Opinion
2019–07625 Index No. 708128/17
05-06-2020
Jean E. TOUSSAINT, appellant, v. Muftawu ZOMAH, respondent.
Ofshtein Law Firm, P.C. (Edelstein & Grossman, New York, N.Y. [Jonathan I. Edelstein ], of counsel), for appellant. Baker, McEvoy, Morrissey & Moskovits, P.C. (Marjorie E. Bornes, Brooklyn, NY, of counsel), for respondent.
Ofshtein Law Firm, P.C. (Edelstein & Grossman, New York, N.Y. [Jonathan I. Edelstein ], of counsel), for appellant.
Baker, McEvoy, Morrissey & Moskovits, P.C. (Marjorie E. Bornes, Brooklyn, NY, of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., MARK C. DILLON, WILLIAM F. MASTRO, BETSY BARROS, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Allan B. Weiss, J.), entered January 10, 2019. The order granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident on March 16, 2017. After discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident. The Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion, and the plaintiff appeals.
The defendant met his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 ; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176 ). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine and the plaintiff's left knee did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v. Yshua, 59 A.D.3d 614, 874 N.Y.S.2d 180 ), and that, in any event, the alleged injuries were not caused by the accident (see Gouvea v. Lesende, 127 A.D.3d 811, 6 N.Y.S.3d 607 ; Fontana v. Aamaar & Maani Karan Tr. Corp., 124 A.D.3d 579, 1 N.Y.S.3d 324 ). The defendant also demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180–day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see John v. Linden, 124 A.D.3d 598, 599, 1 N.Y.S.3d 274 ; Marin v. Ieni, 108 A.D.3d 656, 657, 969 N.Y.S.2d 165 ; Richards v. Tyson, 64 A.D.3d 760, 761, 883 N.Y.S.2d 575 ). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Zavala v. Zizzo, 172 A.D.3d 793, 794, 99 N.Y.S.3d 354 ; Cavitolo v. Broser, 163 A.D.3d 913, 914, 81 N.Y.S.3d 188 ; Bayk v. Martini, 142 A.D.3d 484, 35 N.Y.S.3d 923 ; Estrella v. Geico Ins. Co., 102 A.D.3d 730, 731, 959 N.Y.S.2d 210 ; Griffiths v. Munoz, 98 A.D.3d 997, 998, 950 N.Y.S.2d 787 ; Lively v. Fernandez, 85 A.D.3d 981, 982, 925 N.Y.S.2d 650 ).
Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
RIVERA, J.P., DILLON, MASTRO and BARROS, JJ., concur.