Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego CountySuper. Ct. Nos. GIC836173, GIC837901, Joan M. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
IRION, J.
Sue-Anne Tiu appeals from a denial of her petition for writ of administrative mandamus, challenging a decision by the County of San Diego, Civil Service Commission (the Commission). As we will explain, we conclude that Tiu's appeal is without merit, and accordingly we affirm.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Tiu, who was employed by the County of San Diego, Department of Child Support Services (the County) beginning in 1991, took a medical leave in 2002. After Tiu's medical leave ended, the County determined that Tiu was unfit to return to work. Tiu signed a document agreeing to participate in a rehabilitation treatment plan that would allow her to return to work upon completion of the plan if she obtained a note from her treatment provider indicating that she was fit to return.
Tiu subsequently raised two separate issues to the Commission. First, Tiu apparently complained to the Commission that she was entitled to a hearing because the County effectively put her on compulsory leave by coercing her into agreeing to participate in the rehabilitation treatment plan. In response, the Commission determined that Tiu's leave was voluntary, not compulsory, and that she was thus not entitled to a hearing. Second, Tiu filed a charge with the Commission, alleging that she was subjected to various types of employment discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.). The Commission denied the complaint, finding there was no evidence to support Tiu's allegations of employment discrimination.
We have inferred from certain comments in the record that under the applicable San Diego County compensation ordinance, Tiu would be entitled to a hearing before the Commission if the leave was determined to be compulsory, but not if it was determined to be voluntary.
Tiu filed two separate petitions seeking administrative mandamus to challenge the Commission's decisions. The first petition, case No. GIC836173, challenged the Commission's decision that Tiu was not placed on compulsory leave and thus was not entitled to a hearing (the compulsory leave petition). The appellate record contains a copy of the compulsory leave petition. Second, Tiu filed a petition, case No. GIC837901, to challenge the Commission's decision regarding her allegation of employment discrimination (the discrimination petition). The record does not contain a copy of the discrimination petition, and we have taken our description of that petition from Tiu's appellate briefing. We infer from the captions of certain documents in the record that the compulsory leave petition was consolidated with the discrimination petition.
According to the County's appellate brief, Tiu earlier filed a different case challenging its decision on her employment discrimination claim.
The record contains the trial court's decision on the discrimination petition. The trial court denied the petition in that case on three separate grounds. First, Tiu failed to lodge the necessary portions of the administrative record. Second, based on the record before the trial court, "the Commission did not proceed without or in excess of its jurisdiction; there was a fair trial and there was no prejudicial abuse of discretion." Third, Tiu had unreasonably delayed in litigating the matter, so she was barred from pursuing it by the doctrine of laches.
The record contains no information about the trial court's ruling on the compulsory leave petition. In her appellate brief, Tiu contends that the trial court denied the compulsory leave petition "on the basis of res judicata." The record, however, contains no indication of such a ruling.
Tiu's notice of appeal lists both the compulsory leave petition (i.e., case No. GIC837901) and the discrimination petition (i.e., case No. GIC836173) on its caption, and it refers to the judgment simultaneously entered in both of those cases. Thus, we are unsure whether Tiu intends to appeal from a ruling on the discrimination petition or a ruling on the compulsory leave petition.
Without identifying which petition she is referring to, Tiu appeals, arguing that her "[p]etition is neither barred by res judicata nor collateral estoppel."
II
DISCUSSION
Tiu's sole challenge to the judgment is her argument that her "petition" is not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. Because Tiu does not indicate which of her two petitions is the subject of this appeal, we consider both of them.
As we have explained, the record contains no indication that the ruling on the discrimination petition was based on principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Instead, the record clearly shows that the trial court denied the discrimination petition (i.e., case No. GIC837901) based on three separate grounds, none of which Tiu challenges on appeal. We thus reject Tiu's appeal to the extent it seeks to challenge the trial court's ruling on the discrimination petition because her appeal fails to address the grounds on which the trial court based its ruling and accordingly presents no reason for us to reverse the trial court's ruling.
If Tiu is intending to appeal from a ruling on the compulsory leave petition (i.e., case No. GIC836173) that she claims was based on principles of res judicata, we reject such an argument. The record contains no ruling in that case premised on the ground of res judicata. It is Tiu's burden, as the appellant, to provide us with an adequate record. (See Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.) She has failed to do so.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McDONALD, Acting P. J., AARON, J.