Opinion
LLICV156011965S
01-20-2016
Torrington Diesel Corp. v. Weingart Custom Building & Remodeling, Inc. et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#109)
HON. JOHN D. MOORE, J.
The defendants have moved for summary judgment (#109), arguing that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, or unjust enrichment because the plaintiff failed to obtain written authorization from the defendants before proceeding with the repairs on the defendants' dump truck. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 23, 2015, the plaintiff, Torrington Diesel Corporation, initiated the present action, by service of process, against the defendants, Weingart Custom Building and Remodeling, Inc. and Gregory Weingart. On June 12, 2015, the plaintiff filed a six-count amended complaint. The plaintiff alleges the following facts in its amended complaint. The plaintiff is a Connecticut corporation located in Torrington, Connecticut, and in the business of repairing construction, transportation, material handling, and other commercial vehicles. On January 9, 2014, the defendants, through an officer or employee, requested that the plaintiff repair a 2006 Ford 550 dump truck. The plaintiff agreed and repaired the dump truck by furnishing parts and services, and the defendants subsequently took delivery of the dump truck. In accordance with their agreement, the plaintiff billed the defendants the sum of $6, 275.40. The defendants, however, have refused or neglected to pay the bill. Accordingly, the defendants were unjustly enriched and the plaintiff requests money damages on all counts.
On August 11, 2015, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (#109) on all counts of the amended complaint arguing that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment on the ground that the plaintiff failed to obtain written authorization for the repairs which is required by General Statutes § 14-65f. In support of their motion, the defendants filed a memorandum of law (#110) and attached the following evidence: (1) defendants' requests for admission served on the plaintiff, defendant's exhibit A; (2) the signed and sworn affidavit of the defendant Mr. Weingart, defendant's exhibit B; (3) the dump truck repair invoice, defendant's exhibit C; and (4) the defendants' interrogatories and requests for production, defendant's exhibit D. On September 21, 2015, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment (#112) arguing that there is a genuine issue of material fact that written authorization is not required because Weingart orally consented to the repairs. The plaintiff attached as evidence the signed and sworn affidavits (#113) of Pieritalo Bauchiero, the president of the Torrington Diesel Corporation, and Shawn Kelly, a mechanic who works for the plaintiff. The plaintiff further argued that the parties had previously, on two occasions, established a course of dealing in which the plaintiff would perform repairs for the defendants and not issue an invoice to the defendants until after the service was accomplished. Moreover, the plaintiff contended that the statute at issue does not prohibit an action for an oral contract or for the equitable remedies of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit. On October 9, 2015, the defendants filed a reply (#115) to the plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the summary judgment motion. This matter was heard at the short calendar on October 26, 2015.
DISCUSSION
" Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). " In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 820-21, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015).
" The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anastasia v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, 307 Conn. 706, 711, 59 A.3d 207 (2013). " In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maltas v. Maltas, 298 Conn. 354, 365, 2 A.3d 902 (2010). " A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002) .
In the present case, the defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff failed to obtain written authorization for the repair services rendered pursuant to General Statutes § 14-65f. The defendants further argue that there is no course of dealings or bad faith exception to § 14-65f, nor any precedent to create either exception. In opposition, the plaintiff argues: (1) that § 14-65f does not require written authorization when oral consent is given; (2) that a course of dealing was established with the defendants such that written authorization was not required; and (3) that the plaintiff should receive the value of its work under the doctrines of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. The court begins its analysis by reviewing § 14-65f.
I
Written Authorization Under § 14-65f
General Statutes § 14-65f provides, in relevant part: " (a)(1) Prior to performing any repair work on a motor vehicle, a motor vehicle repair shop shall obtain a written authorization to perform the work, on an invoice signed by the customer, that includes an estimate in writing of the maximum cost to the customer of the parts and labor necessary for the specific job authorized. A repair shop shall not charge for work done or parts supplied without written authorization or in excess of the estimate unless the customer gives consent orally or in writing."
As an initial matter, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to written authorization in the present case. No written authorization was ever given by the defendants. Defendants' requests for admission, May 12, 2015, Nos. 1-6, inclusive; affidavit of Gregory J. Weingart, August 5, 2015, Para. 6; plaintiff's responses to defendants' interrogatories and requests for production, June 12, 2015, No. 6.
The plaintiff argues, however, that the defendants gave oral consent for the work performed (see plaintiff's responses to defendants' interrogatories and requests for production, June 12, 2015, no. 6; affidavit of Shawn Kelley, September 14, 2015, para. 8; affidavit of Pieritalo Bauchiero, September 15, 2015, para. 6), and that oral consent is sufficient. The plaintiff's argument in this regard relies solely on the last sentence of § 14-65f(a)(1), which provides: " [a] repair shop shall not charge for work done or parts supplied without a written authorization or in excess of the estimate unless the customer gives consent orally or in writing."
Although our appellate courts have not addressed this issue, several judges of the Superior Court have found that written authorization is required for a repair shop to charge for automotive repairs, even if the consumer provided oral consent. " Section 14-65f(a) requires a repair shop, before performing any motor vehicle repair work, to obtain a written authorization signed by the customer . . . In the absence of such authorization, the repair shop is barred from charging its customers for the work done or parts supplied. A customer may waive his right to an estimate but only by a signed writing in a form prescribed by section 14-65g." Lewis Truck & Trailer, Inc. v. Jandreau, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV-81-01924940-S (January 22, 1986, Gaffney, J.) (1 C.S.C.R. 73), aff'd on other grounds, 11 Conn.App. 168, 526 A.2d 532 (1987). " The provisions of [General Statutes] § 14-65f(a) could not be clearer as to the obligations of a car repair shop. Absent unusual circumstances . . . unless there is written authorization, the repair shop cannot charge for repair . . . Such a consumer protection statute is strictly construed." (Emphasis in original.) Felicello v. Cerillo, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 990421617S, (December 23, 1999, Pittman, J.).
The court recognizes that New England Truck Sales & Service, Inc. v. Spezzano, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 28 98 40, (June 20, 1990, Hodgson, J.) reached a different result. The court notes first, however, that New England Truck Sales & Services appears to be the only case that reached the conclusion that the oral consent provision of § 14-65f(a) trumps the language in the earlier part of the statute mandating written authorization. The court further points out that New England Truck Sales & Services reached its result in conclusory fashion, without engaging in any analysis of the interplay between all portions of § 14-65f(a). Id.
In New England Truck Sales & Services, the court seems to have reached its result based entirely on the testimony of the defendant at a hearing for a prejudgment remedy. The defendant's testimony constitutes an express abandonment of the defendant's rights under § 14-65f(a). During his testimony at the hearing, the defendant stated that " the plaintiff's failure to provide him with an advance estimate as to any of the three bills at issue 'is not a problem, ' and he confirmed that he requested that the work be done and that he did not expect to learn the amount of the charges until after it had been completed." New England Truck Sales & Services, Inc. v. Spezzano, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 28 98 40. The defendant additionally testified that " he thought it would not be possible for the plaintiff to provide a price because of the difficulty of predicting what problems would be encountered in the course of the repair." Id.
This court finds persuasive the analysis of Judge, now Justice Vertefeuille, in Rosa v. Davis, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV96-0133744 (August 16, 1996, Vertefeuille, J.) (17 Conn. L. Rptr. 442, 443), a case that considered the oral consent provision found in the second sentence of § 14-65f(a) in light of the mandatory language of the preceding sentence. The first sentence states, unambiguously, that " [p]rior to performing any repair work on a motor vehicle, a motor vehicle repair shop shall obtain a written authorization to perform the work . . . signed by the customer, which includes an estimate . . ." (Emphasis added). General Statutes § 14-65f(a)(1). The statute then goes on to state in the second sentence that " [a] repair shop shall not charge for work done or parts supplied without a written authorization or in excess of the estimate unless the customer gives consent orally or in writing." Id. In considering these two sentences together, Judge Vertefeuille held that if the oral consent provision of the second sentence were meant to apply to the mandatory requirement of written authorization found in the first sentence, the oral consent provision " would so eviscerate the [written] requirement as to render it meaningless." Rosa v. Davis, supra, 443. See also DP Diesel Repair, LLC v. Healy, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV085023054S (December 7, 2010, Burke, J.) (51 Conn. L. Rptr. 107, 109).
Judge Vertefeuille's conclusion is buttressed by the legislative history of this statute. " The legislative history concerning the enactment of [§ ]14-65f . . . shows that the legislature's concern was regulating the automobile repair industry, protecting consumers, and reducing the overall number of complaints filed with the department. Speaking before the House of Representatives, Representative Robert J. Vicino remarked: '[T]his bill is a first in an effort to try to resolve some of the problems that now exist in the area of automobile repairs . . .' In addition, Representative Vicino commented that the bill 'will go a long way toward probably reducing complaints in the [d]epartment; that most people will know after they deal or before they deal with their repairer as to where they stand . . .' This history demonstrates that § § 14-63 through 14-65k are remedial in nature, and we must, therefore, construe them broadly to accomplish their purpose and liberally . . . in favor of those the legislature intended to benefit." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jim's Auto Body v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 285 Conn. 794, 810-11, 942 A.2d 305 (2008).
The court also finds persuasive the holding of DP Diesel Repair, LLC v. Healy, supra, 51 Conn. L. Rptr. 107, which interprets the meaning of the oral consent provision by positing that " [t]he oral consent provision of § 14-65f(a) applies only after a written authorization has been given and the cost of the work will exceed the written estimate which forms part of the authorization . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 109. The limited purpose of the oral consent provision, therefore, is to vary a written estimate after it has been given in conjunction with a written authorization signed by the customer.
In light of the remedial nature of § 14-65f(a), this court holds that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff cannot succeed on an action to collect for services rendered for motor vehicle repair unless the defendants were to have signed a written authorization prior to the work being performed. Oral consent, absent such written authorization, cannot serve as the basis for such a recovery. In the present case, as mentioned above, there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning written authorization. The defendant did not execute such written authorization prior to the work being performed. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot rely on facts it claims constitute the defendant's oral consent to create a genuine issue of material fact so as to defeat the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The only exception to this holding is when the customer executes a written waiver of her right to receive an estimate pursuant to § 14-65g.
II
Course of Dealing
The plaintiff next argues that a course of dealing, including implied or oral authorization, between the plaintiff and the defendants negates the statutory requirement of written authorization. The plaintiff argues there is a course of dealing because Mr. Bauchiero's affidavit opined that the defendants' principal, Mr. Weingart, had brought his dump truck in for repairs on two previous occasions, and one occasion after the repair in issue. Further, the plaintiff contends that Mr. Bauchiero's and Mr. Kelley's affidavits demonstrate that Mr. Weingart orally agreed to the repair work twice, observed the work while it was being performed, and offered no objection.
There is no Connecticut appellate law, however, to support the argument that a course of dealing, even one including implied authorization, trumps the statutory requirement of written authorization. Judges of the Superior Court have found the opposite, concluding that a course of dealing does not circumvent the written authorization requirement. " The legislature could have chosen to . . . broaden the waiver provisions to include an implied waiver of written authorizations where individuals or businesses have a repeated and regular course of dealing. But as it stands, the statute is unambiguous on its face . . . Without a written waiver of advance estimates or a subsequent notification to the customer of the estimate followed by further oral or written authorization, the plaintiff is prohibited by the statute from charging for its repair work, period." Circle " A" Automotive Service, Inc. v. American Rentals, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV990433344S (January 31, 2001, Pittman, J.) (29 Conn. L. Rptr. 162, 163); see also H.O. Wolding, Inc. v. Spillane's Servicenter, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. 348347 (August 22, 1991, Wagner, J.) (4 Conn. L. Rptr. 433, 434) (reinforcing that oral consent is sufficient only when claim is made for work done or parts supplied in excess of estimate after written authorization has been waived).
As with the plaintiff's oral consent argument, the plaintiff again relies on New England Truck Sales & Services, Inc. v. Spezzano, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 28 98 40, this time as the sole legal authority for the proposition that " [o]ther courts have allowed a recovery upon a finding of a course of dealing and that the customer orally consented to the repair work, " plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to motion for summary judgment, September 21, 2015, without satisfying the written authorization requirement found in § 14-65f. The doctrine of course of dealing, however, is not the basis of the holding of New England Truck Sales & Services . Although the court in New England Truck Sales & Services reviews the history of the business relationship between the plaintiff truck repair shop and the defendant customer, the portion of the decision dealing with § 14-65f never mentions the phrase " course of dealing." Instead it holds, as mentioned above, that the defendant " gave oral consent" for the truck repairs in question. Id. As a result, the plaintiff has not provided any authority for the proposition that a course of dealing pertaining to automotive repairs could trump the statutory requirement of written pre-authorization of such repairs.
The court finds that, for the same reasons as those set forth in the preceding section and in Circle " A" Automotive Services, Inc. v. American Rentals, Inc., supra, 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 163, as a matter of law, the statutory mandate of written authorization from the customer prior to the commencement of repair work is a prerequisite for the recovery of car repair services. As there is no genuine dispute in this case that the defendants never provided the required written authorization for the repairs, the plaintiff's argument that the course of dealing creates a genuine issue of material fact fails.
III
Quantum Meruit and Unjust Enrichment
Finally, the plaintiff argues that facts supporting the application of the doctrines of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment in this case create a genuine issue of material fact so as to defeat the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the plaintiff argues, drawing upon the affidavits of Mr. Bauchiero and Mr. Kelley, that quantum meruit and unjust enrichment should be applied because the defendants acted in bad faith by orally consenting to the repair work and then not paying for it. As a legal basis for this argument, the plaintiff contends that nothing in § 14-65f prohibits a motor vehicle repair shop from recovering for the reasonable value of its work or parts it expended on the repair of a vehicle, even in the absence of written authorization.
" Quantum meruit is a theory of contract recovery that does not depend upon the existence of a contract, either express or implied in fact . . . Rather, quantum meruit arises out of the need to avoid unjust enrichment to a party, even in the absence of an actual agreement . . . Centered on the prevention of injustice, quantum meruit strikes the appropriate balance by evaluating the equities and guaranteeing that the party who has rendered services receives a reasonable sum for those services. Unjust enrichment applies whenever justice requires compensation to be given for property or services rendered under a contract, and no remedy is available by an action on the contract . . . Indeed, lack of a remedy under the contract is a precondition for recovery based upon unjust enrichment. Not unlike quantum meruit, it is a doctrine based on the postulate that it is contrary to equity and fairness for a defendant to retain a benefit at the expense of the plaintiff." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 401, 766 A.2d 416 (2001). One fundamental principle of equitable remedies like quantum meruit and unjust enrichment is that " [o]ne who seeks equity must also do equity and expect that equity will be done for all." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Falkenstein v. Falkenstein, 84 Conn.App. 495, 504, 854 A.2d 749, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 928, 859 A.2d 581 (2004). Put another way, our Supreme Court has stated that " [w]hen the illegality, either in whole or in part, is in the thing which the party seeking to recover was to do, then there can be no recovery upon a [claim of] quantum meruit." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McKnight v. Gizze, 119 Conn. 251, 256, 175 A. 676 (1934).
As mentioned above, the purpose of § 14-65f is to protect the consumer. The plaintiff has not cited, and the court could not find, any Connecticut case law to support the proposition that a plaintiff repair shop could recover on a theory of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment for work it performed without written authorization.
More to the point, it would be a violation of the fundamental principle of equity cited above to allow such a recovery. Under our jurisprudence, a claimant cannot recover on an equitable theory based upon a prohibited or an illegal act. See Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 101 Conn.App. 438, 445, 922 A.2d 236, cert. denied, 283 Conn. 911, 928 A.2d 537 (2007). Our Supreme Court, in construing an ancient predecessor of § 14-65f, one that (1) required written authorization for proceeding with auto repair work in excess of $50, and (2) imposed criminal sanctions on repair shops that did so without such written authorization, held that " the prohibited thing is the transaction itself." Di Biase v. Garnsey, 103 Conn. 21, 26, 130 A. 81 (1925), e.g., performing the repair without the requisite written authorization. This holding is echoed in more recent superior court cases construing § 14-65f to disallow equitable remedies when the claimant has not received the required written authorization. " A plaintiff is not entitled to recover from an illegal transaction created by the plaintiff's failure to adhere and comply with the mandatory provisions of § 14-65f . . ." R& M Automotive, Inc. v. Clapp, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 92-00449283S (September 28, 1993, Morelli, J.T.R.) (10 Conn. L. Rptr. 188, 189) (to permit recovery on quantum meruit would defeat and nullify § 14-65f); see also New Haven Truck & Auto Body, Inc. v. Bunning, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-10-6015535-S (June 20, 2013, Hadden, J.T.R.) (56 Conn. L. Rptr. 295, 298) (plaintiff is not allowed to recover by way of unjust enrichment for breach of contract claim under § 14-65f).
In the present case, the plaintiff failed to first obtain written authorization as required under § 14-65f(a). Without written authorization from the defendants to perform the repair work on the dump truck, the repair work performed constituted an illegal or prohibited transaction under the mandatory provisions of § 14-65f. Therefore, the plaintiff violated § 14-65f, does not come to this case with clean hands, and cannot rely on equitable remedies such as quantum meruit or unjust enrichment to recover any resources expended in repairing the dump truck. This certainly makes sense in light of the fact, as discussed above, that § 14-65f was enacted to protect the consumer, not the-repairman; without written authorization before repair, there can be no recovery for labor and parts spent on repairs. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, recover for work performed under a theory of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment and cannot defeat the defendants' motion for summary judgment by marshalling facts in support of such equitable claims.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
So ordered.