Opinion
23-cv-06235-DMR
02-09-2024
TINA CHIANG, Plaintiff, v. SABRINA AFIFI, Defendant.
ORDER REASSIGNING CASE TO DISTRICT JUDGE; REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO REMAND CASE TO SUPERIOR COURT AND DENY AS MOOT IFP APPLICATION AND MOTION TO REMAND
DONNA M. RYU CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Defendant Sabrina Afifi removed this case from Alameda County Superior Court, where it was pending as a complaint for unlawful detainer against her, and filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). [Docket Nos. 1, 2.] On January 2, 2024, Plaintiff Tina Chiang filed a motion to remand this action to state court. [Docket No. 5.]
Although Plaintiff erroneously filed the motion to remand as an administrative motion, Defendant filed a response a few days later, styled as an “Objection to Motion to Remand.” [See Docket No. 6.]
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or other defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “If the district court at any time determines that it lacks jurisdiction over the removed action, it must remedy the improvident grant of removal by remanding the action to state court.” Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir.), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447). “The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction falls to the party invoking the statute.” Id.
Defendant has filed a declination to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). [Docket No. 4.] Therefore, the court issues this report and recommendation and reassigns this case to a District Judge for final disposition, with the recommendation that summary remand be ordered and the IFP application and motion to remand be denied as moot.
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and a “federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). “[T]he presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). That rule applies equally to evaluating the existence of federal questions in cases brought initially in federal court and in removed cases. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 n.2 (2002).
Relevant for purposes here, a federal question exists only when it is presented by what is or should have been alleged in the complaint. Id. at 830. The implication of a federal question through issues raised by an answer or counterclaim does not suffice to establish federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 831; see also ARCO Envtl. Remediation, LLC v. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Quality of Mont., 213 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, . . . even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original)).
II. DISCUSSION
The Notice of Removal states one ground for removal: that the complaint presents a federal question such that the case could have originally been filed in this court. [See Docket No. 1 at 3-9 (“Notice of Removal”).] Defendant references the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., the First Amendment, and the Seventh Amendment, among other state and federal statutes. See Id. at 3-8. She appears to argue that Plaintiff violated these laws. See id.
The court cites the page numbers generated by ECF for ease of reference.
The complaint Plaintiff filed in Alameda County Superior Court simply alleges a state cause of action for unlawful detainer. [See Docket No. 1 at 22-26 (“Compl.”).] The complaint does not support removal to federal court. “An unlawful detainer action, on its face, does not arise under federal law but is purely a creature of California law.” Snavely v. Johnson, No. C 15-03773 WHA, 2015 WL 5242925, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2015) (citations omitted). Moreover, whatever Defendant intends to argue in response to the unlawful detainer action does not give rise to removal jurisdiction. See Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 831; see also Nguyen v. Bui, No. 12-501 HRL, 2012 WL 762156, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012) (holding that affirmative defenses based upon federal law do not confer federal jurisdiction upon state unlawful detainer claim).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the court recommends that this action be remanded to the Alameda County Superior Court, the IFP application and motion to remand be denied as moot, and that the Clerk be ordered to close the case file. The Clerk is directed to reassign this case to a District Judge.
Any party may file objections to this report and recommendation with the district judge within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 72-2.
IT IS SO ORDERED.