The United States, as a sovereign, "is immune from suit except as it consents to be sued" and "the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define the court's jurisdiction to entertain the action." Three-M Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 293, 294-95 (10th Cir. 1977) (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)). One such consent to be sued is found in the FTCA.
As we did in Lloyd and Jontz, the federal courts have based their analysis on the unique nature of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Gregory, 634 F.2d at 203-04; Three-M Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 293, 294-95 (10th Cir. 1977). Because a government may not be sued except as it consents, any waiver of immunity defines the court's jurisdiction over an action.
The Postal Service filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Relying on this court's decision in Three-M Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 293, 294-95 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding, in case involving alleged default by government in payment of rent for property leased for use as a post office, that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over statutory unlawful detainer action brought against the United States under Utah law because the landlord plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act), the Postal Service argued that plaintiffs' statutory action for unlawful detention under Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-40-104(1)(d) sounds in tort and is thus subject to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671-80. According to the Postal Service, plaintiffs were therefore required by 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) to exhaust their administrative remedies against the Postal Service before filing a district court action against the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), which they failed to do. Because the FTCA's administrative exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, Three-M En
If a plaintiff fails to satisfy the claim presentment and notice requirement, then a federal district court will not have jurisdiction over any action under the FTCA. See Dahl, 319 F.3d at 1228; Three-M Enters., Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 293, 294 (10th Cir. 1977). The claim presentment and notice procedures, like the United States' waiver of its sovereign immunity, must be "strictly construed."
The FTCA provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for tort claims against the United States. See, e.g., Bradley v. U.S., 951 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 1991); Three-M Enter., Inc. v. U.S., 548 F.2d 293, 294 (10th Cir. 1977). Because the FTCA constitutes a waiver of the government's sovereign immunity, the Court must strictly construe its notice requirements.
But before commencing a lawsuit against the United States, the FTCA requires claimants to exhaust administrative remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see also Three-M Enters., Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 293, 294 (10th Cir. 1977) (“[A]s a prerequisite to suit under the [FTCA], 28 U.S.C. [§] 2675(a) requires that the claim first be presented to the appropriate federal agency and be finally denied by the agency.”). To satisfy this provision's exhaustion requirement, a claimant must file an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency.
“Because the FTCA constitutes a waiver of the government's sovereign immunity, the notice requirements established by the FTCA must be strictly construed.” Cizek v. United States, 953 F.2d 1232, 1233 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Three-M Enters., Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 293, 295 (10th Cir.1977)). “The requirements are jurisdictional and cannot be waived.”
But, "[a]s a jurisdictional prerequisite, the FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies." Duplan v. Harper, 188 F.3d 1195, 1199 (10th Cir. 1999) (first citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); then citing McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); then citing Pipkin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 273 (10th Cir. 1991)); see also Three-M Enters., Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 293, 294 (10th Cir. 1977) (explaining § 2675(a) "requires that the claim first be presented to the appropriate federal agency and be finally denied by the agency before a court can exercise jurisdiction over an FTCA action"). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a claimant must file an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency.
Before commencing a lawsuit against the United States, the FTCA requires claimants to exhaust administrative remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); seealso Three-M Enters., Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 293, 294 (10th Cir. 1977). To satisfy this provision's exhaustion requirement, a claimant must file an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency.
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).Three–M Enters., Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 293, 294–95 (10th Cir.1977).Id.