Opinion
No. 05-09-00298-CR
Opinion Filed February 1, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F07-48439-UI.
Before Justices FITZGERALD, MURPHY, and MYERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Javier Tovar appeals his conviction for burglary of a habitation. In a single point of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to imprisonment. We affirm the trial court's judgment. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled. Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to burglary of a habitation. Appellant also pleaded true to having two prior felony convictions. After finding appellant guilty and finding two enhancement paragraphs true, the trial court assessed punishment at twenty-five years' imprisonment. In his sole point of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated the objectives of the Texas Penal Code by sentencing him to prison. Appellant asserts any term of imprisonment, without intensive drug treatment for his addiction, falls short of the rehabilitation goals of the penal code. The State responds that appellant has failed to preserve his complaints for appellate review and, alternatively, the record does not support his claims. Appellant did not complain about the sentence either at the time it was imposed or in his motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (for error to be preserved for appeal, the record must show appellant made a timely request, objection, or motion). After sentencing, appellant did not object to the sentence, and his motion for new trial complained that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence. Thus, appellant has not preserved this issue for our review. Even if appellant had preserved error, however, his arguments still fail. As a general rule, punishment that is assessed within the statutory range for the offense is not excessive or unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). In this case, the trial court imposed the minimum punishment for the offense, in light of two prior felony convictions. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.42(d), 30.02(a), (d) (Vernon 2003 Supp. 2009). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the twenty-five-year sentence. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (as long as a sentence is within the proper range of punishment, it will not be disturbed on appeal). We overrule appellant's sole point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.