Opinion
CASE NO. 1:15-cv-0903-MJS
02-22-2016
DAVID TOWNSEL, Plaintiff, v. MADERA COUNTY DEP'T OF CORR., Defendant.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
(ECF No. 1)
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's complaint is before the Court for screening.
I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The in forma pauperis statute provides, "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
II. PLEADING STANDARD
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.
III. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff's allegations can be summarized essentially as follows: While Plaintiff was housed at the Madera County Department of Corrections, he could not receive and was unable to send mail from Friday, December 20, 2013, to Monday, December 23, 2013. Plaintiff brings suit against Defendant Madera County Department of Corrections for infliction of emotional distress and for violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Plaintiff's address on record indicates that he is no longer in custody.
IV. ANALYSIS
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v. Outlander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). Negligence is not sufficient to state a claim under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).
A. Eighth Amendment - Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In order to state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must "objectively show that he was deprived of something 'sufficiently serious,'" and "make a subjective showing that the deprivation occurred with deliberate indifference to the inmate's health or safety." Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). In order to satisfy the first prong of the test, the matters about which the plaintiff is complaining must rise to the level of either "the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain" or the deprivation of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (Prison officials "must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). In order to prevail on a claim of cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner must allege and prove that objectively he suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation and that subjectively prison officials acted with deliberate indifference in allowing or causing the deprivation to occur. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991).
Here, Plaintiff's claims simply do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. He alleges only that his incoming and outgoing mail was interfered with over one weekend. There is no suggestion that this temporary deprivation constituted any measureable deprivation, much less a serious one or that it was done with deliberate indifference. Lastly, Plaintiff fails to link the Defendant to any deprivation. Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.
B. First Amendment - Send and Receive Mail
Though Plaintiff does not allege that his First Amendment rights were violated, the complaint can be construed as asserting such a violation. Generally, prisoners have "a First Amendment right to send and receive mail." Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). However, isolated incidents of mail interference or tampering will not support a claim under section 1983 for violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990). See also Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999) (temporary delay or isolated incident of delay in mail processing does not violate prisoner's First Amendment rights).
In order to state a First Amendment claim of mail interference under Section 1983, Plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the delayed mail amounted to more than an isolated incident. Plaintiff has not done that here. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not alleged harm. There are no allegations that the temporary interference with his mail either constituted an ongoing practice of unjustified censorship or caused him to miss court deadlines or in any way prejudiced him. Also, he must link the Defendant to his allegations of wrongdoing. He must allege specific facts showing how the Defendant actually and proximately caused the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights. He has not done so.
C. Infliction of Emotional Distress
The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; (3) and actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct." Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 593 (1979). Conduct is outrageous if it is "so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community." Id. The distress inflicted must be "of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it." Fletcher v. W. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 397 (1970) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff's cursory allegations do not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Again, he alleges only that his mail was temporarily interfered with on one occasion. This does not amount to "extreme and outrageous conduct," and there is no allegation that Plaintiff was harmed, let alone harmed in such a way "that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure." Accordingly, this claim must also be dismissed.
V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff opts to amend, he must address the deficiencies noted in this Screening Order. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter . . . to 'state a claim that is plausible on its face.'" Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George, 507 F.3d at 607. Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on curing the deficiencies set forth above.
Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled "First Amended Complaint," refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
Within thirty (30) days from the service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this Screening Order;
1. The Clerk of Court is directed to send Plaintiff a copy of his complaint filed on June 15, 2015, and a copy of the Pro Se Packet; andIT IS SO ORDERED.
2. If Plaintiff fails to file a first amended complaint or otherwise respond to this Order, the Court will dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure to comply with a court order and failure to prosecute.
Dated: February 22, 2016
/s/ Michael J . Seng
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE