A bailment that arises as a personal favor is a gratuitous bailment. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1844 (1985) ("Gratuitous deposit is a deposit for which the depositary receives no consideration beyond the mere possession of the thing deposited."); see also Todd v. Dow, 19 Cal.App.4th 253, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 490, 494-95 (1993) (concluding that the storage of a rifle as a personal favor was a gratuitous bailment). A gratuitous bailee is a lawful possessor, though of a more particular kind.

In our review, we apply the same three-step process as does the trial court: "'First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings . . . .'" (Toddv. Dow (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 253, 258.) Second, we "'determine whether the moving party's showing has established facts which negate the opponent's claim and justify a judgment in movant's favor. . . .'" (ibid.)

"Our review of the summary judgment motion requires that we apply the same three-step process required of the trial court. [Citation.] 'First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond by establishing a complete defense or otherwise showing there is no factual basis for relief on any theory reasonably contemplated by the opponent's pleading. [Citations.] [¶] Secondly, we determine whether the moving party's showing has established facts which negate the opponent's claim and justify a judgment in movant's favor. [Citations.] . . . [¶] . . . [T]he third and final step is to determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" ( Todd v. Dow (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 253, 258 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 490].) "'The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is to permit a party to show that material factual claims arising from the pleadings need not be tried because they are not in dispute.'

Courts have applied the Biakanja/Rowland duty analysis in determining parental liability for adult children and have additionally emphasized the parents' ability to control the child. ( Hansra, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at pp. 639-640, 645 [plaintiffs did not allege mother "had an ability to control" adult married son who did not live with her]; Todd v. Dow (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 253, 256, 258-259 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 490] [parents had no ability to control adult married son who did not live with them].) Thus, a plaintiff who alleges a defendant had a duty to control another person based on a special relationship must make a twofold showing (1) that the defendant had the ability to control the actor and (2) that the defendant bore a duty of care under a Biakanja/Rowland analysis.

If we determine the moving party made the requisite prima facie showing of the nonexistence of a triable issue of fact, we then review the opposing party's submissions to determine if a material triable issue exists. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850-851 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493] ( Aguilar); Todd v. Dow (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 253, 258 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 490].) "In performing our de novo review, we must view the evidence in a light favorable to plaintiff as the losing party [citation], liberally construing [his or] her evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing [defendant's] own showing, and resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiffs favor."

Before a special relationship can give rise to a duty of care, there must be an ability to control the third party causing the injury. (See, e.g., Todd v. Dow (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 253, 259.) In the present case, CertainTeed did not mine, manufacture, or sell the asbestos that Johnson unloaded.

The rationale is clear: It is the allegations in the complaint to which the summary judgment motion must respond. ( Todd v. Dow (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 253, 258 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 490].) Upon a motion for summary judgment, amendments to the pleadings are readily allowed.

(2) Our review of the summary judgment motion requires we apply the same three-step process required of the trial court. ( AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 203 ].) "First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond by establishing a complete defense or otherwise showing there is no factual basis for relief on any theory reasonably contemplated by the opponent's pleading. [Citations.] [¶] Secondly, we determine whether the moving party's showing has established facts which negate the opponent's claim and justify a judgment in movant's favor. [Citations.] . . . [¶] [T]he third and final step is to determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. [Citation.]" ( Id., at pp. 1064-1065, italics added; accord, Todd v. Dow (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 253, 258 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 490].) Our review is guided by the foregoing principles.

( AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 203].) "First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond by establishing a complete defense or otherwise showing there is no factual basis for relief on any theory reasonably contemplated by the opponent's pleading. [Citations.] [¶] Secondly, we determine whether the moving party's showing has established facts which negate the opponent's claim and justify a judgment in movant's favor. [Citations.] . . . [¶] [T]he third and final step is to determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. [Citation.]" ( Id., at pp. 1064-1065; accord, Todd v. Dow (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 253, 258 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 490].) Our review is guided by the foregoing principles.

If Robert had caused substantial harm with Maria's firearms, it could be permissible to consider that harm in analyzing whether a forfeiture of the firearms would be unconstitutionally excessive as to Maria. (Indeed, tort law generally recognizes a tort of negligent entrustment, which can make an owner of property liable for damages when another person harms a third party with the property. See, e.g., Todd v. Dow, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490, 494-95 (Ct. App. 1993).) However, these are not the facts of this case.