Thorpe v. Wilson

7 Citing cases

  1. Piland v. Hertford County Bd. of Comm'rs

    141 N.C. App. 293 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 22 times
    Holding county was proper party rather than board of county commissioners

    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15(a) (1990). As this Court stated in Thorpe v. Wilson, 58 N.C. App. 292, 293 S.E.2d 675 (1982), in allowing a similar name change: "Names are to designate person, and where the identity is certain a variance in the name is immaterial." Patterson v. Walton, 119 N.C. 500, 501, 26 S.E. 43, 43 (1896).

  2. Thorpe v. DeMent

    69 N.C. App. 355 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that the date of discovery occurred when the defendant-lawyer informed plaintiffs of his error, which effectively destroyed their wrongful death claim, and plaintiffs dismissed lawyer shortly after

    Upon appeal by both parties, this Court affirmed the trial court's ruling on plaintiffs' ability to recover damages only to the extent of the insurance coverage. Thorpe v. Wilson 58 N.C. App. 292, 293 S.E.2d 675 (1982). The present action, by the Thorpe estate against DeMent for his alleged negligence in failing to provide proper notice to the Wilson estate, was filed on 31 October 1979.

  3. O'Nan v. Nationwide Ins. Co.

    DOCKET NO. 1:17-CV-5 (W.D.N.C. Jul. 11, 2017)

    e's correct name was caused by the Defendants - and particularly by the franchisee itself, and since the pro se Plaintiff has managed to allege all of the alternatively used names of the franchisee, it is hard to imagine that the state court would not allow the Plaintiff to amend her Complaint on remand to substitute J.L. Kuder Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Servpro of McDowell & Rutherford Counties for "Servpro of Marion" as a defendant in this matter. See also Langley v. Baughman, 195 N.C. App. 123, 126, 670 S.E.2d 913, 915 (2009) (applying Liss to allow amendment to relate back where "defendant received notice of the original claim despite the error in his name"); Pierce v. Johnson, 154 N.C. App. 34, 571 S.E.2d 661 (2002) (applying Liss where the named defendant, unbeknownst to plaintiff, was deceased and service of summons and complaint was unintentionally effected on the individual who had been named the personal representative of his estate and was the proper defendant in the matter); Thorpe v. Wilson, 58 N.C. App. 292, 297, 293 S.E.2d 675, 679 (1982) ("If, as here, the effect of amendment is merely to correct the name of a person already in court, there is no prejudice. This is true even though the change relates back to the date of the original complaint."). Moreover, because Plaintiff's claims against this defendant relate back, Defendants' argument regarding the statute of limitations is inapplicable.

  4. Hart v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc.

    1:09CV311 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 12, 2009)   Cited 1 times

    North Carolina's prohibition against awarding punitive damages against a person solely based on vicarious liability, and prohibiting punitive damages against corporations unless the officers, directors, or managers of the corporation participated in or condoned the conduct constituting the aggravating factor reflects the common law notion that "[t]he sole purpose of the allowance of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer." Thorpe v. Wilson, 58 N.C. App. 292, 299, 293 S.E.2d 675, 680 (1982). Defendant contends that, in applying North Carolina's damages statute to Plaintiff's allegations, it is apparent to a legal certainty that punitive damages cannot be awarded against Defendant because the aggravating factors alleged in the complaint were conducted solely, if at all, by third parties.

  5. Crabtree ex Rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree

    837 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 2005)   Cited 31 times
    Acknowledging central purpose is to punish and deter the wrongdoer, holding open the possibility of a different result if a tortfeasor appears to consider death as an escape from punitive damages

    See, e.g., Doe v. Colligan, 753 P.2d 144, 146 (Alaska 1988); Evans v. Gibson, 220 Cal. 476, 31 P.2d 389, 395 (1934); Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929, 939 (D.C. 1995); Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So.2d 845, 846-47 (Fla. 1988); Sightler v. Transus, Inc., 208 Ga.App. 173, 430 S.E.2d 81, 81 (1993), cert. denied, (citing Morris v. Duncan, 126 Ga. 467, 54 S.E. 1045, 1046 (1906)); Wolder v. Rahm, 249 N.W.2d 630, 632 (Iowa 1977); Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 759 F.Supp. 1516, 1521-22 (D.Kan. 1991) (predicting Kansas law); Stewart v. Estate of Cooper, 102 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Ky. 2003); Johnson v. Levy, 122 La. 118, 47 So. 422, 424 (1908); Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. 1982); Allen v. Anderson, 93 Nev. 204, 562 P.2d 487, 488-89 (1977); Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 117 N.M. 337, 871 P.2d 1343 (1994); Thorpe v. Wilson, 58 N.C.App. 292, 293 S.E.2d 675, 680 (1982); McAdams v. Blue, 3 N.C.App. 169, 164 S.E.2d 490, 494 (1968) (citing Rippey v. Miller, 33 N.C. 247, 250 (1850)); Mongold v. Estate of Gilbert, 114 Ohio Misc.2d 32, 758 N.E.2d 1245, 1249 (Ohio Ct. of Com. Pl. 2000); Morriss v. Barton, 200 Okla. 4, 190 P.2d 451, 459-60 (1947); Olson-Roti v. Kilcoin, 653 N.W.2d 254, 260 (S.D. 2002); Hayes v. Gill, 216 Tenn. 39, 390 S.W.2d 213, 217 (1965); Dalton v. Johnson, 204 Va. 102, 129 S.E.2d 647, 650-51 (1963); Parker v. Artery, 889 P.2d 520, 525 (Wyo. 1995); 30 A.L.R.4th 707 §§ 3, 4 (1984 Supp. 2005) (listing courts that have refused to award punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate).See Evans, 31 P.2d at 395; Lohr, 522 So.2d at 846; Thompson, 319 N.W.2d at 408; Marcante v. Hein, 51 Wyo. 389, 67 P.2d 196, 202-03 (1937); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 cmt. a (1979); 1 J.D. Lee Barry A. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law § 21.35 (Rev. Ed. 1994); 1 James D. Ghiardi John J. Kircher, Punitive Damages Law Practice § 9.10 (1987 Cum.Supp. 1

  6. Harrell v. Bowen

    179 N.C. App. 857 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 9 times

    The death of the wrongdoer precludes his being punished by the assessment of punitive damages. Thorpe v. Wilson, 58 N.C. App. 292, 299, 293 S.E.2d 675, 680 (1982) (internal citation omitted). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-1 (2005), which became law in 1996, provides that "[p]unitive damages may be awarded, in an appropriate case and subject to the provisions of this Chapter, to punish a defendant for egregiously wrongful acts and to deter the defendant and others from committing similar wrongful acts."

  7. Shelton v. Fairley

    356 S.E.2d 917 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 3 times
    In Shelton the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that former law partners of a deceased executor of an estate were not liable for his activities as executor because those actions did not constitute the practice of law.

    This Court has ruled that punitive damages may not be recovered from the estate of a deceased tort-feasor, no matter how aggravated the circumstances. Thorpe v. Wilson, 58 N.C. App. 292, 293 S.E.2d 675 (1972). The rationale of such a rule is that "the sole purpose for allowance of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer," id.; there, as here, such purpose could not be achieved by allowing recovery against those derivatively liable.