Opinion
NO. 01-14-00189-CR
03-31-2015
RUBEN TOTTEN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 228th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1365961
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Ruben Totten appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine. In a single issue, he complains about the court's denial of his request for a jury instruction. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
BACKGROUND
At trial, Officer Trant with the Houston Police Department's narcotics unit testified about his involvement in appellant's arrest. On October 25, 2012, Trant was working undercover providing surveillance on a group of duplex units. This particular location was known for narcotics activity, and Trant had previously purchased drugs at that location.
Trant testified that he saw a green Ford Ranger drive past him and park in the duplex parking lot. Trant saw appellant (a white male) and another person (a black male) in the vehicle when it drove past him. While the vehicle was parked, the occupants raised the hood. One of the occupants spent some time inspecting the engine while the other occupant went inside a duplex for approximately five to ten minutes. Trant could not tell which occupant went into the duplex.
When the vehicle left the duplex, it drove west on Brownsville. Trant testified that he then saw the vehicle turn right onto Frankie Street without using a turn signal. Trant did not pull the vehicle over, however, because he was undercover in an unmarked car. Instead, he radioed two nearby uniformed officers, Officers Kunkel and Betancourt, to pull the vehicle over. Kunkel and Betancourt then pulled over a vehicle that appellant was in. Trant testified, however, that the vehicle Kunkel and Betancourt stopped was not actually the vehicle that he had seen turn without signaling.
Officer Kunkel testified about Trant notifying him about a green Ford Ranger that Trant believed had been involved in a narcotics transaction and that Trant had witnessed failing to signal a turn. Kunkel testified that he and his partner, Officer Betancourt, spotted the vehicle a few seconds after receiving a call from Trant. Kunkel and Betancourt began to follow the vehicle in their marked patrol car, and Kunkel noticed that the vehicle's rear taillight was cracked and emitting a white light. They initiated a traffic stop. Betancourt approached the driver's door and Kunkel approached the passenger's door. Kunkel provided in-court identification of appellant as the passenger.
Kunkel asked appellant if he had anything illegal on him. Appellant said that he had a switchblade knife. Kunkel asked appellant to get out of the car so that Kunkel could take possession of the switchblade knife in appellant's pocket. He then arrested appellant and searched appellant's person to ensure that he did not have any other weapons or drugs. That search revealed crack cocaine hidden in appellant's shoe. Those drugs were the basis of appellant's possession charge in this case.
After a chemist with the City of Houston Police Department Crime Lab testified that the substance Kunkel recovered from appellant's shoe was 1.2 grams of cocaine, the State and appellant rested. Appellant's counsel "ask[ed] for a 38.23 instruction," which the court denied. The following day, before closing arguments, appellant's counsel reurged this request, which was again denied.
The jury found appellant guilty and, after finding two enhancements for prior offenses to be true, assessed a sentence of 25 years' confinement. The court entered judgment on the jury's verdict, and appellant timely appealed.
TEXAS CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23
In his sole point of error, appellant argues that the "trial court committed reversible error by refusing to give a requested jury instruction under Article 38.23." That article provides:
(a) No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (West 2005).
In any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the jury shall be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event, the jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.
Noting that the "terms of the statute are mandatory," the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that "when an issue of fact is raised, a defendant has a statutory right to have the jury charged accordingly." Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). To demonstrate that he or she is entitled to an instruction, the defendant must establish that the evidence raises an issue of fact, the evidence on that fact is affirmatively contested, and the contested factual issue must be material to the lawfulness of the challenged conduct in obtaining the evidence. Id. The evidence raising a fact issue "may be strong, weak, contradicted, unimpeached, or unbelievable." Mendoza v. State, 88 S.W.3d 236, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
A. Parties' arguments
Appellant argues that he was entitled to an article 38.23 instruction informing the jury that it must disregard the evidence about the drugs found on appellant if the jury believes, or has a reasonable doubt, about the legality of the traffic stop that led to his search and arrest. Specifically, he argues that the evidence raised a fact issue about whether Trant's allegedly witnessing a green Ford Ranger commit a traffic violation justified the traffic stop, given that Trant testified that the vehicle he observed making a turn without signaling was not the same vehicle Kunkel and Betancourt pulled over. Appellant also claims that photographic evidence of the scene raises a fact issue about whether Trant could have seen the vehicle turn without signaling. Finally, appellant asserts that Kunkel's testimony that the vehicle that appellant was riding in had a cracked taillight does not provide legal cause for the stop because a cracked taillight does not constitute a traffic offense. See Vicknair v. State, 751 S.W.2d 180, 187-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (op. on reh'g).
The State does not respond directly to appellant's argument that the evidence raised a material fact question as to whether the failure to signal a turn and the later traffic stop involved the same vehicle. Instead, the State focuses on the issue of the cracked taillight. Specifically, the State argues that an article 38.23 instruction was not warranted, as there is "no dispute that Officer Kunkel received a report from Officer Trant that the Green Ranger carrying Appellant had failed to signal a right turn at the interaction." Thus, "even allowing for a factual dispute over the cracked taillight," the State asserts that the "dispute was not material" because "Officer Kunkel still had reasonable suspicion as a matter of law to conduct the traffic stop based upon the information he had at the time regardless of whether Officer Trant observed the cracked taillight or not."
A. Analysis
We agree with appellant that the evidence raised a fact issue warranting an article 38.23 instruction and that it was thus error for the trial court to refuse appellant's request. Officer Betancourt—who was driving the patrol car that pulled appellant over—did not testify at appellant's trial. Officer Kunkel, Betancourt's partner, testified that Trant called them early in the afternoon on October 25, 2012 to let them know that he was doing undercover narcotics surveillance in the area and might need them to "be in the area" and "help with an investigation."
Kunkel testified that Trant contacted them again about 5:00 p.m. that day with information about a vehicle to pull over:
Q. What type of information did you learn from Officer Trant?
A. He advised us that he was watching a possible narcotics location and that he observed what he believed to be a narcotics transaction, and he gave us a vehicle description and a suspect description of the parties involved and we were close enough to find the vehicle that he saw involved in the narcotics transaction.
Q. Did he give you any other information?
A. On top of the description, he gave us probable cause to stop the vehicle. He observed it turn without using its signals, which is a traffic violation.
Q. Do you remember the vehicle description that you received?
A. Green Ford Ranger.
Q. Did you receive a license plate so that you could locate that vehicle?
A. I don't remember. Probably not.
Q. Were you able to locate that vehicle?
A. Yes.
Q. How soon after were you able to locate it?
A. A few seconds. He told us what direction of travel it was going, on what street. And we were close enough to find it on that street as well.
Q. Did you immediately pull the vehicle over just based on that?
A. No. We pulled up behind the vehicle and also observed that the tail lens was cracked and emitting a white light.
Q. Is that a traffic violation?
A. Yes. That is a traffic violation as well.
Q. What did you do at that point?
A. We initiated a traffic stop. . . .
In his testimony, Officer Trant conceded that although he thought that the green Ford Ranger's short visit at this particular duplex complex was suspicious because of prior drug activity in the complex, there was no legal justification for detaining the vehicle nor its occupants until he witnessed the driver turn without signaling. And he further testified that he is not sure if the appellant was in the car that he saw turn without signaling (because the occupants were a "blur") and that Kunkel and Betancourt did not pull over the vehicle that he had seen turn without signaling:
Q. Do you remember what information you gave to Officer Kunkel and Officer Betancourt?
A. Well, they knew when it began [because] I always brief people. I let them see me, which they knew me from the past and I told them I was going to a location that we've been to several times. And I was going to basically conduct surveillance and look for narcotics activity.
Q. Did you give a description of the vehicle you had seen?
A. I did.
Q. Did you see them actually pull the vehicle over?
A. No, ma'am. I stayed where I was at.
Q. Did you ever see that vehicle again once they had pulled it over?
A. No, ma'am. No.
Q. Do you know if the person they pulled over is the same person that you saw?
A. When they went by - I mean, I could just see two occupants. It was kind of a blur -
Q. Did you notice if it was the same vehicle that they -
A. It wasn't the same vehicle.
Q. And how do you know that?
A. Just by what they told me, description-wise.
The State argues that there was no fact issue for the jury to resolve about the legality of the stop warranting an article 38.23 instruction. It analogizes this case to the facts presented in Broussard v. State, 434 S.W.3d 828, 834-35 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd). In that case, officers testified that they approached and detained the occupants of a parked vehicle because the officers smelled marijuana emanating from the vehicle and saw the defendant smoking a cigar in the vehicle. Id. at 833. Tests on a cigar recovered from inside the car revealed that it contained Kush, a legal substance, rather than marijuana. Id. The defendant argued that he was thus entitled to an article 38.23 instruction because he raised "a fact issue regarding whether the police officers smelled marijuana." Id. The court disagreed, explaining that "[e]ven if the cigar recovered from the car did not smell like marijuana" that does not amount to affirmative evidence that "officers did not smell marijuana emanating from the vehicle." Id. at 834 (emphasis added). The marijuana smell "may have resulted from the recent use of marijuana rather than from the appellant's smoking marijuana when the officers saw him smoking inside his vehicle." Id. at 835. Because there was no affirmative evidence that the officers did not smell marijuana emanating from the car, the evidence did not raise a fact issue supporting an article 38.23 instruction. Id.
The State also cites Tollett v. State, a case in which one officer saw the defendant driving erratically, but a different officer (who did not witness the erratic driving) detained the defendant. 422 S.W.3d 886, 897 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd). In rejecting defendant's argument that the evidence raised a fact issue to support an article 38.23 instruction, the court noted that the absence of evidence is not the same thing as affirmative evidence. Id. ("We conclude Officer Sharp's testimony that he did not observe appellant commit any traffic violations is not affirmative evidence that Officer Hernandez lied about appellant committing traffic violations prior to the time Officer Sharp arrived.").
In Madden v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals provided the following explanation about the type of conflicting affirmative evidence requiring an article 38.23 jury instruction:
To raise a disputed fact issue warranting an Article 38.23(a) jury instruction, there must be some affirmative evidence that puts the existence of that fact into question. In this context, a cross-examiner's questions do not create a conflict in the evidence, although the witnesses's answers to those questions might.
Here, for example, one issue was whether appellant exceeded the speed limit of 55 m.p.h. through a construction site, giving Officer Lily a reasonable suspicion to stop him. If Officer Lily testifies that appellant did speed and Witness Two (or appellant) testifies that he
did not speed, this disputed factual issue must be submitted to the jury. If the jury finds that appellant did obey the speed limit and that Officer Lily was unreasonable in believing that he did not, then they may not consider the evidence obtained as a result of this unlawful detention. If, however, Officer Lily says that appellant did speed, and Witness Two (or appellant) says that he doesn't remember or doesn't know, there is no disputed fact to submit because there is no affirmative evidence of a factual conflict. Similarly, if Officer Lily testifies that appellant did speed, but the cross-examiner grills him, "Isn't it true that he really did obey the speed limit, you're wrong or you're lying?" there is no factual dispute unless Officer Lily admits, "Yes, that is true." The cross-examiner cannot create a factual dispute for purposes of an Article 38.23(a) instruction merely by his questions. It is only the answers that are evidence and may create a dispute. Even the most vigorous cross-examination implying that Officer Lily is the Cretan Liar does not raise a disputed issue. There must be some affirmative evidence of "did not speed" in the record before there is a disputed fact issue. Because there was such evidence in this record, the trial judge properly gave a jury instruction on this disputed fact.242 S.W.3d 504, 513-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (footnotes omitted).
The evidence here is more like the evidence discussed above in Madden than in Broussard or Tollett. In this case, there is affirmative evidence creating a fact issue about the legal justification for Kunkel and Betancourt's stop of the vehicle appellant was riding in. Specifically, while the State argues that Trant's witnessing the green Ford Ranger turn without signaling provided the probable cause for the traffic stop, there is also affirmative evidence that Kunkel and Betancourt pulled over a different vehicle. It may well be that the jury would resolve this dispute in the State's favor, but submission to the jury is mandatory when a fact issue—compelling or not—is raised by affirmative evidence. Mendoza, 88 S.W.3d at 239 (article 38.23 submission is mandatory without regard for whether the evidence is "strong, weak, contradicted, unimpeached, or unbelievable").
The State points out that, "if other facts, not in dispute, are sufficient to support the lawfulness of the challenged conduct, then the disputed fact issue is not material to the ultimate admissibility of the evidence and is not to be submitted to the jury." See Mbugua v. State, 312 S.W.3d 657, 669 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref'd). But the State does not actually argue that the green Ford Ranger's short visit to the duplex or the cracked tail light provided legal justification for the stop. The factual dispute about whether the vehicle that committed the traffic violation was the same one that was pulled over goes to the only legal justification proffered by the State for appellant's detention leading to his arrest for possession.
This is likely because Trant acknowledged that he did not witness any activity at the duplex complex justifying a stop. And a cracked taillight emitting a white light is only an infraction justifying a stop if it is completely broken out such that it does not also emit a red light. Compare Vicknair, 751 S.W.2d at 187-89 (op. on reh'g) (cracked taillight emitting sliver of white light did not justify traffic stop), with Howard v. State, 888 S.W.2d 166, 172-73 & n.6 (Tex. App.—Waco 1994, pet. ref'd) (completely busted out taillight that emitted only a white light, and no red light, justified traffic stop because it violated statute requiring automotive taillights to emit a red light).
Because error was preserved in the trial court, appellant must only show "some harm" from the trial court's refusing his request for an article 38.23 instruction. Mills v. State, 296 S.W.3d 843, 849 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, pet. ref'd) (citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.3d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). Because appellant raised a fact issue about the legality of Kenkel and Betancourt's stop, and because the narcotics seized in that stop formed the basis of appellant's conviction, appellant suffered "some harm" from the charge error. See, e.g., Vrba v. State, 69 S.W.3d 713, 719 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (appellant suffered some harm from the erroneous omission of an article 38.23 instruction because "record contains no evidence of [appellant's] guilt independent of that obtained as a result of the stop").
We sustain appellant's point of error.
CONCLUSION
We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Sherry Radack
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Brown and Lloyd. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).