Opinion
16-P-681
03-02-2017
TOWN OF MONTAGUE v. Jeanne GOLRICK.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant, Jeanne Golrick, appeals from a judgment entered against her in this tax lien case. Her primary argument is that because she was not served notice of the petition seeking foreclosure as contemplated by G. L. c. 60, § 66, the judgment must be set aside. We disagree. As we understand the record, Golrick acknowledges that the town of Montague (town) properly recorded both the instrument of tax taking and the petition seeking foreclosure long before she obtained her purported title. Golrick thus had at least constructive notice of the pending petition. Cf. Frost Coal Co . v. Boston , 259 Mass. 354, 357-358 (1927) ; Devine v. Nantucket , 449 Mass. 499, 507 (2007). More importantly, Golrick concedes she had actual notice of the petition and, in fact, she actively participated in the process by filing a formal appearance, filing opposition papers, and by appearing in person and arguing at all hearings. Lastly, Golrick does not argue she suffered any prejudice occasioned by the lack of formal § 66 notice. Neither due process nor § 66 requires more than what occurred here. See Vincent Realty Corp . v. Boston , 375 Mass. 775, 779-780 (1978). Cf. Adoption of Pearl , 34 Mass. App. Ct. 308, 312 n.5 (1993) (actual notice satisfied due process requirements).
We need only briefly address Golrick's remaining arguments. The Land Court judge properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction. See G. L. c. 185, § 1(b ) ; G. L. c. 60, § 64. The Land Court recorder had authority to issue the judgment at issue. See G. L. c. 185, § 6, final sentence. Had Golrick wished to have the questions presented considered by a Land Court judge she could have done so via a petition in the Land Court to vacate the judgment. See G. L. c. 60, §§ 69, 69A. Although Massachusetts does not appear to recognize allodial theory as applied to real property, those few non-Massachusetts jurisdictions addressing it suggest that real property so held does not exempt that property either from court process or local taxation. See Stevens v. Salisbury , 240 Md. 556, 562-563 (Md. 1965). Golrick has failed to bring to our attention any authority suggesting the contrary. From all that appears of record the town's counsel is admitted to practice before the Massachusetts Bar and properly appeared on the town's behalf. Golrick has brought to our attention nothing suggesting the contrary. To the extent we have not commented explicitly on Golrick's remaining arguments, we have considered and found them to be without merit.
The term does not appear in any reported Massachusetts decisions, the General Laws, the Massachusetts Constitution, or in any regulatory enactment.
"After the close of the Revolutionary War, the ownership of property in this country has frequently been referred to as ‘allodial’ in nature or that the property is held by ‘allodial tenure.’ In its strict sense, ‘allodium’ means land owned absolutely, and not subject to any rent, service, or other tenurial right of an overlord; however, it has been, and is, uniformly recognized throughout this country that the ownership of property is subject to the rights of government to tax the property, to regulate reasonably its use and enjoyment under the police power of the States, and to take the same, upon payment of the values thereof, when needed for a public purpose." Stevens v. Salisbury , supra .
Judgment affirmed.