Opinion
23A-JV-2586
05-22-2024
T.M., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT CHRISTOPHER J. EVANS DYLLAN M. KEMP DOLLARD EVANS WHALIN, LLP NOBLESVILLE, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA COURTNEY STATON DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Hamilton Circuit Court The Honorable Andrew R. Bloch, Judge The Honorable Valorie Hahn, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 29C01-2305-JD-729
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT CHRISTOPHER J. EVANS DYLLAN M. KEMP DOLLARD EVANS WHALIN, LLP NOBLESVILLE, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA COURTNEY STATON DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Riley Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[¶1] Appellant-Respondent, T.M., appeals his adjudication for possession of a narcotic drug, which would be a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult, and his commitment to the Department of Correction.
[¶2] We affirm.
ISSUES
[¶3] T.M. presents this court with three issues, which we restate as follows:
(1) Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in the admission of evidence;
(2) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support T.M.'s adjudication for a Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug if committed by an adult; and
(3) Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it committed T.M. to the Department of Correction (DOC).
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[¶4] On May 25, 2023, officers of the Fishers Police Department responded to a call at the residence of Daphne Thacker-Grant (Thacker-Grant), T.M.'s mother, in Fishers, Indiana. Thacker-Grant noticed that the safe in her closet had been opened and $5,000 was missing. When speaking with sixteen-year-old T.M., she noticed "a bulge in his pocket" and asked him to empty his pockets. (Transcript p. 11). T.M. refused. After Lieutenant Jason Peasley of the Fishers Police Department (Officer Peasley) arrived, Thacker-Grant was able to remove approximately $3,500 and a small baggie of pills from inside T.M.'s pocket. The baggie appeared to be the cut corner of a plastic bag and the pills inside looked "deteriorated" as if they had gotten wet. (Tr. p. 31). Because of their poor condition, Officer Peasley had difficulty reading their markings. He put the baggie inside a nylox glove, which he placed in his pocket for transportation to the Fishers Police Department's property room. Officer Peasley packaged the pills per departmental policy, which, in turn, was in keeping with the Indiana State Police Laboratory requests and procedures. He labeled the package, sealed it, initialed the bag over the seals to verify that they remained unbroken, placed that package into a secure locker, and sent a request to the Indiana State Police Laboratory for testing. The secure locker can only be accessed from inside the secure property room itself. Upon finding the evidence in the secure locker, the property room manager entered the item in the computer system and placed it on the shelf corresponding with the position entered in the computer system. In the course of his investigation, Officer Peasley was made aware of a jail call in which T.M. referred to the pills as "roxies[,] which is a slang term for opiate." (Tr. p. 73).
[¶5] On May 30, 2023, the State filed a delinquency petition, alleging that T.M. had committed what would be a Level 6 felony theft and a Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic if committed by an adult. The petition identified the narcotic as Oxycodone.
[¶6] On June 9, 2023, Detective Tom Brooks (Detective Brooks) collected the pills from the property room and transported them to the Indiana State Police Laboratory for testing. When he arrived at the Laboratory, he double checked the paperwork, verified that the package was sealed, and handed it to the technician. Upon receipt, the technician placed his own barcode on the package for internal use. Brandy Cline (Cline), a forensic scientist in the drug unit, analyzed the pills and concluded that they contained Fentanyl and Tramadol even though their markings were consistent with the standard markings typically observed on Oxycodone.
[¶7] On September 8, 2023, the State moved to amend the delinquency petition to identify the narcotic in the possession charge as Fentanyl as opposed to Oxycodone, which was granted by the juvenile court the following day. After Detective Brooks retrieved the evidence from the Indiana State Police Laboratory, he returned it to the secure property room of the Fisher's Police Department.
[¶8] On September 21, 2023, the juvenile court conducted a fact-finding hearing. During the proceedings, the State moved to admit the Fentanyl pills into evidence. T.M. objected, contending that the State had failed to establish an adequate chain of custody for the evidence. Because the pills were fungible items, T.M. argued that "we don't know that it is what it purports to be." (Tr. p. 56). The juvenile court admitted the pills into evidence over T.M.'s objection. At the close of the hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated T.M. as a delinquent child and concluded that he had committed possession of a narcotic drug, which would be a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult. The juvenile court concluded that the State had failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to the theft allegation.
[¶9] On October 19, 2023, during the dispositional hearing, Juvenile Probation Officer Vanessa Campbell (Campbell) testified that T.M. had been "on some sort of juvenile court supervision since the age of 12." (Tr. p. 82). He had been placed on probation twice, secure detention multiple times, home monitoring, residential placement, and the DOC. Most recently, T.M. had been released from the DOC in December of 2022 and was on parole at the time he committed the instant delinquent act. Campell recommended to place T.M. back in the DOC because T.M. had received "several opportunities" already through community supervision, residential supervision, and the DOC to progress with his rehabilitation, yet to no avail. (Tr. p. 82). Even though Campbell had attempted to find residential treatment facilities, none had been willing or able to accept T.M. After receiving argument, the juvenile court ordered T.M. to be committed to the DOC.
[¶10] T.M. now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Admission of Evidence
[¶11] T.M. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it admitted the narcotics into evidence after the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody. Generally, "[a] trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence." Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. 2014). Upon review, "we reverse only if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it." King v. State, 985 N.E.2d 755, 757 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied.
[¶12] Conceding that the State is not required to exclude each and every remote possibility of tampering, T.M. argues that because the pills are fungible and their appearance "indistinguishable to the naked eye," "a more stringent standard [is] required and the State's burden of showing the continuous whereabouts of the evidence is enhanced." (Appellant's Br. p. 16). It is generally established that the State bears a higher burden to establish the chain of custody of "fungible" evidence, such as blood and hair samples, whose appearance is indistinguishable to the naked eye. Culver v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1062, 1068 (Ind. 2000); see also Bivins v. State, 433 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ind. 1982) (acknowledging that hair is characterized as fungible evidence). To establish a proper chain of custody, the State must give reasonable assurances that the evidence remained in an undisturbed condition. Cliver v. State, 666 N.E.2d 59, 63 (Ind. 1996). However, the State need not establish a perfect chain of custody, and once the State "strongly suggests" the exact whereabouts of the evidence, any gaps go to the weight of the evidence and not to admissibility. Troxell v. State, 778 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ind. 2002) (citing Wrinkles v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1156, 1160 (Ind. 1997)); Jenkins v. State, 627 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ind. 1993) (noting that the failure of an FBI technician to testify did not create error). Moreover, there is a presumption of regularity in the handling of evidence by officers, and there is a presumption that officers exercise due care in handling their duties. Culver, 727 N.E.2d at 1067. To mount a successful challenge to the chain of custody, one must present evidence that does more than raise a mere possibility that the evidence may have been tampered with. Cliver, 666 N.E.2d at 63.
[¶13] Even if we hold the State to a higher burden to establish the chain of custody for fungible evidence as requested by T.M., we conclude that the State presented ample evidence strongly suggesting the exact whereabouts of the evidence at all times and giving reasonable assurances that the property passed through various hands in an undisturbed condition. See id. When the pills were removed from T.M.'s pocket, Officer Peasley packaged the pills per departmental policy, placed them in a secure locker in the Fisher's Police Department property room, and made arrangements with the Indiana State Police Laboratory for further testing. The pills did not leave Officer Peasley's person between the time he collected them and when he secured them in the property room. After being secured in the locker, the property room manager entered the evidence into the computer and placed it on the shelf indicated by the computer system. Detective Brooks transported the pills from the property room to the Indiana State Police Laboratory for testing. He double checked the paperwork, verified the seal on the package, and provided it to the technician. The technician then labeled the package with the Laboratory's barcode for internal use. During the hearing, Cline testified that the pills she was shown to be admitted into evidence were in substantially the same condition as when she last saw them. After Cline performed her analysis of the pills, Detective Brooks returned the evidence to the secure property room at the Fisher's Police Department, where they remained until trial.
[¶14] T.M.'s arguments with respect to perceived issues in the collection of the pills in a nylox bag, the manner of identification, and the possibility that someone else might have subsequently opened the package amount to nothing more than speculation and do not raise to the level of evidence tampering. Speculation alone is insufficient to defeat the presumption of regularity in handing evidence. See Cliver, 666 N.E.2d at 63 ("The defendant can challenge the adequacy of the foundation, but he must present evidence which does more than raise a mere possibility that the evidence could have been tampered with."). Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court properly admitted the pills into evidence.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶15] Next, T.M. contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt his adjudication for a Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug if committed by an adult. When the State seeks to have a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent for committing an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult, the State must prove every element of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A.E.B. v. State, 756 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001). Upon review, the reviewing court applies the same sufficiency standard used in criminal cases. Id. When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims with respect to juvenile adjudications, the reviewing court neither reweighs the evidence nor judges the credibility of the witnesses. B.K.C. v. State, 781 N.E.2d 1157, 1163 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003). Rather, the reviewing court considers only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and will affirm if the evidence and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value to support the judgment. Id.
[¶16] To support an adjudication for possession of a narcotic drug, as alleged in the delinquency petition, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that T.M. knowingly or intentionally possessed a narcotic drug without a valid prescription or order of a practitioner acting in the course of the practitioner's professional practice. I.C. § 35-48-4-6(a). A person engages in conduct "knowingly" if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so. I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). A person engages in conduct "intentionally" if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so. I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a).
[¶17] Focusing on the mens rea prong of the statute, T.M. argues that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence at trial to demonstrate that he knowingly or intentionally possessed a narcotic drug. T.M. points to Cline's testimony, which concluded that the pills that were seized and later tested at the Indiana State Police Laboratory were counterfeit because the pills tested positive for Fentanyl and Tramadol, but "[F]entanyls are not blue, round, or marked M/30" like the pills that were tested. (Tr. p. 63). Instead, "a blue, round tablet marked M/30 would typically contain [O]xycodone" but the sample tested did not. (Tr. p. 67). T.M. maintains that the fact that the pills were later determined to be counterfeit bolstered his claim that he did not know the nature and substance of the pills that were in his possession.
[¶18] Absent a defendant's admission, like here, intent is determined from consideration of the defendant's conduct and the natural and usual consequences of that conduct. Hendrix v. State, 615 N.E.2d 483, 485 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993). The pills were found inside T.M.'s pocket, stored in a baggie. Officer Peasley testified that "baggie corners" are a typical packing agent for illegal substances. (Tr. p. 71). Accordingly, it is reasonable to infer T.M. was aware of the illicit nature of the narcotics due to the way the pills were packaged as opposed to the legitimate way most individuals store pills. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 902 N.E.2d 280, 289 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000) (concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for dealing in cocaine, in part, where the drugs recovered from Washington's jacket pocket contained nine rocks of crack cocaine that were individually packaged in baggie corners.) Moreover, during a phone call made from jail, T.M. referred to the pills as "roxies," which is a slang term for opiates. (Tr. p. 73).
[¶19] T.M.'s argument that the State was required to establish the representations that were made to T.M. when he first acquired the narcotics because the fact that the pills were later determined to be counterfeit supported his argument that he was unaware of the nature and substance of the pills is not persuasive. Even if T.M. was mistaken about the actual type of pill he had in his possession and thought he was carrying Oxycotin, Oxycotin is a schedule II controlled substance, which also requires a prescription. See I.C. §§ 35-48-2-6(b)(1)(O); 35-48-4-6(a).
[¶20] Based on the packaging of the pills in baggies in T.M.'s pocket and his reference to the narcotics as roxies, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to establish T.M.'s adjudication beyond a reasonable doubt.
III. Disposition
[¶21] In addressing T.M.'s claim that the juvenile court abused its discretion in granting wardship to the DOC, we observe that the choice of the specific disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent child is a matter that is committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, subject to the least harsh disposition. R.H. v. State, 937 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010). A juvenile court's dispositional order may be overturned on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where the juvenile court's actions are clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the juvenile court or the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Id.
[¶22] Dispositional decrees where a juvenile is adjudicated a delinquent are intended to promote rehabilitation. R.J.G. v. State, 902 N.E.2d 804, 806 (Ind. 2009). This is in keeping with the legislative policy that juveniles are to be "treated as persons in need of care, protection, treatment, and rehabilitation." Id. The goal in the juvenile justice system is to rehabilitate juveniles so that they do not become adult criminals. R.H., 937 N.E.2d at 388. Thus, the juvenile court is provided with a myriad of dispositional alternatives to permit the court to find the disposition that best fits the unique and varying circumstances of each child's problems. Because of the need to tailor dispositions for each individual child, the juvenile court is accorded great latitude and flexibility in its choice of specific dispositions for a juvenile adjudicated delinquent. M.T. v. State, 928 N.E.2d 266, 268 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010), trans. denied.
[¶23] Although the statute requires the juvenile court to select the least restrictive placement, it allows for a more restrictive placement under certain circumstances. K.A. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 382, 386-87 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002), trans. denied. That is, the statute requires placement in the least restrictive setting only "[i]f consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child." See I.C. § 31-37-18-6. Thus, the statute recognizes that in certain situations the best interest of the child is better served by a more restrictive placement because "commitment to a public institution is in the best interest of the juvenile and society." D.S. v. State, 829 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005).
[¶24] Here, the evidence established that many less restrictive rehabilitative efforts failed to reach T.M. and did not produce positive changes in his behavior. T.M. has been adjudicated a delinquent for what would have been Level 6 felony auto theft, two Counts of Level 3 felony armed robbery, and Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief, if committed by an adult. T.M. has been placed on community supervision, residential supervision, and in the DOC. T.M. was released from the DOC in December of 2022 and was on parole at the time he committed the instant delinquent act. In the predispositional report, Campbell characterized T.M. as "rash and impulsive in his willingness to face danger and harm, and acts fearless when facing threats and negative consequences." (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 84). "Diagnostically, his results suggested the presence of antisocial and aggressive/sadistic personality traits with negativistic and narcissistic features." (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 84). After an extensive review of the supporting documents, Campbell concluded that T.M. "has been engaging in criminal thinking since he was [a] child with the first reported incident occurring some time in elementary school when he brought [a] BB gun to school." (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 84). Even though Campbell attempted to find less restrictive placement options for T.M., she reported that none of the residential treatment facilities had been willing or able to accept T.M.
[¶25] T.M.'s wardship to the DOC serves the juvenile justice system's purpose, inasmuch as intervention is needed to prevent T.M.'s behavior from further escalating, with the hope that T.M. will not commit criminal offenses as an adult. To that end, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the wardship of T.M. to the DOC. See C.C. v. State, 831 N.E.2d 215, 218-19 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005) (observing that a juvenile's repeated involvement with the juvenile justice system and repeated failures at rehabilitation efforts, coupled with the failure to alter behavior despite several placements by the court were appropriate considerations for a grant of wardship to the DOC).
CONCLUSION
[¶26] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the narcotics into evidence; the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support T.M.'s adjudication; and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by committing T.M. to the DOC.
[¶27] Affirmed.
Brown, J. and Foley, J. concur