Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3926-13T4
11-06-2015
CHARMAINE TOMAINI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GARY TOMAINI, Defendant-Respondent.
Robert B. Woods argued the cause for appellant. Respondent has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Leone and Whipple. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, Docket No. FM-13-1049-91. Robert B. Woods argued the cause for appellant. Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Plaintiff seeks enforcement of a Judgment of Divorce (JOD) approximately twenty years after it was entered and approximately thirteen months after her ex-husband's death. The Family Part found plaintiff's claims were barred by the doctrine of laches. We agree and affirm.
I.
Plaintiff Charmaine Tomaini and defendant Gary Tomaini were married in 1965, and divorced by the Family Part in 1992. The parties had two offspring, Cindy Tomaini and Gary Tomaini, Jr. The JOD was entered on February 28, 1992. The JOD provided, in pertinent part, the following equitable division of assets in paragraphs one and eight:
1. The marital home . . . shall be listed and sold . . . . The net proceeds after all closing costs shall be equally divided. The defendant shall give to the plaintiff the sum of $30,000.00 for her interests in his pensions and plaintiff shall waive any future or further interest in his pensions.
. . . .
8. The plaintiff shall be the beneficiary of 75% of the proceeds of a $25,000.00 Prudential life insurance policy on the defendant's life. This provision shall end if the plaintiff remarries or cohabits. Plaintiff shall also be a 100% beneficiary on all other life insurance policies, including beneficiary of the death benefits on the defendant's pensions, both the PBA pension and the police pension, until she remarries or cohabits.
Despite the divorce, plaintiff and defendant continued to live together amicably in the marital home. In 2006, fourteen years after the JOD, plaintiff and defendant sold the marital home for $700,000. One month after the sale, plaintiff and defendant purchased another residence as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, which plaintiff now occupies as the surviving tenant. Defendant died intestate on April 9, 2012. Cindy Tomaini was appointed the administratrix of respondent, the Estate of Gary Tomaini (the Estate).
On May 30, 2013, more than twenty years after the JOD, and more than thirteen months after defendant's death, plaintiff filed a verified complaint against the Estate and the administratrix in the Probate Part of the Chancery Division. The complaint sought various relief, including enforcement of paragraphs one and eight of the JOD. On July 25, 2013, the Probate Part dismissed plaintiff's complaint without prejudice, stating the claim should be brought in the Family Part of the Chancery Division.
On August 13, 2013, plaintiff filed a motion in the Family Part. Plaintiff's motion sought various relief, including: (1) enforcing paragraph one of the JOD compelling the payment of the $30,000, and entering judgment for that amount against defendant, the Estate, and the administratrix; and (2) compelling the disclosure of all life insurance policies that existed at the time of defendant's death, the turning over of any benefits and proceeds received from those policies as per paragraph eight of the JOD, and the accounting by the administratrix for all insurance policies, and entering judgment for the proceeds against the Estate and the administratrix.
In response to these allegations, the administratrix certified that the only asset in defendant's estate was a 2008 Honda CRV automobile purchased after the marriage and titled in defendant's name only, that she had sold the Honda, and that she had paid off all the debts of the Estate. The administratrix certified that when the proceeds from the sale of the marital home were split evenly between plaintiff and defendant, defendant took $30,000 from his proceeds and paid it to plaintiff in satisfaction of paragraph one of the JOD. The administratrix also argued that defendant had named plaintiff as the beneficiary and plaintiff had collected benefits, on the Prudential insurance policy, as well as a Minnesota Life policy, and a pension policy. Finally, the administratrix argued that plaintiff had not filed a claim against the Estate within the period provided in N.J.S.A. 3B:22-4, and that plaintiff's claim was barred by laches.
Plaintiff certified this did not occur.
After hearing oral argument, the Family Part issued a written opinion on March 31, 2014, denying plaintiff's motion to enforce the JOD. Regarding plaintiff's attempt to enforce paragraph one of the JOD, the trial court held that
Plaintiff waited over 20 years after the divorce and 18 months after defendant's death to make an application to enforce the JOD. . . . To grant plaintiff's request for relief now, 20 years after the divorce and 18 months after the death of Defendant, would result in prejudice to the Estate of the Defendant, especially if the Estate has already been distributed. Additionally, waiting 18 months after the death of the Defendant substantially prejudiced Defendant's Estate since Defendant is no longer available to testify as to the truth or falsity of Plaintiff's statements.Regarding plaintiff's attempt to recover benefits from the life insurance policies, the trial court held that "[i]t is uncontested that Plaintiff received payouts from three separate life insurance policies" and that the administratrix "certified that no other life insurance policies existed and Plaintiff received all payouts from pensions/life insurance policies."
It is unclear how the trial court arrived at the figure of eighteen months. --------
Plaintiff appeals both determinations.
II.
Laches is "'an equitable defense that may be interposed in the absence of the statute of limitations.'" Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 418 (2012) (citation omitted). Laches "applies when a party sleeps on her rights to the harm or detriment of others." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 445 (2012). "'[L]aches is "invoked to deny a party enforcement of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable and unexplained delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other party."'" Ibid. (quoting Fox, supra, 210 N.J. at 418 (quoting Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 180-81 (2003))). "Laches may only be enforced when the delaying party had sufficient opportunity to assert the right in the proper forum and the prejudiced party acted in good faith believing that the right had been abandoned." Knorr, supra, 178 N.J. at 181. "The key factors to be considered in deciding whether to apply the doctrine are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the 'changing conditions of either or both parties during the delay.'" Ibid. (quoting Lavin v. Bd. of Educ., 90 N.J. 145, 152 (1982)).
"Whether laches should be applied depends upon the facts of the particular case and is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court." Fox, supra, 210 N.J. at 418 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). As such, the application of the doctrine of laches is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Scurry, 193 N.J. 492, 504 (2008). We must hew to this standard of review.
III.
Plaintiff argues "there is nothing in the JOD that puts a time limit or period of time nor an end date for the operation of [l]aches." However, "laches is an equitable principle" that arises from the circumstances, not from any contractual provision. See Lavin, supra, 90 N.J. at 152 n.1. Moreover, "[t]he time constraints of laches . . . are not fixed but are characteristically flexible." Id. at 151. "Laches ordinarily is 'applied in an individualized manner in particular cases.'" Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Carteret, 115 N.J. 536, 554 (1989) (citation omitted).
We address separately defendant's two claims, which involve delays of different lengths. The first is plaintiff's over twenty-year delay before and after defendant's death in requesting enforcement of paragraph one of the JOD, which required a $30,000 payment for her interest in defendant's pensions. The second is plaintiff's more than thirteen-month delay after defendant's death in seeking to collect on any life insurance policies whose proceeds were not paid in accordance with paragraph eight of the JOD.
A.
The trial court properly found that laches barred plaintiff's $30,000 claim pursuant to paragraph one of the JOD. Plaintiff states she did not seek to collect that $30,000 in the more than twenty years between the JOD and defendant's death. "In extreme circumstances . . . 'the length of the delay alone . . . may result in laches.'" Urban League, supra, 115 N.J. at 554 (quoting Lavin, supra, 90 N.J. at 152). In Urban League, the court found that where a party's failure to raise a claim for fifteen years, "the delay above forcefully suggests unfair surprise." Urban League, supra, 115 N.J. at 555. Here, plaintiff delayed over twenty-years.
The reasons plaintiff offered for her over twenty-year delay were that she had continued to live amicably with defendant for years after the divorce, and that she was caring for their terminally ill son. That plaintiff was amicably living with defendant did not prevent her from making efforts to collect the $30,000, and could have aided her efforts, unless her residence with defendant was contingent on her waiver of her claim. Plaintiff's care for their son, while commendable and distracting, did not remove her need for the funds, and could have increased it. The trial court was unimpressed with plaintiff's reasons.
"The primary factor to consider when deciding whether to apply laches is whether there has been a general change in condition during the passage of time that has made it inequitable to allow the claim to proceed." N.W. Covenant Med. Ctr. v. Fishman, 167 N.J. 123, 141 (2001). Plaintiff's delay prejudiced the administratrix because it deprived her of defendant's knowledge and testimony concerning whether he paid the claim. There is now no opportunity for defendant to testify whether he paid plaintiff $30,000 from the proceeds of the sale of the marital home, or with other funds.
In addition, plaintiff failed to raise this claim until thirteen months following defendant's death, after the estate had already distributed its only asset. The administratrix asserted, without dispute by plaintiff, that the only asset in defendant's estate after his death was the Honda CRV, which was sold to satisfy other debts of the estate.
Plaintiff has proffered no excuse for her thirteen-month delay between defendant's death and the filing of her complaint. This thirteen-month delay further prejudiced the Estate by depriving it of the only assets with which it could pay plaintiff's claim, as explained further below. As a result, plaintiff's delay of more than twenty years to make a claim to the $30,000 was inexcusable given defendant's death and the distribution of his estate.
Plaintiff argues there is no prejudice to defendant because he is deceased, and allegedly got to keep the $30,000 during his lifetime. However, plaintiff seeks to collect the $30,000 from the Estate, which never had the $30,000 and was plainly prejudiced by plaintiff's delay. The Estate has not forfeited laches based on defendant's alleged failure to pay, which the administratrix has certified he did.
Plaintiff is correct in noting that the doctrine of laches cannot be used to reach an inequitable result. See Linek v. Korbeil, 333 N.J. Super. 464, 475 (App. Div.) (the "tools of equity jurisprudence cannot validly be used to sponsor an inequitable result"), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 676 (2000). However, its application here does not violate the principles of equity because of the extraordinary delay and prejudice to the Estate. It would be inequitable to force defendant's estate, twenty years after the divorce and more than thirteen months after defendant's death, to pay claims that were known and enforceable by plaintiff much earlier.
B.
Plaintiff's claim for additional life insurance proceeds is also barred by laches. Although plaintiff could not make a claim for any of the life insurance policies until defendant's death, plaintiff still delayed making such a claim against the Estate for thirteen months after his death. Her unexcused delay was unreasonable given her knowledge of the provision in the JOD. Paragraph eight required plaintiff to be the beneficiary of 75% of the proceeds on a Prudential life insurance policy, and the 100% beneficiary of all of defendant's other life insurance policies and his pension life insurance. Moreover, the trial court found, and plaintiff conceded before us, that plaintiff had already received the requisite payouts from the Prudential life insurance policy, the Minnesota Life policy, and the pension policy.
By failing to bring her claim before the distribution of the assets of the Estate, plaintiff prejudiced the Estate's ability to pay her claim. "The core equitable concern in applying laches is whether a party has been harmed by the delay." Knorr, supra, 178 N.J. at 181. The Estate has been harmed by plaintiff's delay until after the distribution of assets to bring her claim for payment of additional proceeds, or damages for failing to name her as the beneficiary on defendant's insurance policies. "'The policy behind laches is to discourage stale claims[.]'" Scurry, supra, 193 N.J. at 503 (citation omitted).
Moreover, plaintiff's claim is also barred because it was brought after the nine-month period permitted for creditors to present claims against an estate under N.J.S.A. 3B:22-4 of the probate code, which provides:
Creditors of the decedent shall present their claims to the personal representative of the decedent's estate in writing and under oath, specifying the amount claimed and the particulars of the claim, within nine months from the date of the decedent's death. If a claim is not so presented to the personal representative within nine months from the date of the decedent's death, the personal representative shall not be liable to the creditor with respect to any assets which the personal representative may have delivered or paid in satisfaction of any lawful claims, devises or distributive shares, before the presentation of the claim.While at first blush N.J.S.A. 3B:22-4 may appear to be a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery from the estate, "[c]laims filed out of time under the Probate Code may nevertheless be presented 'any time before the remaining assets of the estate shall have been distributed or paid over pursuant to law.'" Fazilat v. Feldstein, 180 N.J. 74, 83 (2004) (quoting N.J.S.A. 3B:22-10).
Thus, given defendant's death in April of 2012, N.J.S.A. 3B:22-4 limited the time in which plaintiff could seek relief from his estate to January 2013. However, plaintiff failed to bring any claim against defendant's estate until late May 2013, more than thirteen months after defendant's death and more than four months after the time permitted by N.J.S.A. 3B:22-4. Moreover, the administratrix asserted that the only asset remaining in defendant's estate at the time of his death had been sold, and the proceeds of sale distributed, before plaintiff made her claims. Plaintiff has not contested this, but is instead seeking an accounting to find additional money she may be owed. Therefore, the probate code bars plaintiff's claims.
"The probate code has as its goal the State's long-standing interest in securing 'the speedy settlement of decedent[s'] estate[s].'" Fazilat, supra, 180 N.J. at 82 (citation omitted). This interest exists to "'bar belated creditors from participating in the orderly settlement of the estate'" and to allow for the decedent's personal representative to "'make an orderly determination of [the] estate's liabilities and assets.'" Id. at 83 (citations omitted).
Thus, both laches and the probate code bar any claim against the estate for any other life insurance proceeds, or for damages for not naming plaintiff as the beneficiary. In any event, there is nothing in the record suggesting that there are any other life insurance policies.
IV.
Because plaintiff's claim to additional benefits or damages regarding other life insurance policies is barred by laches and the probate code, there is no need for an accounting to determine if defendant had any other life insurance policies. To force defendant's estate to perform an accounting of life insurance policies would inequitably burden the estate since it has already been distributed, all of the debts have been paid, and plaintiff conceded receiving several life insurance policy payouts. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion to decline to order such an accounting.
Nonetheless, we note that such an accounting was not beyond the power of the Family Part. In addressing plaintiff's request for an accounting of defendant's life insurance policies, the Family Part ruled that if "[p]laintiff wish[ed] to conduct an accounting on Defendant's Estate, she must do so in Probate." The determination of whether a case is properly brought before the Family Part is governed by Rule 5:1-2, which states that "[a]ll civil actions in which the principal claim is unique to and arises out of a family or family relationship shall be brought in the Family Part." Ibid. "While the Law Division/Probate Part has full authority to hear and determine controversies over wills, trusts, and estates, it was not the intent of the Legislature to permit that court to encroach upon the general jurisdiction of the . . . Family Part given to it by the [New Jersey] Constitution." D'Angelo v. D'Angelo, 208 N.J. Super. 729, 732 (App. Div. 1986) (citing N.J.S.A. 3B:2-1); see N.J. Const. Art. VI, § III, ¶ 3 (providing that the Chancery division "shall include a family part"). Moreover, the Family Part "has authority to enforce its own judgments." D'Angelo, supra, 208 N.J. Super. at 731 (citing Joseph Harris & Sons, Inc. v. Van Loan, 23 N.J. 466, 469 (1957)). The "distribution of assets of a marital estate and performance of judgment/agreement obligations are logical extensions of the rule that allows a court to enforce its own orders." Id. at 732.
Here, without the JOD, plaintiff's demand to be paid the proceeds of any life insurance policies of which she was the beneficiary would be proper only before the Probate Part. However, as plaintiff's claims arise out of a JOD, the Family Part is an appropriate forum to perform an accounting of such life insurance policies, pursuant to D'Angelo. Though the Family Part has authority to order an accounting of an estate pursuant to a JOD, any error by the court in not doing so here was harmless because plaintiff's delays in raising her claim barred it under laches and the probate code.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION