Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-907
07-14-2017
ANTONIO TINDELL v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al.
MEMORANDUM MCHUGH, J.
Plaintiff Antonio Tindell, a prisoner incarcerated at the Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility (CFCF), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on allegations that (1) he was not given a bottom bunk bed or proper medical treatment despite informing staff about his scoliosis and back spasms, and (2) he injured himself while descending from the top bunk due to the absence of ladders. For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff suffers from scoliosis and spasms in his lower back. He alleges that, since his arrival at CFCF in August of 2016, he informed Corizon staff—including Ms. Robinson (a nurse), Ms. Loriania, and several sick call nurses—of his medical conditions. However, he did not receive a bottom bunk bed assignment and only received two weeks worth of motrin and two tubes of muscle rub, which he alleges was inadequate to treat his conditions. Several sick call slips and grievances attached to the amended complaint reflect plaintiff's unsuccessful effots to obtain a bottom bunk bed.
On February 6, 2017, plaintiff was awakened by spasms in his lower back. As he attempted to descend from his top bunk bed, he slipped because of the pain in his back. Plaintiff was taken to the medical unit on a stretcher because he was not able to walk.
On February 23, 2017, plaintiff woke up to use the rest room and again experienced lower back spasms while descending from his top bunk bed. He slipped off of the metal table he was using to descend from the top bunk bed, and attributes his fall to a "lack of proper bedding an[d]/or access to a ladder to get up or down from [the] top bunk." (Am. Compl. at 3.) He was sent to Nazareth Hospital, where he received an x-ray and treatment for his pain. However, he alleges that he did not receive adequate follow up care upon his return to CFCF.
Plaintiff also did not immediately receive a bottom bunk after his second fall. A sick call request that plaintiff submitted after his second fall requesting a bottom bunk reflects a response, apparently from medical staff, that a "bottom bunk [is] not available for muscle issues. You are schedule[d] for chronic care soon please address then." However, when plaintiff informed Major Abello of his situation on February 27, 2017, he was transferred to a bottom bunk bed.
Plaintiff originally initiated two lawsuits based on the above facts. After granting plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court consolidated the cases and instructed plaintiff to file an amended complaint raising all of his claims in one pleading. Plaintiff returned with an amended complaint against the City of Philadelphia, Mayor Jim Kenney, U.S. Facilities, and Corizon, Inc. He alleges that U.S. Facilities and Mayor Kenney failed to provide ladders to access the top bunk beds despite being "well aware of the safety risk to human [lives]" from the lack of ladders. (Am. Compl. at 9.) Plaintiff asks the Court to "make [the] defendants install ladders to the bunk beds for safer access," and award him damages. (Id. at 5.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies, which requires the Court to dismiss the amended complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). In determining the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must take three steps: (1) the Court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim;" (2) the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth;" and (3) "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). As plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).
III. DISCUSSION
The Eighth Amendment governs claims brought by convicted inmates challenging their conditions of confinement, while the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs claims brought by pretrial detainees. Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2005). As plaintiff's status during his incarceration at CFCF is not clear from the amended complaint, the Court will analyze his claims under both amendments.
A. Claims Based on the Absence of Ladders for the Top Bunk Beds
Conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment if they satisfy two criteria. First, the conditions "must be, objectively, sufficiently serious" such that a "prison official's act or omission . . . result[s] in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the officials responsible for the challenged conditions must act with deliberate indifference to the prisoner's health or safety. Id. "[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 837.
A pretrial detainee claiming a Fourteenth Amendment violation must establish that his conditions of confinement amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979). That inquiry generally turns on whether the conditions have a purpose other than punishment and whether the conditions are excessive in relation to that purpose. See id. at 538-39; Hubbard, 399 F.3d at158. Negligence is not actionable under either constitutional provision. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986).
To the extent plaintiff is raising claims based on the absence of a ladders that could be used to descend from the top bunk beds at CFCF, his claims fail. Courts faced with similar allegations have held that the absence of a ladder or other safety mechanism for the top bunk in a prison cell at most suggests negligence and does not give rise to a constitutional claim. See, e.g., Vercusky v. Purdue, No. 3:15-CV-2461, 2016 WL 7330589, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2016) ("This Court similarly concludes that Plaintiffs allegation that the prison Warden failed to install ladders for access to the top bunks in the SHU at FCI-Schuylkill does not amount to a cognizable constitutional violation."); Tutora v. Sweeney, No. CIV.A. 14-4458, 2014 WL 7059086, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2014) ("[T]he absence of a ladder or railing from the top bunk does not create an objectively serious condition threatening inmate safety or reflect deliberate indifference on behalf of prison officials."); Williams v. Corizon, Civ. A. No. 12-2412, 2013 WL 4787223, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2013) ("To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to argue that Defendant City of Philadelphia is liable because they did not have ladders for all the bunk beds, such argument fails, since that is, at most, negligence, which does not demonstrate the requisite culpability for liability to attach."); Walker v. Walsh, Civ. A. No. 11-1750, 2012 WL 314883, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2012) ("[F]ailing to install safety rails on an upper bunk of a set of bunk beds that is to be exclusively utilized by adults does not constitute a condition which would pose an unreasonable risk of future injury." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Pumphrey v. Smith, Civ. A. No. 09-233, 2010 WL 4983675, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2010) ("The lack of a bunk ladder in a prison cell does not meet the stringent requirements of deliberate indifference."); see also Franco-Calzada v. United States, 375 F. App'x 217, 218-19 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (dismissing appeal as frivolous when plaintiff's constitutional claims rested on allegations that he fell from a faulty ladder attached to his top bunk, which defendants knew or should have known to be unsafe because at least two other inmates had fallen).
Although the lack of a ladder might not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, I feel compelled to observe as a matter of public policy that it is disheartening that a major city that continues to make extensive use of bunk beds to address its overcrowding issues has not found some practical and cost-effective method to ensure convenient and safe access to upper bunks that inmates are required to use.
B. Claims Based on Failures to Address Plaintiff's Medical Needs
Plaintiff may be able to state a claim based on the failure of Corizon staff to address his medical needs, including his need for a bottom bunk. To succeed on any such claims, plaintiff must establish that the staff members in question were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Brown v. Deparlos, 492 F. App'x 211, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam). "Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. To state a claim against a municipality or an defendant that contracts with a municipality, a plaintiff must identify a policy or custom of the municipality or defendant that caused the constitutional violation in question. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003).
The amended complaint, liberally construed and taken as true, reflects that plaintiff informed several Corizon and/or CFCF employees about his scoliosis and back spasms, and repeatedly requested a bottom bunk, but that he remained on a top bunk bed for approximately six months. Plaintiff then fell twice because he experienced back spasms during his descent from the top bunk bed. Although such allegations might state a claim against individuals who were aware of plaintiff's medical need for a bottom bunk bed, none of those individuals are named as defendants. See Whitehead v. Wetzel, No. 3:14-CV-51, 2016 WL 3561809, at *7 (W.D. Pa. June 2, 2016) ("Courts have found that it can be an Eighth Amendment violation where an inmate has a serious medical need requiring him to use the bottom bunk but the prison officials are deliberately indifferent to that need."), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:14-CV-51, 2016 WL 3577604 (W.D. Pa. June 27, 2016)
Plaintiff has not stated a claim against the named defendants for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The amended complaint does not specifically identify a policy or custom of the City of Philadelphia, Corizon, or U.S. Facilities, that caused the constitutional violations alleged. See McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009) (a plaintiff "must identify [the] custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was" to satisfy the pleading standard). Furthermore, plaintiff has not alleged how Mayor Kenney was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, whether through his own misconduct or his deliberate indifference to known deficiencies in a policy or procedure that violated plaintiff's rights. See Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 320 (3d Cir. 2014), reversed on other grounds, Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015).
It is possible that plaintiff only sued U.S. Facilities and Mayor Kenney due to the absence of ladders on the top bunk, in which case there is no basis for a constitutional claim against those defendants for the reasons discussed above. --------
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court will dismiss plaintiff's claims based on the absence of ladders for top bunk beds at CFCF with prejudice because amendment of those claims would be futile in light of the case law cited above. However, plaintiff will be given leave to file an amended complaint challenging his medical care and the failure to provide him with a bottom bunk bed. An order follows.
/s/_________
United States District Judge