See, e. g., Jefferson v. United States, 488 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1974); Taylor v. United States, 472 F.2d 1178, 1179-80 (8th Cir. 1973); Martinez v. United States, 464 F.2d 1289, 1290 (10th Cir. 1972). Prior to our decision in Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1976), language used by this court in other opinions left some doubt whether, in an appropriate case, we would also apply Tucker to § 2255 petitions for relief from sentences enhanced by convictions invalidated on other than right to counsel grounds. In a case that dealt with invalid prior convictions under Gideon, this court concluded, seemingly without reservation, that the Supreme Court in Tucker "ruled that any reliance upon an invalid prior conviction to enhance a criminal sentence is constitutionally impermissible."

428 U.S. at 482, 96 S.Ct. at 3052. Our court has previously determined that Stone applies retroactively to cases, such as this, in which federal habeas corpus relief was sought prior to the date of the Stone decision. Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir. 1976); Bracco v. Reed, 540 F.2d 1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 1976); accord, Dupont v. Hall, 555 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1977); Cole v. Estelle, 548 F.2d 1164, 1164 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1977); Rigsbee v. Parkinson, 545 F.2d 56, 57 (8th Cir. 1976); Chavez v. Rodriguez, 540 F.2d 500, 502 (10th Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court has not yet delineated the perimeters of "full and fair litigation" of a fourth amendment claim.

Corley v. Cardwell, 544 F.2d 349, 351 (9th Cir. 1976). Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452, 460-61 (9th Cir. 1976). Eaglin has not alleged even one instance in which a juror was exposed to, let alone influenced by, publicity concerning Bowles' confession.

. In Tisnado v. U.S., 547 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1976), the Ninth Circuit held this limitation on the exclusionary rule applied equally to a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. "Thus, according to Stone v. Powell, a federal court may not grant either § 2254 or § 2255 habeas corpus relief on the basis that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced, respectively, at a state or federal trial where the defendant was provided an opportunity to litigate fully and fairly his fourth amendment claim before petitioning the federal court for collateral relief."

Bagnell had an opportunity to raise these arguments at trial and on direct appeal but failed to do so, and he has shown neither cause nor actual prejudice. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 162-70, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982); United States v. Dunharn, 767 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1985); Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452, 456 (9th Cir. 1976); see generally Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). Bagnell's ineffective assistance of counsel arguments do not support relief. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to suppress Bagnell's confession because such a motion would have been fruitless.

We do not reach the merits of Ishmael's § 2255 petition because we hold that he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in pre-trial proceedings and on direct appeal. Accordingly, collateral review of that claim is barred by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). See United States v. Cook, 997 F.2d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[I]t is clear that the [Supreme] Court intends for Fourth Amendment claims to be limited in § 2255 proceedings as they are limited in § 2254 proceedings — i.e., to be addressed only if a defendant has not had a full and fair opportunity to raise the claims at trial and on direct appeal."); Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452, 456 (9th Cir. 1976) (same). Although we express no view regarding the effect of Kyllo on our previous disposition of Ishmael's Fourth Amendment claim, a change in the law does not, by itself, render prior proceedings any less "full and fair" for purposes of Stone.

Even though Benny is currently released on parole, he is still "in custody" for purposes of habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir. 1976). Benny has a right under § 4211(c)(1) to an early termination hearing and decision five years after being released on parole.

Even though Benny is currently released on parole, he is still "in custody" for purposes of habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir. 1976). (FN10).

In Stone, the Supreme Court held that a petitioner may not raise a Fourth Amendment claim in habeas proceedings where he has had an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate that claim at trial. SeeTisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452, 456 (9th Cir.1976) (applying Stone rule to § 2255 petitions).

The burden is on the defendant to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motions. Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452, 460 (9th Cir. 1976). During discovery the government notified the court that it intended to produce evidence of Frederick's prior sexual misconduct with other children.