Opinion
No. CV 03-0829632
March 5, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The court must decide whether the Attorney General exceeded his investigative authority under General Statutes § 4-61dd, the "Whistleblower Statute," by serving subpoenas duces tecum on the petitioners for the production of various documents, and if so, whether the petitioners' motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum and for a protective order should be granted.
The court finds that the Attorney General did not have investigative authority to issue subpoenas to the petitioners under § 4-61dd, because the requests for information fall squarely within the "construction, alteration or repair" exception to the "large state contract" provision of the statute. Furthermore, even if the construction exception did not apply, the Attorney General exceeded the scope of his investigative authority under the statute insofar as he requested documents outside the subject matter of the actual whistleblower complaint. Accordingly, the petitioners' motion to quash subpoenas duces tecum and for a protective order is granted.
FACTS
The questions in this case present issues of first impression under Connecticut law, and it is therefore helpful to briefly recount the proceedings leading up to the matter now pending before the court. On October 9, 2003, the Attorney General issued identical subpoenas duces tecum to seven separate entities with ties to the Tomasso family ("petitioners"). Claiming authority under General Statutes § 4-61dd(a), the Attorney General requested that the petitioners produce documents pertaining to fourteen categories of information that related to several large state construction contracts between numerous state agencies and the petitioners. On November 17, 2003, the petitioners filed a substitute motion to quash subpoenas duces tecum and for a protective order. The primary basis for the motion was the petitioners' allegation that the Attorney General did not have statutory authority to issue the investigative subpoenas under the whistleblower statute in the absence of at least one relevant complaint filed by a whistleblower. The petitioners disputed the existence of such a complaint in alleging that their research revealed "no whistleblowers who have complained to the Auditors of Public Accounts in connection with any of the 14 (now 13) categories of information sought in the attached subpoenas." (Petitioners' Substitute Motion to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum, p. 7.) The court held a preliminary hearing on the morning of December 8, 2003, where it set a schedule to take evidence and to hear oral argument on the merits of the petitioners' claims. Later that afternoon, the Attorney General served the petitioners with seven new subpoenas which superseded the original set of requests. The new subpoenas were allegedly based on a whistleblower complaint received by the auditors of public accounts on November 28, 2003, which specifically mentioned the petitioners' involvement in certain state contracts.
The seven entities include: Tomasso Brothers, Inc.; Tomasso Brothers Construction Company, Inc.; TBI Construction Company, LLC; Tunxis Plantation County Club, Inc.; Tunxis Management Co.; Tunxis Management Co., II; and Tenergy Water, LLC.
The petitioners filed their original motion to quash on November 5, 2003. The motion was accompanied by a request to file those matters under seal due to the Attorney General's request for all documents that had been produced in connection with any federal grand jury investigation. The petitioners argued that the Attorney General was improperly attempting to circumvent the federal rules of grand jury secrecy. Subsequently, the Attorney General removed this category of demand. In order to notify the court of the changed circumstances created by the Attorney General's withdrawal, the petitioners thereafter filed a substitute motion to quash, which did not require sealing.
The whistleblower complaint dated November 26, 2003, specifically mentions the awarding and managing of state contracts involving the Connecticut Juvenile Training School (CJTS), the proposed girls' correctional facility, and the former Long Lane School.
Thereafter, the petitioners filed a revised motion to quash subpoenas duces tecum and for a protective order on January 7, 2004. The current motion to quash is based on the petitioners' continued allegation that the Attorney General lacks authority to issue the subpoenas for five reasons: "(1) [the Attorney General] still has not complied with the clear statutory prerequisites to his power to investigate; (2) [the Attorney General] otherwise has no broad-ranging right under the whistleblower statute to investigate as he sees fit . . .; (3) the whistleblower statute expressly exempts large state construction contracts, such as the projects listed in the `new' subpoenas, from its scope; (4) the new `complaint' was self-generated by the Attorney General's improperly commenced initial investigation, and therefore cannot provide the jurisdictional basis for this investigation; and (5) even if [the Attorney General's] investigation were otherwise proper, he may not use the investigative provisions of the whistleblower statute to commence or conduct civil litigation." (Petitioners' Revised Motion to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum, p. 4-5.)
The Attorney General filed an objection to the petitioners' motion to quash subpoenas duces tecum and for a protective order on January 21, 2004. In the Attorney General's opposing memorandum, he counters that: (1) the Attorney General's current subpoenas were issued in full compliance with the requirements under § 4-61dd; (2) the Attorney General and the auditors have a broad statutory duty to investigate allegations of corruption in state government contracting, which cannot be limited by those who may be the subject of an investigation or have information relating to the conduct of state officials; (3) the Attorney General and the auditors have a duty to investigate all whistleblower complaints, irrespective of the manner of their transmission and irrespective of the precise wording or phrasing, as the Attorney General and auditors "deem proper"; (4) the construction exemption to the "large state contract" provision does not bar the Attorney General from issuing subpoenas to state contractors for information relevant to an investigation of misconduct by state officials; and (5) it is irrelevant to the authority of the Attorney General and auditors to conduct a § 4-61dd investigation whether civil litigation may follow at the conclusion of a whistleblower report. (See Respondent's Objection to Petitioners' Motion to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum, p. 4, 13.) On January 28, 2004, the petitioners filed a reply brief in support of their revised motion to quash subpoenas duces tecum and for a protective order. In their brief, the petitioners claimed legal deficiencies in the Attorney General's arguments, and reemphasized the allegations outlined in their revised motion to quash. The court heard oral argument on February 2, 2004, at which time each party had an opportunity to argue its position.
The legal issues presented in this case focus primarily on General Statutes § 4-61dd, commonly referred to as the "Whistleblower Statute," and specifically, to the scope of the Attorney General's investigative jurisdiction under the statute's provisions. General Statutes § 4-61dd(a) provides in relevant part that:
Any person having knowledge of any matter involving corruption, unethical practices, violation of state laws or regulations, mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority or danger to the public safety occurring in any state department or agency or any quasi-public agency, as defined in section 1-120, or any person having knowledge of any matter involving corruption, violation of state or federal laws or regulations, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority or danger to the public safety occurring in any large state contract, may transmit all facts and information in his possession concerning such matter to the Auditors of Public Accounts. The Auditors of Public Accounts shall review such matter and report their findings and any recommendations to the Attorney General. Upon receiving such a report, the Attorney General shall make such investigation as he deems proper.
A determinative issue in this case surrounds the scope of authority that this language extends to the Attorney General to issue investigative subpoenas based on information found in a whistleblower complaint. Although the court will address this question in its opinion, the court ultimately finds that the outcome of the case must be decided on a separate ground which is raised in the petitioners' argument.
Specifically, the petitioners allege that the Attorney General lacks jurisdiction to issue them investigative subpoenas, because his requests for information fall squarely within the construction exemption to the "large state contract" section of the whistleblower statute. Section 4-61dd(g)(1) exempts from the statutory definition of a "large state contract," "a contract for the construction, alteration or repair of any public building or public work." The petitioners contend that the projects listed in the Attorney General's subpoenas fall clearly within this exception, and that the Attorney General is thus precluded from using his power under the statute to seek such information from the petitioners.
Section 4-61dd(g)(1) defines "large state contract" as "a contract between an entity and a state or quasi-public agency, having a value of five million dollars or more . . ."
The Attorney General does not dispute that the contracts he seeks are excepted from the definition of a "large state contract," but instead alleges that the exception does not bar him from issuing subpoenas to state contractors for information relevant to an investigation of misconduct by state officials. Specifically, the Attorney General argues that the language in § 4-61dd(a) provides for two categories of whistleblower complainants, only one of which is subject to the construction exception. The Attorney General contends that:
The first category is extremely broad, and includes "[a]ny person having knowledge of any matter involving corruption, unethical practices, violation of state laws or regulations, mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority or danger to the public safety occurring in any state department or agency or any quasi-public agency."
(Respondent's Objection to Petitioners' Revised Motion to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum, p. 13.) The second category of complainants is more limited and includes:
[A]ny person having knowledge of any matter involving corruption, violation of state or federal laws or regulations, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority or danger to the public safety occurring in any large state contract.
(Respondent's Objection to Petitioners' Revised Motion to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum, p. 14.) The Attorney General alleges that because the term "large state contract," as defined and limited in § 4-61dd(g)(1), is not used with regard to the first category of complainants, the exception is meant to apply only to the second class of complainants — those alleging wrongdoing in large state construction contracts. The Attorney General argues further that since his subpoenas were issued in an effort to reveal wrongdoing on the part of state officials, his requests fall within the first category, to which the exception does not apply. The petitioners maintain that there is nothing in either the whistleblower statute or its legislative history to support the distinction that the Attorney General advances.
In support of their argument, the petitioners provide the court with a detailed history of the legislative proceedings surrounding the adoption of the construction exemption to the "large state contract" section of the whistleblower statute. The legislative history reveals that the exception was added as an amendment to the whistleblower statute in 1998 to extend protection against retaliation to employees of certain "large state contractors" who blow the whistle on wrongful conduct. See 1998 Senate Bill 457, An Act Concerning Oversight of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Large State Contractors, Public Act 98-191. In extending the protection of the act to include "large state contracts," the legislature chose to exempt specific types of large state contracts — namely, those that relate to the construction, alteration or repair of public buildings and public works. See 41 S. Proc., Pt. 6, 1998 Sess., p. 1689; 41 H.R. Proc., Pt. 13, 1998 Sess., p. 4451-52. Discussions in both houses concerning the amendment show that the legislators clearly understood that by adopting the exemption, the act would not apply to whistleblower complaints involving large state contracts for public buildings and works. For instance, in the Senate Session Transcript from April 28, 1998, Senator Gary Lebreau introduced the amendment by explicitly stating:
What this Amendment does is that it accepts (sic) public works. That includes highway and bridge contracts from the provisions of this bill. It also would include those major public works at the University of Connecticut, including major service contracts.
41 S. Proc., supra, p. 1689. Similarly, in the House Session Transcript dated May 5, 1998, Representative Ronald San Angelo posed the following question:
If a large contractor over $5 million was building a building that the State was going to be accepting and the employees did have concerns over what was going on in that contract, would they still have any protection under the whistle blower statute?
41 H.R. Proc., Pt. 13, 1998 Sess., p. 4454. The House sponsor of the bill, Representative Susan Bysiewicz, replied that "this bill would apply to state contracts as defined in the bill and so through you, Mr. Speaker, the answer is no. I don't believe so." 41 H.R. Proc., supra, p. 4455. It is evident from these discussions that the legislature specifically intended to exclude whistleblower protection for contracts "for the construction, alteration or repair of any public building or public work." There is nothing in these discussions, however, that reflects an intent to limit the application of the exemption to complaints alleging wrongdoing in large state contracts, and not to complaints that allege misconduct on behalf of state officials. In fact, a thorough review of the legislative history concerning the exemption yields nothing to support the Attorney General's theory that the legislature ever intended to create a distinction between these two types of whistleblower complainants.
Based on the court's independent review of the legislative history surrounding the "large state contract" amendment, as well as the plain language of the statute, the court concludes that the legislature did not intend to create two categories of whistleblower complainants, only one of which is subject to the exception. The court, therefore, finds that since the investigative subpoenas at issue request information relating to construction projects under the controls of both the department of public works and the department of transportation, the requests fall squarely within the construction exemption to the "large state contract" found in § 4-61dd(g). Accordingly, the Attorney General is precluded, under these facts, from issuing investigative subpoenas to the petitioners pursuant to his authority under the whistleblower statute.
Even if the construction exemption to the "large state contract" provision did not control the outcome of this case, the petitioners argue that the Attorney General is still without jurisdiction to issue the current subpoenas, because he exceeded the scope of his investigative authority under the whistleblower statute. Specifically, the petitioners allege:
The whistleblower statute is not a license for the Attorney General to investigate allegations of corruption and related unlawful practices on his own initiative. Unlike a federal grand jury, the Attorney General is not empowered simply to read newspaper articles and issue investigative subpoenas.
(Petitioners' Revised Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum, p. 7.) To the contrary, the petitioners allege that the Attorney General must comply with specific jurisdictional prerequisites under § 4-61dd(a) before he may invoke his investigative power. In support of this argument, the petitioners rely on Barnes v. Blumenthal, 261 Conn. 434, 463, 804 A.2d 152 (2002), in which the Court held: "the office of the Attorney General is `a creature of statute' that is governed by statute and, thus, has no common-law authority." The Barnes decision establishes that "[t]he Attorney General's authority to act is only as broad as the express terms of the statutory grant upon which he relies." (Petitioners' Revised Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum, p. 7.) Based on this premise, the petitioners maintain that because the Attorney General relies solely on his authority under § 4-61dd(a) to issue the current subpoenas, he must conform to the limitations the statute imposes in order to invoke his power to investigate. The petitioners claim that the Attorney General exceeded these limitations, and thus, the current subpoenas were improperly issued.
The petitioners first allege that the plain language of the statute mandates that a series of steps be taken before the Attorney General has authority to commence an investigation. The petitioners maintain that the Attorney General cannot demonstrate that he satisfied these prerequisites, and it was thus improper to issue the current investigative subpoenas. The petitioners argue that the language in § 4-61dd(a) outlines an explicit sequence of events that must occur before the Attorney General can commence an investigation: "(1) There must be a whistleblower; (2) the whistleblower must transmit his or her complaint to the Auditors of Public Accounts; (3) the Auditors must review that whistleblower complaint; and (4) the Auditors must report their findings, along with any recommendations, to the Attorney General." (Petitioners' Revised Motion to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum, p. 8.) It is only after having received such a report, that the Attorney General can then "make such investigation as he deems proper." Gen. Stat. § 4-61dd(a).
During oral argument on February 2, 2004, the petitioners sought to prove that this process was not completed before the Attorney General commenced his investigation. The petitioners elicited testimony from Robert Jaekle, an auditor of public accounts, concerning the typical treatment of a whistleblower complaint after it is filed in his office, as well as his knowledge as to how the current complaint was handled. On cross-examination, Mr. Jaekle testified that, ordinarily, upon the filing of a whistleblower complaint, it is logged in and referred to the whistleblower unit. Thereafter, an investigator in the unit is assigned to the file and conducts a preliminary review. After the investigation is completed, a memo is drafted and directed to the auditors, who then forward any findings and recommendations to the Attorney General's office.
In regards to the steps that were taken here, Mr. Jaekle confirmed that his office received the one-paragraph complaint on November 28, 2003, in a letter dated November 26, 2003. Prior to notifying the Attorney General's office that a complaint had been filed, Mr. Jaekle testified that his office received a letter from the Attorney General on December 3, 2003. In the letter, the Attorney General mentioned the November 28 complaint, and claimed that the matters addressed in the complaint related to several ongoing investigations being conducted in his office. Thereafter, pursuant to the Attorney General's request, Mr. Jaekle referred the complaint to the Attorney General's office on December 5, 2003. The petitioners contend that Mr. Jaekle's testimony supports their claim that the process required under § 4-61dd(a) was not followed in this instance. The Attorney General was aware of the November 28 complaint and its contents before the auditors notified his office of its existence. Furthermore, contrary to the procedure outlined in the statute, the auditors forwarded the complaint to the Attorney General's office without conducting an initial review and without issuing any findings or recommendations concerning the whistleblower's allegations.
The November 28 complaint further reveals that the whistleblower had communicated with the Attorney General on prior occasions in stating that "on at least several occasions over the past two years I have spoken to the Attorney General and members of his staff about my knowledge about the awarding and managing of state contracts . . ."
The court agrees that the ordinary procedure for processing a whistleblower complaint was not explicitly followed in regards to the November 28 complaint. The court, however, is uncertain that the language of § 4-61dd(a) mandates the exact process that the petitioners proclaim. Accordingly, if the "large state contract" construction exception were inapplicable, the court declines to grant the petitioners' motion to quash based solely on this alleged deficiency in process.
The petitioners further allege that even if the process comports with § 4-61dd(a), the Attorney General exceeded the scope of his investigative authority by requesting information concerning subject matters that were not alluded to in the whistleblower complaint. Specifically, the petitioners challenge the fact that the November 28, 2003 whistleblower complaint mentions only three contracts: the Connecticut Juvenile Training School (CJTS), the proposed girls' correctional facility, and the former Long Lane School. The subpoenas issued to the petitioners, however, request sixteen categories of information, only six of which relate in any way to the three contracts specifically mentioned in the whistleblower complaint. The petitioners allege that the whistleblower statute does not convey to the Attorney General jurisdiction to make such a sweeping investigation. The Attorney General argues that he does have broad statutory authority under § 4-61dd(a) to investigate allegations of corruption and wrongdoing and that this "broad authority to investigate must, of necessity, extend not only to the explicit subject of a complaint, but also to those matters whose relevance become apparent only after an investigation has begun." (Respondent's Objection to Petitioners' Motion to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum, p. 10.)
The petitioners also allege that the Attorney General's original subpoenas were invalidly issued because they were not based on a whistleblower complaint. The court agrees that Auditor Jaekle's testimony on February 2, 2004, confirms that his office did not receive any whistleblower complaints pertaining to any of the categories of information requested in the Attorney General's original subpoenas prior to the filing of the November 28, 2003 complaint. The court, however, finds that since the December 8, 2003 subpoenas specifically superseded the original requests, the issue of the original subpoenas' legitimacy is not before the court. Furthermore, the court need not decide whether the November 28 complaint was solicited by the Attorney General and/or otherwise a "sham," because the petitioners have offered no authority for the proposition that, if true, this would affect the outcome of the court's decision.
The subpoenas also include requests for information relating to construction projects for the Bradley International Airport Parking Garage, the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters and Juvenile Detention Center in Bridgeport, the Connecticut Lottery Corporation, the Connecticut Building at the Eastern States Exposition, the Kaynor Regional Vocational-Technical School in Waterbury, and for various properties under the control of the State of Connecticut. The Attorney General also requests information concerning "any gifts, goods, services or things of value . . . provided to or on behalf of . . . any officer, employee, or agent of the State of Connecticut . . ."
The court recognizes that while the Attorney General persistently alleges throughout his argument that § 4-61dd(a) grants him "broad" investigative authority, his recent requests to the legislature recommending revisions to the whistleblower statute severely contradict this claim:
Connecticut law concerning investigations with respect to fraud and mismanagement in state government is too narrow. This needs to change. There should always be a state official who is fully empowered to investigate fraud and mismanagement. The provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-61dd, commonly known as the "Whistleblower Statute," split limited investigative responsibilities between the Auditors of Public Accounts and the Attorney General. These provisions are not broad enough to fully protect the public interest.
(Emphasis added.) Recommendations to the Legislature for a Comprehensive Approach to Reforming State Contracting, January 22, 2004, p. 21-22.
The petitioners argue that the Attorney General offers no authority to support his claim that he has such broad investigative power under the statute. Furthermore, the petitioners allege that the legislature expressly rejected a proposal that would have given the Attorney General broader investigative power under § 4-61dd. The legislative history surrounding the enactment of the whistleblower statute reveals that the legislature considered language in the first file copy of the bill that granted the Attorney General and the auditors broad power to "[j]ointly conduct preemptive inspections, inquiries and investigations relating to programs and operations involving the collection, administration or expenditure of public funds, the use or disposition of state owned or leased property . . ." File No. 529, Sub. H.B. 6742 (1987). A subsequent amendment to the bill, however, eliminated the above language, as well as section one in its entirety. Auditor Jaekle, then a Representative, lamented the deletion of this language in explaining:
The Attorney General relies strongly on Hartford County Sheriff's Dept. Communities Charities Assn. v. Blumenthal, 47 Conn. Sup. 447, 806 A.2d 1158 (2001), for the proposition that the court has previously upheld the Attorney General's broad statutory authority to conduct whistleblower investigations. The Attorney General, however, fails to address the implications that the decision in Barnes v. Blumenthal, 261 Conn. 434, 804 A.2d 152 (2002), has on the Hartford County Sheriff's case, a lower court decision that was rendered before Barnes.
This section of the first file copy of the bill also contained the following language:
Section 1. (New) (a) In addition to any other powers, duties and responsibilities provided for in other provisions of the general statutes, the auditors of public accounts and the Attorney General shall act jointly to detect and prevent fraud, waste and abuse in the management of state personnel, in the use and disposition of public property, and in the collection, disbursement and expenditure of state and federal funds administered by state or regional governmental agencies. The auditors of public accounts and the Attorney General shall also jointly evaluate the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of state agencies in the performance of their delegated duties and functions.
File No. 529, Sub. H.B. 6742 (1987).
What really is the difference between the file copy and this amendment is Section 1 of the file copy disappearing. The rest of the file copy is pretty much staying intact. What you're having is you're left with a situation where employees or other people of this state could bring complaints to the auditors. They could do a preliminary review, turn it over to the Attorney General. He'll do investigations . . .
But the section that's missing, the Attorney General can now on his own, go out and make inspections, can go out and make preemptive audits, preemptive reviews of the operation of our state government, actually on his own initiative, go out and try to prevent or ferret out [sic] uncover, discover and then refer to the appropriate agencies, ways to [sic] abuse, fraud and mismanagement in state government . . . The amendment gets rid of that power altogether.
30 H. Proc., Pt. 13, 1987 Sess., p. 4517-18. The amendment to the bill subsequently passed by a large margin and was adopted. The petitioners allege that the legislature's deletion of the language in section one "demonstrates a legislative intent to affirmatively deny the Attorney General the powers that would have been provided to him under the rejected Section 1." (Petitioners' Revised Motion to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum, p. 18.) The court is persuaded that the legislative history, coupled with the clear import in Barnes, establishes that the Attorney General "has no authority to conduct an investigation [pursuant to § 4-61dd] except as defined in the statute . . ." (Petitioners' Revised Motion to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum, p. 17.) The court, therefore, holds that the Attorney General exceeded the scope of his investigative authority by subpoenaing documents pertaining to subject matters that were not alluded to in the November 28, 2003 complaint. As to the categories of information that are directly related to the three contracts specifically mentioned in the complaint, however, the court finds that, but for the construction project exception to the "large state contract" provision, it would otherwise allow the production of these requests.
Finally, the petitioners allege that the subpoenas should be quashed because the Attorney General seeks to use any information uncovered from the investigation for an unauthorized purpose. Specifically, the petitioners allege that the Attorney General intends to use any information he obtains to commence civil litigation against the petitioners. The petitioners maintain that the whistleblower statute does not authorize the Attorney General to pursue civil litigation, and to do so would exceed the Attorney General's express statutory authority.
Section 4-61dd(a) provides in relevant part that "[u]pon the conclusion of his investigation, the Attorney General shall where necessary, report his findings to the Governor, or in matters involving criminal activity, to the Chief State's Attorney." The petitioners allege that this language grants the Attorney General the power to take only one of two actions upon the completion of an investigation: report his findings to the governor, or to the Chief State's Attorney. The statute's language does not give the Attorney General the express authority to pursue civil litigation. As a "creature of statute," the petitioners allege that the Attorney General's intent is improper, because it exceeds the scope of the authority granted to him under § 4-61dd(a). The Attorney General argues that the petitioners' position is purely speculative, for "[f]uture litigation is only one of a multitude of potential uses for information gathered by the Attorney General." (Respondent's Objection to Petitioners' Motion to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum, p. 18 n. 7.) In addition, the Attorney General argues from a policy stand point that:
[I]t would make little sense to enact a statute designed to encourage individuals to report government corruption and abuse of authority, and then conclude that the Attorney General and other state officials were precluded from using the information that was uncovered in order to initiate civil litigation to correct the problem. CT Page 3271
The court again takes note of the Attorney General's statements in his report to the legislature where he admits:
[T]he current whistleblower statute is an "investigate and report" statute . . . The whistleblower statute does not itself contain any civil or administrative remedies. A report to the Governor about wrongdoing can be very hollow if that report is not explicitly backed by the authority to initiate appropriate legal action arising from the wrongdoing that is reported on.
Recommendations to the Legislature for a Comprehensive Approach to Reforming State Contracting, January 22, 2004, p. 22-23.
(Respondent's Objection to Petitioners' Motion to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum, p. 19.) Without addressing the merits of the parties' arguments, the court concludes that the petitioners' concern regarding the Attorney General's motive is speculative and premature at this point. If, in fact, the information obtained from the Attorney General's investigation were used to commence civil litigation against the petitioners in the future, the court does not, at this time, render an opinion as to the propriety of such use or the admissibility of such evidence. The fact that the Attorney General may make such use of his findings, however, is not, in and of itself, a reason to grant the petitioners' motion to quash subpoenas duces tecum.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the court holds that the Attorney General did not have investigative authority under § 4-61dd to serve subpoenas duces tecum on the petitioners, because the requests for information fall squarely within the construction of public works or public buildings exception to the "large state contract" section of the whistleblower statute. Furthermore, even if the exception did not apply, the court finds that the Attorney General exceeded the scope of his investigative authority under the statute insofar as he subpoenaed documents outside the subject matter of the actual whistleblower complaint. The petitioners' motion to quash subpoenas duces tecum and for a protective order is therefore granted.
BY THE COURT
Booth, J.