Courts do not lightly award this extraordinary relief, and preliminary injunctions are therefore "to be granted only sparingly." Toolchex, Inc. v. Trainor, 634 F. Supp. 2d 586, 593 (E.D. Va. 2008) (quoting In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 524 (4th Cir. 2003)). To prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the movant must establish that each of four factors weighs in its favor: (1) the likelihood that the moving party will succeed on the merits; (2) the likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is denied; (3) the balance of the equities; and (4) the public interest.

Preventing trademarks from being used deceptively protects the public and serves the public interest. Toolchex, v. Trainor, 634 F. Supp. 2d 586, 594 (E.D. Va. 2008) (citing Bowe Bell & Howell Co. v. Harris, 145 F. App'x 401, 404 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (affirming a grant of a preliminary injunction)). In addition, protecting the interests of trademark owners serves the public interest.

Loss of goodwill and industry reputation can constitute irreparable harm for either claim. See, e.g., Toolchex, Inc. v. Trainor, 634 F. Supp. 2d 586, 593 (E.D. Va. 2008) (finding that use of protected trademark and its related damage to goodwill is irreparable harm for purposes of trademark claim); MetroPCS New York, LLC v. Riverhead Water Dist., No. 15-CV-6311, 2016 WL 373969, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2016) ("A party's 'loss of reputation, good will, and business opportunities' resulting from a breach of contract may constitute irreparable harm.") (quoting Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 404 (2d Cir. 2004)). As DAG has shown that DIA's continued use of the "Dynamic Airways" name and its concurrent use of the "DYNAMIC" mark both create an imminent risk of irreparable harm, the court finds that this factor favors an injunction on both claims.

Preventing trademarks from being used deceptively protects the public and serves the public interest. Toolchex, v. Trainor, 634 F. Supp. 2d 586, 594 (E.D. Va. 2008) (citing Bowe Bell & Howell Co. v. Harris, 145 F. App'x 401, 404 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (affirming a grant of a preliminary injunction)). In addition, protecting the interests of trademark owners serves the public interest.

Third, several district courts in the Fourth Circuit continue to recognize the presumption in trademark cases after eBay, although often without citing the opinion. See, e.g., Meineke Car Care Ctrs., Inc. v. Catton, No. 3:10–CV–000234–RLV–DSC, 2010 WL 2572875, at *2 (W.D.N.C. June 24, 2010) (noting court in Lone Star “acknowledged that the ‘irreparable injury necessary for injunctive relief regularly follows from trademark infringement’ ”); Lorillard Tobacco, 616 F.Supp.2d at 587 (presumption of injury “generally applied” once plaintiff has shown a likelihood of confusion); Toolchex, Inc. v. Trainor, 634 F.Supp.2d 586, 591 n. 2 (E.D.Va.2008). Indeed, in an opinion issued the year after eBay, National League of Junior Cotillions, Inc. v. Porter, No. 3:06–cv–508, 2007 WL 2316823, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 9, 2007), aff'd, 280 Fed.Appx. 322 (4th Cir.2008), the district court noted, with respect to trademark infringement, that “[b]ecause neither the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has explicitly extended eBay's reasoning to preliminary injunctions, and given the slight record in this case, the Court will not attempt to resolve eBay's impact at the preliminary injunction stage.”

Fourth, the public interest favors an injunction because the public interest is served by avoiding consumer confusion caused by the misleading use of Plaintiff's PRAGMATIC PLAY Marks, PRAGMATIC PLAY Game Marks, and PRAGMATIC PLAY Works. Toolchex, Inc. v. Trainor, 634 F.Supp.2d 586, 594 (E.D. Va. 2008) (citing Bowe Bell & Howell Co. v. Harris, 145 Fed.Appx. 401,404 (4th Cir. 2005)); JTH Tax, Inc. v. Lee, 514 F.Supp.2d 818, 826 (E.D. Va. 2007).

Defendants are unlikely to suffer any cognizable harm from the preliminary injunction, as they will merely be prevented from profiting from past counterfeiting and infringement and from moving their funds beyond the reach of this Court. See Toolchex, Inc. v. Trainor, 634 F.Supp.2d 586, 593 (E.D. Va. 2008) (holding that any harm a defendant would suffer by being prevented from deliberately infringing a plaintiff's trademark does not alter the balance of hardship analysis). This factor thus weighs in favor of granting the preliminary injunction.

Therefore, preliminary injunctions are “to be granted only sparingly.” Toolchex, Inc. v. Trainor, 634 F.Supp.2d 586, 590-91 (E.D. Va. 2008) (quoting In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig, 333 F.3d 517, 524 (4th Cir. 2003)).

” Toolchex, Inc. v. Trainor, 634 F.Supp.2d 586, 590 (E.D. Va. 2008) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Invoking such a broad and sweeping remedy in what at first glance seemed to be an employment matter seemed especially hard hitting.

However, it is Globus's burden to establish such evidence. Toolchex, Inc.v.Trainor, 634 F.Supp.2d 586, 591 (E.D. Va. 2008) (“The party seeking the preliminary injunction bears the burden of proving that each factor supports granting relief”) (citation omitted).