Townsend v. State

4 Citing cases

  1. Williams v. Hobbs

    CASE NO. 5:14CV00188 BSM/HDY (E.D. Ark. Oct. 8, 2014)

    Appellant contends that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that the State rebutted the presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness that arose when the State added a firearm-enhancement charge to the information two days after his first trial ended in a mistrial. Appellant cites Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); Phavixay v. State, 2009 Ark. 452, 352 S.W.3d 311; and Townsend v. State, 355 Ark. 248, 134 S.W.3d 545 (2003), for the proposition that "[a] presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness arises when a prosecuting attorney files an additional charge after the defendant's initial trial that exposes the defendant to a longer possible period of imprisonment."We agree with the State that no presumption arose in the present case because appellant's unopposed mistrial motion due to a hung jury was not the exercise of a legal right as contemplated by the United States Supreme Court in Blackledge and by the Arkansas Supreme Court in cases including Phavixay.

  2. U.S. v. Korey

    614 F. Supp. 2d 573 (W.D. Pa. 2009)   Cited 8 times
    In United States v. Kore, 614 F.Supp.2d 573 (W.D. Pa. 2009), for example, the defendant had successfully appealed the initial charges, the initial charges were themselves entirely baseless, and the defendant secured dismissal on remand.

    This issue is not unique to the federal courts. Vindictive prosecution has been addressed by the state courts as well. State courts, followingBlackledge, have consistently held that a presumption of vindictiveness arises from a prosecutor's decision to file more severe charges after a successful appeal, absent new evidence or an intervening change in case law to support them.See Townsend v. State, 134 S.W.3d 545, 549-50 (Ark. 2003) (holding that the defendant established a presumption of vindictiveness because after he successfully appealed his conviction, the state filed an amended felony information that subjected him to a higher sentence than he received in his previous trial); Whiteplume v. State, 874 P.2d 893 (Wyo. 1994) (holding that a presumption of vindictiveness existed where, in the absence of new evidence, the state filed a more serious kidnapping charge against the defendant after he successfully appealed his sexual assault conviction); Neal v. State, 150 S.W.3d 169, 174 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (noting that a presumption of vindictiveness arises where a defendant is convicted, appeals the conviction and obtains a new trial, and the state thereafter files a greater charge or additional enhancements); State v. Marti, 732 A.2d 414, 417 (N.H. 1999) (finding a presumption of vindictiveness where the prosecutor filed 104 additional indictments after the defendant had exercised his right to appeal the origina

  3. Phavixay v. State

    2009 Ark. 452 (Ark. 2009)   Cited 11 times

    We must now determine whether the State sufficiently rebutted the presumption of vindictiveness. Our decision in Townsend v. State, 355 Ark. 248, 134 S.W.3d 545 (2003), is instructive. In that case, the State rebutted the appellant's presumption of vindictiveness by showing that the allegations contained in the amended information were not available prior to the appellant's first trial.

  4. Williams v. State

    2013 Ark. App. 179 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 3 times

    Appellant contends that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that the State rebutted the presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness that arose when the State added a firearm-enhancement charge to the information two days after his first trial ended in a mistrial. Appellant cites Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); Phavixay v. State, 2009 Ark. 452, 352 S.W.3d 311; and Townsend v. State, 355 Ark. 248, 134 S.W.3d 545 (2003), for the proposition that "[a] presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness arises when a prosecuting attorney files an additional charge after the defendant's initial trial that exposes the defendant to a longer possible period of imprisonment." We agree with the State that no presumption arose in the present case because appellant's unopposed mistrial motion due to a hung jury was not the exercise of a legal right as contemplated by the United States Supreme Court in Blackledge and by the Arkansas Supreme Court in cases including Phavixay.