Opinion
No. C3-96-167.
Filed August 13, 1996.
Appeal from the District Court, Douglas County, File No. C9-95-389.
Thomas J. Reif, Thornton, Hegg, Reif, Johnston, Dolan, P.A., (for Appellants).
Ann L. Carrott, Douglas County Attorney, (for Respondent Douglas County).
Brenda A. Bjorkland, Minnesgasco, a Division of NorAm Energy Corp., (for Respondent Minnegasco).
Kevin F. Gray, Rajkowski Hansmeier Ltd., (for Respondent Minnegasco).
Timothy R. Thornton, Briggs and Morgan, P.A., (for Respondent Minnegasco).
Considered and decided by Parker, Presiding Judge, Randall, Judge, and Schumacher, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. sec. 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellants challenge the district court's order dismissing their action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the county zoning ordinance expressly provides for a direct appeal to a district court, and in light of this court's recent decision in Toby's of
Alexandria v. County of Douglas, 545 N.W.2d 54 (Minn.App. 1996), review denied (Minn. May 21, 1996), we reverse and remand.
FACTS
Minnegasco applied for a conditional use permit to build a "peak shaving plant" in a commercial zone. A shaving plant is used to inject propane air into the natural gas system to supplement natural gas supplies during high demand periods. The Douglas County Planning Advisory Commission held a public hearing where evidence was received regarding the pending application. The Planning Advisory Commission recommended the Douglas County Board of Commissioners deny the application. The Board of Commissioners held a public meeting to consider the recommendation of the Planning Commission. The Board granted Minnegasco's application.
Pursuant to the Douglas County zoning ordinance, appellants appealed the Board's decision to Douglas County District Court. The county zoning ordinance provides that any party aggrieved by a decision of the Board of Commissioners may appeal the decision to a Minnesota district court. Douglas County Zoning Ordinance Sec. VI(G)(2)(b) (1993). Respondents moved to dismiss the matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing an appeal of the Board's decision could only be taken by writ of certiorari to this Court.
The district court granted respondents' motions and entered judgment dismissing appellants' complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court ruled the only available means by which a decision of the Board of Commissioners could be reviewed was by writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the Douglas County zoning ordinance could not convey subject matter jurisdiction to the district courts, and equitable estoppel did not apply to the case at bar.
This appeal followed.
DECISION
Recently, in Toby's of Alexandria v. County of Douglas, 545 N.W.2d 54 (Minn.App. 1996), review denied (Minn. May 21, 1996), this court passed on the same Douglas County zoning ordinance provision at issue in this case. The Douglas County Board of Commissioners denied Toby's a conditional use permit to operate a restaurant. Id. at 55. Toby's, pursuant to the Douglas County zoning ordinance, appealed the decision to the district court. Id. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
This Court reversed, holding that the county zoning ordinance specifically conferred jurisdiction on the district court to hear appeals from the county board's decision to grant or deny conditional use permits. Id. at 56. Similarly, we hold that the district court possessed subject matter jurisdiction in the present case.
Absent an adequate method of review or legal remedy, judicial review of the quasi-judicial decisions of administrative bodies, such as the decision to grant or deny a conditional use permits, must be invoked by writ of certiorari. Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1992); Nietzel v. County of Redwood, 521 N.W.2d 73, 76 (Minn.App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 1994); Pierce v. Otter Tail County, 524 N.W.2d 308, 310 n. 2 (Minn.App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Feb. 3, 1994). But Toby's, and the present case, can be distinguished, as only in these two cases was the direct appeal to district court spelled out in the zoning ordinance. In Toby's, we held that "Section VI of the Douglas County zoning ordinance, together with the enabling statute [Minnesota Statutes Chapter 394], * * * provide[s] an available method of judicial review." Toby's, 545 N.W.2d at 56.
As we noted in Toby's, Chapter 394 provides counties the power to conduct planning and zoning activities, including the specific procedures for enacting zoning ordinances and for obtaining conditional use permits. Id.; See Minn. Stat. § 394.21-.37 (1994 Supp. 1995); Minn. Stat. § 394.24 (Supp. 1995) (official controls); Minn. Stat. § 394.301 (1994) (conditional use permits). Chapter 394 does not specify how to appeal a decision regarding the grant or denial of conditional use permits. The statute does provide that the board of adjustment has the authority to hear and decide appeals from the decision of any administrative official who enforces any ordinance adopted pursuant to Chapter 394. Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 5 (1994). The issuance or denial of a conditional use permit is an appealable "decision" within the jurisdiction of the board of adjustment because the section concerning conditional use permits, section 394.301, is within Chapter 394, and because it is an administrative officer who issues the permit following an order by the county board or planning commission. Toby's, 545 N.W.2d at 56. As we noted in Toby's, the Douglas County zoning ordinance specifically directed individuals to appeal to district courts, bypassing the board of adjustment level of appeal. Id. In Toby's, we also concluded that nothing in the enabling statute precludes counties from directing methods of appeal. Id. See Minn. Stat. § 394.25, subd. 1 (1994) ("Official controls shall be adopted by ordinance and may include but are not limited to the features set forth in this section."). Accordingly, we held that the zoning ordinance conveyed subject matter jurisdiction to the trial court. Toby's, 545 N.W.2d at 56.
This case is indistinguishable from Toby's. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court possesses subject matter jurisdiction. Because we conclude that the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction, we need not address appellants' arguments regarding estoppel, waiver, and due process.