Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-11817-DPW.
August 30, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kevin Tobin originally brought this action in Massachusetts Superior Court alleging three counts: intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional interference with contractual relations. Defendants removed the case to this court on grounds of federal preemption by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001- 1461. Before me are Tobin's motion to remand the case to state courts and defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, I will deny Tobin's motion to remand and grant defendants' motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Tobin filed the present suit in state court two years after commencing a related action in this court against Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty Mutual"). In that case, Tobin v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., No. 01-11979, (D. Mass. filed Nov. 15, 2001), Tobin alleged, inter alia, that Liberty Mutual unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of age and disability. The general factual context to the instant case is set forth in a summary judgment memorandum issued today in that case and I need not repeat it here. Instead, for present purposes, I focus on only those facts and allegations taken from Tobin's complaint in the instant case, which are relevant to Tobin's motions pending before me.
From June 1968 to January 2001, Tobin worked as a sales representative of Liberty Mutual. Complaint ¶ 17. Defendants were also employees of Liberty Mutual: at all times relevant to the complaint: Nadeau was a sales manager indirectly supervising Tobin; Vance was an administrator in the Liberty Mutual's human resource department, and from January 1999 to January 2001, Schwitters was Tobin's direct supervisor. Id. ¶ 8, 10, 13.
Tobin alleges in his complaint that in 1994, he began experiencing problems at work and that in 1995, he was diagnosed as a bi-polar manic by his doctor. Id. ¶ 26-27. Tobin contends that while his condition made it difficult for him to concentrate and to be organized and also made him fatigued, he was, with the aid of medication, able to continue to function successfully at work. Id. ¶ 29-31. Tobin took two disability leaves, from December 1997 to June 1998 and from September 1998 to January 1999. Id. ¶ 64, 82.
Tobin alleges that at some point unknown to him, "defendants conspired to build a case to justify the termination of the employment of Mr. Tobin from Liberty Mutual." Id. ¶ 32. He further states that "[a] series of events followed, orchestrated by Nadeau, which were intended to unfairly and inaccurately discredit Tobin in the eyes of his employer," and that "Vance and Schwitters participated in this process." Id. ¶ 33-34. Tobin contends that defendants took actions to place undue stress and pressure on Tobin to hinder his ability to perform his job and that as a result, he required accommodations to satisfy his job requirements. Id. ¶ 36-38. He further alleges that defendants conspired to deny any such accommodations to him by, in part, withholding the fact that Tobin was disabled and required accommodations from senior management at Liberty Mutual. Id. ¶ 39. After a series of negative performance evaluations, warnings, and probationary periods, Tobin was ultimately terminated from Liberty Mutual on January 10, 2001. Id. ¶ 111.
Generally speaking, Tobin alleges that defendants made a number of willful misrepresentations and took a number of actions which ultimately led to his termination. Id. ¶ 111. The specifics of the allegations are not relevant for present purposes except insofar as they formed the basis for defendants' removal of the action from state court. Defendants identify paragraphs 103-06, 109, and 111-14 of Tobin's complaint as that basis.
In those paragraphs, Tobin alleges that in a meeting in December 2000, prior to his termination, he met with Schwitters and indicated to her "that the stress imposed was making it difficult for him to function and that he intended to apply for disability leave immediately if his performance was inadequate" and that Schwitters responded by telling Tobin he was "doing all right." Complaint ¶ 103-04. Tobin further alleges that:
Schwitters clearly understood that Tobin would be applying for disability leave if he understood that his performance was inadequate and termination of his employment was probable.
With the knowledge that Tobin would be filing a disability claim if he understood termination was probably, Schwitters, conspiring with Vance and Nadeau, gave positive feedback to Tobin and encouraged him to remain on the job while simultaneously orchestrating with Nadeau and Vance his termination.
. . .
With the knowledge that the approval of senior management had already been secured to terminate Tobin in the event that he failed to meet the terms of probation, Schwitters encouraged Tobin to continue to work and discouraged him from filing for disability leave as he intended to do at that time.Id. ¶ 105-06, 109. Paragraphs 111-14 of the complaint further allege:
On or about January 10, 2001, Mr. Tobin was wrongfully terminated from Liberty Mutual with no further warning.
Immediately upon being advised by Vance that he was being terminated, Tobin responded by advising that he was disabled and was giving notice of application for disability benefits.
Vance responded by advising Tobin that disability benefits were only available to employees and since Vance had notified Tobin of his discharge, he was no longer eligible for disability benefits.
During the term of his employment, a charge was imposed against the earnings of Tobin to pay for the disability benefits which Tobin sought at the time of discharge.Id. ¶ 111-14.
Defendants contend that the allegations contained in these paragraphs bring the matter within the enforcement provisions of ERISA. Specifically, they contend that this court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the action involves questions involving the laws of the United States — specifically ERISA. They argue that because Tobin's state law claims fall within the scope of §§ 502(a) and 510 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132 and 1140, the statute's civil enforcement provisions, they are preempted by federal law and confer federal subject matter jurisdiction to this court. They further contend that because they fall within the scope of § 510, Tobin's claims, as characterized in the complaint, are preempted by § 514 of ERISA, thereby warranting dismissal of the claims.
Tobin, on the other hand, points out that the employer, Liberty Mutual, is not a defendant in this action and that he has not alleged in his complaint that any of defendants violated ERISA provisions. Rather, he maintains that the basis for his state law tort claims is an alleged conspiracy by defendants to discredit him and cause him to be wrongfully terminated and that employee benefits are not at issue in this case.
II. DISCUSSION
As noted earlier, presently before me are both Tobin's motion to remand to state court and defendants' motion to dismiss. Whether this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, which is the basis for Tobin's motion, is a threshold matter, and I consider that motion first before turning to defendants' motion to dismiss.
A. Motion to Remand
On its face, Tobin's complaint does not present a federal question. Ordinarily, this would warrant remanding the case because under the "well-pleaded complaint rule," federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (on which defendants relied in removing the case) is determined from the face of the state court complaint that triggered removal. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983). However, there is an exception to the wellpleaded complaint rule "when a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete pre-emption." Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003); see also Danca v. Private Health Care Systems, Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Where a claim, though couched in the language of state law, implicates an area of federal law for which Congress intended a particularly powerful preemptive sweep, the cause is deemed federal no matter how pleaded." (citingMetropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987)). "This is so because `when the federal statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law.'" Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2004) (quotingBeneficial, 539 U.S. at 8).
In Metropolitan Life, the Supreme Court held that state causes of action that fall within the scope of § 502(a) of ERISA, the civil enforcement provision of the statute, are completely preempted and thus are removable to federal court. 481 U.S. at 66. Section 502(a) states, in relevant part:
A civil action may be brought —
. . .
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). In determining whether a claim falls within the scope of § 502(a), a court "must look beyond the face of the complaint `to determine whether the real nature of the claim is federal regardless of plaintiff's [state law] characterizations.'" Danca, 185 F.3d at 5 (quoting Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n. 2 (1981)).
While Tobin's claims here are not aimed at enforcing the terms of Liberty Mutual's disability or pension plans, defendants nevertheless argue that Tobin's claims are completely preempted insofar as they fall within the scope of § 510 of ERISA. Section 510 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan, this subchapter, section 1201 of this title, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act [ 29 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq.], or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan, this subchapter, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. . . . The provisions of section 1132 of this title shall be applicable in the enforcement of this section.29 U.S.C. § 1140.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the First Circuit has directly addressed whether a state law claim that, by its factual allegations, falls within § 510 is completely preempted by ERISA. The Supreme Court, in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), did hold that because Congress intended § 502(a) to be the exclusive remedy for rights guaranteed under ERISA, including those provided by § 510, a state law action that falls within § 510 is preempted by ERISA. Id. at 142. But Ingersoll concerned ordinary preemption under § 514 of ERISA, which is distinct from complete preemption for removal purposes. Danca, 185 F.3d at 4 ("Standing alone, the likelihood or even certainty of defendants' raising a colorable ERISA § 514 preemption defense is no basis for federal jurisdiction."). Nevertheless, several circuits have extended Ingersoll to hold that state law causes of action that fall within § 510 are completely preempted.Bullock v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 259 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2001); Wood v. Prudential Ins. Co., 207 F.3d 674 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, these cases hold that § 510 completely preempts state law claims even where the relief requested in the state law claims is not available under § 502, which is the case with Tobin's claims. See Wood 207 F.3d at 678. I find these cases persuasive, and thus, I similarly conclude that claims that fall within the scope of § 510 are completely preempted by ERISA.
I turn, then, to whether Tobin's allegations are encompassed by § 510 in the first instance. As defendants note, § 510 concerns the actions of "any person," not just the employer, and thus, Tobin's contention that ERISA is inapplicable because Liberty Mutual is not a defendant in this case carries no force. Rather, the pivotal question is whether the conduct Tobin alleges in the complaint falls within the scope of § 510. I conclude that it does.
Section 510 states that it is unlawful for any person to "discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against" a participant or beneficiary for exercising a right under an employee benefit plan or for the purpose of interfering with the attaining of any such right. Paragraphs 103-06 and 109 of the complaint allege that "Schwitters clearly understood that Tobin would be applying for disability leave" if he thought he would likely be fired and that Schwitters dissuaded him from doing so by implying that he was not going to be fired. Tobin, in essence, alleges that Schwitters, conspiring with Vance and Nadeau, misled Tobin to believe that he would not be terminated so he would not take disability leave. This, Tobin alleges, allowed defendants to continue with their plan to get him fired from Liberty Mutual.
This alleged conduct falls squarely within the scope of § 510. What Tobin seeks through this law suit is "an alternative enforcement mechanism" under state law to remedy a claim within the scope of federal ERISA law. Danca, 185 F.3d at 5 (citation omitted). While Tobin does not explicitly allege that defendants conspired to terminate him for the purpose of interfering with his right to disability benefits, the substance of his claims indicates exactly that. Tobin alleges that Schwitters did not want Tobin to file a disability claim because it would prevent her (or her superiors) from firing him, and thus, Schwitters essentially tricked him into not filing a disability claim while simultaneously orchestrating his termination. Thus, at the core of Tobin's claims is his contention that defendants acted to get him fired before he could file a disability claim. This constitutes the type of interference with ERISA rights proscribed by § 510.
Moreover, in paragraphs 111-14 of the complaint, Tobin contends that Vance misled him about the availability of disability benefits. Tobin alleges that he asked about the availability of disability benefits, and Vance informed him that he was no longer eligible for such benefits. These paragraphs serve to underscore Tobin's general allegation that defendants conspired to get Tobin fired because they knew he intended to file a disability claim and that he would be unable to do so once terminated.
Thus, I conclude that the allegations identified by defendants as the basis for removal, in paragraphs 103-06, 109, and 111-14 of the complaint, fall within § 510 of ERISA and that Tobin's state law claims are therefore completely preempted by the civil enforcement provisions of the statute. Accordingly, I will deny Tobin's motion to remand the case to state court.
I note that I am satisfied that Tobin's references to disability benefits were references to a "plan" as defined by ERISA — at least for purposes of the present motions. ERISA defines "plan" generally as "an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan" or a plan combining aspects of both, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3), and determining whether a "plan" exists requires an inquiry into "the nature and extent of [the] employer's benefit obligations" under the package. Rodowicz v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 192 F.3d 162, 170 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Belanger v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 71 F.3d 451, 454 (1st Cir. 1995)), modified on other grounds, 195 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 1999). While Tobin does not expressly allege facts as to the nature of his disability benefits, he does not here suggest as a basis for remand that such benefits were pursuant to a plan not covered by ERISA. Cf. Crespo v. Candela Laser Corp., 780 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D. Mass. 1992) (remanding where allegations in complaint did not sufficiently demonstrate "plan" under ERISA "would permit removal upon even the most conclusory allegations of employer benefits, thereby unnecessarily involving the federal courts in claims that stretch ERISA preemption beyond any conceivable purpose envisioned by Congress").
B. Motion to Dismiss
Under the preemption provision in § 514 of ERISA, the statute "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Here, given my conclusion above that Tobin's claims fall within the provisions of § 510, it follows virtually automatically that Tobin's claims are preempted by § 514 and dismissal is appropriate. See Danca, 185 F.3d at 7 (concluding that claims were "both completely preempted, justifying removal, and preempted by ERISA 514, justifying dismissal"). Allowing Tobin to pursue his claims here would "indisputably create a threat of conflicting and inconsistent state and local regulation of the administration of ERISA plans." Id. (dismissing negligent infliction of emotional distress claim). Accordingly, I will grant defendants' motion to dismiss.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth more fully above, Tobin's motion to remand is DENIED, and defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.