EZE contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that Nalco remained in possession of the property by leaving the wells on the Property. EZE cites Townsend v. Singleton, 183 S.E.2d 893 (1971), for the proposition that "[u]ntil a tenant removes its property from the leased premises it remains in possession of the property." (Id. 6.) However,Townsend is factually distinguishable.
That case impliedly reaffirmed the general rule that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover attorneys' fees for suits which they prosecute. Townsend v. Singleton, 257 S.C. 1, 183 S.E.2d 893 (1971). Because plaintiffs have not alleged any basis on which attorneys' fees can be awarded, plaintiffs' prayer for same is denied.
But this court does not read Addy as requiring the injured party to bring an indemnity action in a different court at a different time, since to do so would be an inefficient use of judicial time and energy, as well as a burden on the parties. It seems clear that damages in the form of attorneys' fees can be awarded in a cross-claim which is joined with the original action. South Carolina law is also clear in refusing attorneys' fees to a party who occupies a plaintiff's position. Townsend v. Singleton, 257 S.C. 1, 183 S.E.2d 893 (1971); Rimer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248 S.C. 18, 148 S.E.2d 742 (1966); First National Bank of Chillicothe v. McSwain, 93 S.C. 30, 75 S.E. 1106 (1912). While it is just to recompense one for expenses which are imposed upon an innocent party by the action of another party in prosecuting a suit, a party who chooses to bring a suit stands on entirely different footing.
It is clear that once the contract terminated and appellant refused tender of the rents, respondents possessed the premises as tenants at will. Townsend v. Singleton, 257 S.C. 1, 183 S.E.2d 893 (1971). See, Sections 27-33-10 (3) and 27-35-40 of the Code. As such, appellant thereafter was entitled to the reasonable rental value of his house.
9 Const. of 1895; 223 S.C. 182, 75 S.E.2d 46; 222 N.C. 585, 24 S.E. 350; Restatement, Agency 2d Section 22(b); 236 S.C. 594, 115 S.E.2d 291; 41 Am. Jur.2d Husband and Wife, par. 23; 205 S.C. 98, 31 S.E.2d 148; 193 S.C. 364, 9 S.E.2d 129; 169 S.C. 16, 168 S.E. 188; 146 S.C. 385, 144 S.E. 82; 132 S.C. 212, 128 S.E. 423. As to the Court's erring inrequiring Defendants to pay to counsel for Plaintiff an Attorneys'Fee: 81 S.C. 495, 62 S.E. 859; 96 S.C. 357, 80 S.E. 898; 231 S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d 403; 93 S.C. 30, 75 S.E. 1106; 96 S.C. 357, 80 S.E. 898; 259 S.C. 223, 191 S.E.2d 255; 248 S.C. 18, 148 S.E.2d 742; 257 S.C. 1, 183 S.E.2d 893. As to the Court's erring inapplication of law relating to the presumption arising fromthe failure of parties Defendant to testify: 210 S.C. 207, 42 S.E.2d 67; 219 S.C. 17, 64 S.E.2d 8; 210 S.C. 207, 42 S.E.2d 67; 261 S.C. 469, 200 S.E.2d 681; 213 S.C. 476, 50 S.E.2d 199.
only rightof the Academy under the Indenture is to require the useof the properties by the School District for public educationalpurposes: 211 S.C. 77, 44 S.E.2d 88, 173 A.L. R. 377; 223 S.C. 526, 77 S.E.2d 195; 220 S.C. 414, 68 S.E.2d 334; 107 S.C. 191, 92 S.E. 333; Act 1005 of the 1966 Acts, Section 5, 54 Stat. 2584, 2585; 57 Stat. 1087; 17 Am. Jur.2d 968, Contracts, Section 495; 49 Am. Jur.2d 992, Landlord and Tenant, Section 1021; 206 S.C. 183, 33 S.E.2d 501; 11 Wn. App. 195, 522 P.2d 515; 210 S.C. 183, 42 S.E.2d 537; 241 S.C. 155, 127 S.E.2d 439; 209 S.C. 19, 34, 39 S.E.2d 133; 153 S.C. 106, 150 S.E. 760; 219 S.C. 221; 64 S.E.2d 651; 243 S.C. 342, 133 S.E.2d 838; 82 S.C. 22, 63 S.E. 3; 83 S.C. 88, 64 S.E. 1018; 103 S.C. 10, 87 S.E. 421; 187 S.C. 474, 198 S.E. 403; 1 Speer 225. As to the Academy's being entitled to a reasonablerental for the properties during the period of detentionby the School District after its right of possessionended: 1 Speer 225; 153 S.C. 118, 150 S.E. 478; 257 S.C. 1, 183 S.E.2d 893; Section 41-1 (3), Code of Laws of 1962. Messrs. Boyd, Knowlton, Tate and Finlay, of Columbia, for Respondents-Appellants, cite: As to the School Districtbeing still the absolute owner of the properties in question: 126 S.C. 484, 120 S.E. 236; 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 146 at 1045; 28 Am. Jur.2d Estates § 136 at 250; L. Simes F. Smith, The Law of Future Interest §§ 1250 1511 at 395; H. Tiffany, The Law of Real Property § 199 at 331; 112 S.C. 312, 99 S.E. 825; 289 Ill. 289, 124 N.E. 652; 169 N.C. 507, 86 S.E. 302; 154 Wis. 545, 143 N.W. 681; 38 Ill. 592; 46 F. Supp. 411; 152 F.2d 735; 209 S.W. 914; 105 Ga. 517, 31 S.E. 455; 75 Pa. St. 300, 34 A. 848; 46 F. Supp. 411; 152 F.2d 735; 209 S.W. 914; 105 Ga. 517, 31 S.E. 455; 75 Pa. St. 300, 34 A. 848; 79 Wis. 557, 48 N.W. 661; 4 Kent. Comm. 130; Coke, Litt. 206a; 2 Bl. Comm. 156; 123 Mass. 584; 62 Conn. 378, 26 A. 479; 28 Am. Jur.2d Estates § 136 158; H. Tiffany, The Law of Real Property § 199; 3 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Rea
ldrep, Jr., Esq., of Anderson, for Defendant-Appellants, cites: As to the Court's erring in failing tofind sufficient evidence and testimony of acts of fraud anddeceit committed by the Respondents and the Respondent'sbrokers and therefore erring in refusing to submit the questionof fraud and deceit to the jury: 37 Am. Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit, Sec. 158; 231 S.C. 75, 97 S.E.2d 205; 252 S.C. 398, 166 S.E.2d 808; 248 S.C. 316, 149 S.E.2d 761. As to the Court's erring in failing tosubmit the question of the alleged breach of warranty bythe Respondent when testimony and evidence of unknownindebtedness and unknown defects in the equipment sold tothe Appellants was presented at trial: Sec. 10.2-313 and Sec. 10.2-314 of the South Carolina Code-Uniform Commercial Code. As to the Court's erring in ordering a judgmentdirected against the Appellant-Gilberts which included$5,000.00 in attorney fees when no contractual agreementor statute provided for such a fee to be paid by the Gilbertsto Leggett: 25 S.C. 1, 183 S.E.2d 893; 93 S.C. 30, 75 S.E.2d 1106; 231 S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d 403; 248 S.C. 18, 148 S.E.2d 742. Austin C. Latimer, Esq., of Younts, Reese and Cofield, Greenville, for Defendant-Respondents, cites: As to a lackof testimony to actionable fraud attributable to the Respondentto require submission to the jury: 12 Am. Jur.2d Brokers Secs. 1; 12 Am. Jur.2d Brokers, Secs. 74. Asto the Appellant's being responsible to the Respondent forthe entire amount of the judgment which was obtainedagainst the Respondent because of Appellant's breach ofcontract: 136 S.C. 144, 134 S.E. 263, P. 269.
; 120 S.W.2d 844; 126 Va. 156, 101 S.E. 58; 200 Va. 396, 105 S.E.2d 839; 236 S.C. 195, 113 S.E.2d 528, 532; 29 Am. Jur. (1960 ed) Insurance, Secs. 3, 5 et seq. Annotation, 664 A.L.R.2d 982; 238 S.C. 341, at page 345, 120 S.E.2d 231 at Messrs. Joseph H. McGee and McKenzie A. Perry, Jr., of Buist, Moore, Smythe McGee, Charleston, for Plaintiff-Respondent, and Steinberg, Levkoff, Spitz Goldberg, of Charleston, for Defendant-Respondent, cite: As to thePlaintiff's not having the burden of proof that Geico'spolicy was not validly cancelled prior to the date of theaccident: 22 Am. Jur.2d, Declaratory Judgments Sec. 97 and 98, pages 963 5; 238 S.C. 341, 120 S.E.2d 231; 215 S.C. 216, 50 S.E.2d 923; 45 C.J.S., Insurance, Sec. 461, page 129. As to all of the competentevidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Respondents,supporting the finding of the Trial Judge thatGeico furnished coverage to the Respondent Joseph Sinclairas of the time of the accident referred to in the Complaint: 257 S.C. 1, 183 S.E.2d 893; 253 S.C. 238, 169 S.E.2d 764; 90 N.H. 507, 11 A.2d 361, 127 A.L.R. 483; 342 F.2d 957; 383 F.2d 145. As to the Court'snot erring in finding that Geico afforded coverage to RespondentSinclair: 34 A.L.R.2d 385; 43 Am. Jur.2d Insurance, Sec. 1103, page 1024; 43 Am. Jur.2d Insurance, Section 453, page 496; 229 S.C. 230, 92 S.E.2d 647. February 13, 1974.
We agree and to that extent we reverse. We quote the following from the fairly recent case of Townsend v. Singleton, 257 S.C. 1, 183 S.E.2d 893 (1971): "We have held that recoverable damages do not include the expense of employing counsel except when so provided for by contract or statute. First Nat. Bank of Chillicothe v.McSwain, 93 S.C. 30, 75 S.E. 1106; United States RubberCo. v. White Tire Co., 231 S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d 403 and Rimer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 248 S.C. 18, 148 S.E.2d 742."
After termination of a lease, one continuing to occupy the premises, absent a new agreement, express or implied, comes squarely within the definition of a tenant at will. Townsend v. Singleton, 257 S.C. 1, 183 S.E.2d 893 (1971). Thus, even if there was no written or oral agreement between the parties, the Church was, at the very least, a tenant at will.