Opinion
A130010
12-06-2011
JOEL THOMAS TOLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MEAD LeFEVRE et al., Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCS028127)
I.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Joel Thomas Toler appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court found that appellant had materially breached a settlement agreement entered into with respondents (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6). The settlement agreement resolved a dispute among neighbors; appellant and respondents are residents of American Canyon, California, and members of the Spurs Ranch Owners' Association, the subdivision's homeowners' association. Appellant claims that: (1) the trial court committed legal error in interpreting the terms of the settlement agreement; (2) there was no substantial evidence to support the finding that appellant had materially breached the agreement; and (3) the court abused its discretion in awarding respondents attorney fees.
We disagree with all of appellant's contentions, and affirm the judgment.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORIES
The underlying litigation was commenced by appellant on July 10, 2006, with the filing of a complaint alleging seven causes of action in Solano County Superior Court (Case No. FCS028127). The allegations made in the complaint are not material to the issues raised on appeal, and therefore we will dispense with any discussion of them in this opinion.
Importantly here, the underlying dispute was settled at a subsequent judicially supervised mandatory settlement conference held on June 22, 2009, that lasted nine hours. The settlement consisted of 16 separate points recited by the court and agreed to by the parties in open court.
Provision 3A of the settlement provided that the installation of a surveillance camera installed by appellant on his property would be approved by respondents if "within 30 days the camera shall be mechanically restricted and shielded so that it views only the front gate portion of [appellant's] property and cannot view any of the neighbors' residence [sic]."
In a verified complaint filed by respondents in a related action (Case No. FCS030664), which was dismissed as part of this settlement, respondents alleged, inter alia, that appellant's unauthorized camera could view directly into private and common areas of the development, and appellant's neighbors were annoyed and disturbed because they felt their private activities were being watched by appellant.
Provision 10 of the settlement required that "[t]he pending motions for attorney's fees [sic]shall be withdrawn without prejudice and may be reinstated only upon a finding that [appellant] has materially violated a provision of this settlement." The pending motions, which were to be withdrawn as part of the settlement, had previously been filed by respondents after appellant voluntarily dismissed his Case No. FCS029283 without prejudice. With the dismissal, respondents argued they became the prevailing parties in that litigation, thereby entitling them to recover their fees. (See Civ. Code, § 1354, subd. (c).)
Civil Code section 1354, subdivision (c) provides: "In an action to enforce the governing documents [of a homeowners' association], the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs."
On August 13, 2009, a motion was made by respondents to enforce the settlement, reinstate the previously dismissed motions for attorney fees, and for sanctions and costs in connection with bringing this newest motion. Respondents contended that appellant had failed to comply with three terms of the settlement including, as material here, the failure to "[m]echanically restrict and shield" his surveillance camera, as required by Provision 3A.
The motion, as well as appellant's opposition, address other issues beside the camera shielding, but because they are not relevant to the issue raised on appeal, we have omitted any discussion concerning these other matters.
The motion was supported with a declaration by respondents' counsel, Timothy Blaine, who confirmed that the restriction and shielding on appellant's camera was required to be completed by July 22, 2009, and that Mr. Blaine's clients "have informed me that [appellant] has not shielded his surveillance camera . . . ." The declaration was accompanied by a photograph purportedly taken on August 1, 2009, showing no mechanical shield had been placed on the camera.
In opposition to the motion, appellant filed his own declaration. As to Provision 3A, appellant stated that "[t]he camera is mechanically shielded so that it views only the front gate of my property and cannot view any neighbor's residence. This has been the case since before July 22, 2009."
Respondents filed a reply which was accompanied by another photograph; this one purportedly taken on November 4, 2009, depicting a camera, identified as being owned by appellant, without a shield in place.
Appellant filed a supplemental declaration on November 13, 2009. As to Provision 3A, appellant attached a copy of an invoice dated July 2, 2009, "concerning work I had performed on the camera." The attached invoice from Super Electric, Inc. describes work performed for appellant as "inspect and adjust camera located at south east corner of property. Restricted movement of camera travel from 360°—270° eliminating the view of the Toler-Dostal property line."
After a hearing, the trial court issued its "Decision Regarding Motion to Enforce Settlement" on January 27, 2010. As to the surveillance camera issue, the court concluded that, even accepting appellant's evidence that the movement of the camera had been restricted from 360 to 270 degrees, such modification did not constitute "shielding" as required by Provision 3A. Accordingly, the court found that appellant had materially breached the settlement, and respondents' motions for attorney fees were ordered reinstated and reset for hearing on March 19, 2010.
On February 11, 2010, after the court's decision, but before the March hearing on the motions for attorney fees, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was made on the ground that appellant and his counsel believed they had presented sufficient evidence that he had materially complied with the settlement by taking reasonable steps to restrict the mechanism of the camera so as not to view neighbors' properties. Counsel explained that, "[t]o the extent the settlement is read to require both mechanical restriction and a shield installed, then both [appellant] and his counsel were mistaken and inadvertently failed to present evidence" as to why the camera was not both restricted and shielded.
Two declarations accompanied the motion for reconsideration; the first from Jerry Loos, an electrical engineer for Super Electric, Inc. who performed work on appellant's surveillance camera in July 2009, and the second from John Downing, appellant's counsel. In Mr. Loos's declaration, he explained that appellant requested that a shield be installed on the camera, in addition to restricting its viewing radius, so as not to view any of his neighbors' residences and any portion of his next door neighbor's property. Mr. Loos said that the camera sat on a high pole and that the likely force of the wind against the shield would interfere with the camera's autofocus feature. Therefore, Mr. Loos recommended that pins be installed in the gears that turn the camera, thereby reducing the viewing radius to about 115 degrees.
In appellant's counsel's declaration, counsel stated that in negotiating the settlement with respondents, he did not "understand or comprehend" that the camera needed to be both mechanically restricted and shielded. For this reason, counsel "did not produce evidence of Mr. Loos's decision-making process in the work he performed on the camera."
An opposition was filed by respondents arguing that it was clear on the face of the settlement that the camera had to be both mechanically restricted and shielded. Counsel explained that both requirements were specifically included in the agreement "so that homeowners in the community can be assured that the camera is, in fact, shielded and cannot be readjusted to invade their privacy in the future."
Appellant filed a declaration on March 18, 2010, in reply to respondents' opposition. In it, appellant stated that he had installed a four-by-five-foot shield to the camera pole, but the wind in the area caused the shield to act like a sail and thus interfere with the autofocus feature on the camera. He attempted to fix the problem by having holds drilled in the shield, but it did not solve the focus problem. With obvious frustration, appellant informed the court that to solve the problem and to avoid any claim that he had violated the settlement, he had the camera cut from the pole and mounted in his garage "where it now views nothing. The pole now stands as a lone piece of wood in the cold (see exhibit 4)."
By minute order filed on March 18, 2010, the trial court adopted its tentative ruling denying the motion for reconsideration, as follows: "The motion for reconsideration is denied. The facts submitted by plaintiff are not new or different facts, nor does plaintiff explain why he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced the information for the hearing on the defense motion to enforce settlement. [Citations.]"
The renewed motions for attorney fees were heard the following day. After hearing oral argument, the trial court took the motions under submission. Thereafter, on April 1, 2010, the court issued its ruling granting the motions, and ordering appellant to pay attorney fees of $15,000 for fees incurred from the law firm of Murphy, Pearson, Bradley & Feeney, and $5,000 for fees incurred from the law firm of Porter Scott.
Appellant then appeared in propria persona and filed another motion for reconsideration of all prior rulings made in connection with the settlement dispute. The motion was opposed by respondents. The motion was denied by minute order dated September 1, 2010, as follows: "The motion for reconsideration is denied. [Code of Civil Procedure section] 1008 requires that the motion be filed within 10 days of Notice of Entry of Judgment; when service is by mail then 5 days are added. [Citation.] Even if the motion were timely, however, it fails to meet the requirements of [section] 1008—it is not based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law. [Citation.]"
Judgment was entered the following day. Appellant's notice of appeal was subsequently filed on October 4, 2010.
III.
Legal Analysis
A. Issues Presented and Standard of Review
Appellant frames the issues he raises on appeal as follows: "There are four questions before the Court. The first is whether the trial judge erred in ruling that [appellant] did not comply with the Settlement Agreement between the parties; (2) whether [respondents] met their burden of proof required to prove their allegations; (3) if the trial court abused its' [sic]discretionary power by grant[ing] judgment against [appellant] and (4) whether the trial judge erred in granting attorney fees and costs against [appellant]."
Appellant does not contest the court's denial of his two motions for reconsideration. Accordingly, we will not consider the materials submitted in connection with those motions—only the record as it relates to the original motion to enforce the settlement and the renewed motions for attorney fees are relevant here.
The court in Skulnick v. Roberts Express, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 884 explained the standard of review when a motion is made to enforce a settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6: "A trial court, when ruling on a section 664.6 motion, acts as a trier of fact. [Citation.] Section 664.6's 'express authorization for trial courts to determine whether a settlement has occurred is an implicit authorization for the trial court to interpret the terms and conditions to settlement.' [Citation.] The proper standard of review, therefore, is whether the trial court's ruling [construing] the settlement . . . is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 889.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 provides in relevant part: "If the parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement."
"A settlement agreement is a contract, and the legal principles which apply to contracts generally apply to settlement contracts. [Citation.] An essential element of any contract is 'consent.' [Citations.] The 'consent' must be 'mutual.' [Citations.]" (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810-811.) " 'The existence of mutual consent is determined by objective rather than subjective criteria, the test being what the outward manifestations of consent would lead a reasonable person to believe.' [Citation.] . . . "The parties' outward manifestations must show that the parties all agreed 'upon the same thing in the same sense.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 811.)
"The question on appeal thus resolves into whether the record contains substantial evidence which could lead a reasonable person to construe the agreement [as the trial court did]. [Citation.]" (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.) In applying the substantial evidence test, we will be mindful that "nothing in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 664.6 authorizes a judge to create the material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon." (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 810, italics omitted.)
B. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that the Settlement Agreement Required Appellant Both to Mechanically Restrict And to Shield the Camera
The parties to the settlement agreed in Provision 3A that respondents would approve appellant's surveillance camera if "within 30 days the camera shall be mechanically restricted and shielded so that it views only the front gate portion of [appellant's] property and cannot view any of the neighbors' residence [sic]." (Italics added.)
It is profoundly clear from the plain text of Provision 3A that appellant was required both to mechanically restrict the camera's movement, and to shield it so it could not be used to view neighboring properties. We are not persuaded by his continuing argument that this clause was satisfied because he had pins installed in the camera gears limiting its lateral travel from 360 degrees to 270 degrees. Not only does this contention conflict with the plain meaning of the settlement, but the record contains evidence explaining why this provision was included. There was concern that the camera as installed by appellant could view directly into private and common areas of the development, and appellant's neighbors were annoyed and disturbed because they felt their private activities were being watched by appellant.
In considering whether substantial evidence supports a factual finding by the trial court, all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the prevailing party below, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences are to be indulged to uphold the finding if possible. (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 571.) Given the apparent animosity and distrust that spawned this litigation and propagated it over several years, it is a fair inference that the shielding was an additional requirement allowing the parties to verify visually that the camera could not view neighboring properties, rather than simply relying on appellant's assurances that the camera had been modified in a way where viewing neighboring properties was not possible.
Nor can appellant defeat the plain, objective meaning of the settlement's language simply by denying its meaning. "The parties' undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation. [Citations.]" (Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 956.)
In this case when the settlement was put on the record on June 22, 2009, appellant acknowledged his understanding of the terms, and he declined to ask any clarifying questions of the court when invited to do so. (See Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 585 [stating parties' stipulation in open court to terms of the settlement "tends to ensure that the settlement is the result of their mature reflection and deliberate assent"].) No misunderstanding, reservation or qualification was indicated. No disagreement was voiced. A party, like appellant, who affirms on the record in open court that he understands and agrees to a settlement cannot later avoid it on the ground that his consent was the product of unexpressed confusion, or a subjective misunderstanding of the agreement's meaning. Specifically, "[m]utual assent to contract is based upon objective and outward manifestations of the parties; a party's 'subjective intent, or subjective consent, therefore is irrelevant.' [Citations.]" (Stewart v. Preston Pipeline Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1587, italics added, quoting Beard v. Goodrich (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1040.)
He did object to Provision 1 of the settlement at the time, which was modified to meet his satisfaction.
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Also, respondents presented substantial evidence that the camera had not been shielded. The substantial evidence test was summarized as follows by our Supreme Court in Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.4th 559: " 'In reviewing the evidence on . . . appeal all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the [prevailing party], and all legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in to uphold the [finding] if possible. It is an elementary, but often overlooked principle of law, that when a [finding] is attacked as being unsupported, the power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the [finding]. When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 571, quoting Crawford v. Southern Pac. Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429.) To put it another way, "[w]hen a judgment is attacked for insufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that some reasonable trier of fact could find that the judgment and each essential element thereof was established by the appropriate burden of proof." (Rivard v. Board of Pension Commissioners (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 405, 414.)
Respondents' counsel declared that his clients "have informed me that [appellant] has not shielded his surveillance camera . . . ." The declaration was accompanied by a photograph purportedly taken on August 1, 2009, showing no mechanical shield had been placed on the camera. Respondents filed a reply that was accompanied by another photograph, this one purportedly taken on November 4, 2009, depicting a camera identified as belonging to appellant without a shield in place.
Appellant did not dispute that no shield had been installed, and no objections were made to respondents' evidence. Instead, it was appellant's position that a shield was not required by the settlement agreement so long as the mechanical restriction limited the camera's view. In fact, appellant confirmed this in his November 13, 2010 supplemental declaration to which he attached a copy of an invoice dated July 2, 2009, "concerning work I had performed on the camera." The attached invoice from Super Electric, Inc. describes work performed for appellant as "[i]nspect and adjust camera located at south east corner of property. Restricted movement of camera travel from 360°—270° eliminating the view of the Toler-Dostal property line." No shield had been installed.
Therefore, we conclude that there is indeed substantial evidence supporting the trial court's findings that appellant was required both to mechanically restrict and shield his surveillance camera as a material condition of the settlement, and substantial evidence that he breached the agreement by not doing so. Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in ruling that appellant did not comply with the settlement agreement between the parties, respondents met their burden of proof in showing a breach of the agreement by appellant, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering judgment against him.
C. The Court Did Not Err in Granting the Motions For Attorney Fees
As noted above, the renewed motions for attorney fees were brought under Civil Code section 1354, subdivision (c) ,which provides: "In an action to enforce the governing documents [of a homeowners' association], the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs." Also as noted above, on April 1, 2010, the court issued its ruling granting the motions, and ordering appellant to pay attorney fees of $15,000 for fees incurred from the law firm of Murphy, Peterson, Bradley & Feeney, and $5,000 for fees incurred from the law firm of Porter Scott.
Appellant attacks neither the legal authority under which attorney fees were awarded, nor the amounts. Instead, he only claims that respondents were not entitled to the fee awards because they had not proved that he breached the settlement agreement. Having found that the trial court did not err in finding appellant had, in fact, materially breached the settlement agreement, it therefore follows that appellant's attack on the fee awards must fail.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
RUVOLO, P. J. We concur: REARDON, J. SEPULVEDA, J.