaintiff's submissions to the IRS are patently insufficient to constitute valid claims for refunds. The pattern of (1) submitting tax forms to the IRS showing zeros for wages, (2) attaching a memorandum containing the identical arguments asserted by plaintiff, and (3) subsequent civil lawsuits seeking refunds of taxes withheld by the employer has been a consistently unsuccessful formula in the federal courts. Plaintiff's case will join a long list of similar cases dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of sovereign immunity. See Treglowne v. United States, No. 99-CV-70323, 2000 WL 264677 (E.D.Mich. Jan. 21, 2000); Porcaro v. United States, No. 99 CV-604406-AA, 1999 WL 1249329 (E.D.Mich. Oct. 25, 1999); Perl v. United States, No. 99-11161-NG, 1999 WL 1022186 (D.Mass. Sept. 28, 1999); Irwin v. United States, No. 98-CV-75628-DT, 1999 WL 718594 (E.D.Mich. Aug. 9, 1999); Maruska v. United States, 77 F. Supp.2d 1035 (D.Minn. 1999); Thompson v. United States, No. 1:98-CV-1838RW, 1999 WL 302453 (N.D.Ga. Mar. 22, 1999). Defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted and plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed.
In accordance with the opinion filed this date:
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment (docket # 5) be and hereby is GRANTED and plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.