Thorpe v. Wilson

4 Citing cases

  1. Hofer v. Lavender

    679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984)   Cited 91 times
    Holding that punitive damages may be assessed against a tortfeasor's estate for purposes of deterrence, inconvenience, public good and other losses

    OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 1038 (West 1961).Meighan v. Birmingham Term. Co., 165 Ala. 591, 51 So. 775 (1910); Braun v. Moreno, 11 Ariz. App. 509, 466 P.2d 60 (1970); Johnson v. Levy, 122 La. 118, 47 So. 422 (1908); Tietjens v. General Motors Corp., 418 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1967); Barnes v. Smith, 305 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1962) (New Mexico); Thorpe v. Wilson, 58 N.C. App. 292, 293 S.E.2d 675 (1982); Hayes v. Gill, 216 Tenn. 39, 390 S.W.2d 213 (1965); and, Marcante v. Hein, 51 Wyo. 389, 67 P.2d 196 (1937). Statutory enactments by other states prohibiting or allowing punitive damages provide no assistance in resolving the specific issue before us: whether exemplary damages may be assessed under a statute which specifically provides that all causes of action survive against the representative of a deceased.

  2. Thorpe v. DeMent

    69 N.C. App. 355 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that the date of discovery occurred when the defendant-lawyer informed plaintiffs of his error, which effectively destroyed their wrongful death claim, and plaintiffs dismissed lawyer shortly after

    Upon appeal by both parties, this Court affirmed the trial court's ruling on plaintiffs' ability to recover damages only to the extent of the insurance coverage. Thorpe v. Wilson 58 N.C. App. 292, 293 S.E.2d 675 (1982). The present action, by the Thorpe estate against DeMent for his alleged negligence in failing to provide proper notice to the Wilson estate, was filed on 31 October 1979.

  3. Stutts v. Adair

    94 N.C. App. 227 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 7 times
    In Stutts, since the defendant did not introduce any evidence concerning the decedent's speed, the trial court correctly refused to give the requested instruction.

    This court has said that expert testimony is virtually the only means a plaintiff has to demonstrate lost earnings. Thorpe v. Wilson, 58 N.C. App. 292, 298, 293 S.E.2d 675, 679 (1982). Plaintiffs can offer additional evidence to establish what expectations, if any, the parents had to those earnings.

  4. Lavender v. Hofer

    658 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. App. 1983)   Cited 3 times
    In Lavender we allowed such an amendment only because the appellants had failed to demonstrate that they were in any way prejudiced by the amendment.

    1982); Mervis v. Wolverton, 211 So.2d 847 (Miss. 1968) (statutory prohibition); Gordon v. Nathan, 43 A.D.2d 917, 352 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1974) (statutory prohibition); Summa Corp. v. Greenspun, 96 Nev. 247, 607 P.2d 569 (1980); Allen v. Anderson, 93 Nev. 204, 562 P.2d 487 (1977); Thorpe v. Wilson, 58 N.C. App. 292, 293 S.E.2d 675 (1982); McAdams v. Blue, 3 N.C. App. 169, 164 S.E.2d 490 (1968); Morriss v. Barton, 200 Okla. 4, 190 P.2d 451 (1947); Pearson v. Galvin, 253 Or. 331, 454 P.2d 638 (1969); Ashcraft v. Saunders, 251 Or. 139, 444 P.2d 924 (1969); Hayes v. Gill, 216 Tenn. 39, 390 S.W.2d 213 (1965); Dalton v. Johnson, 204 Va. 102, 129 S.E.2d 647 (App. 1963).National Bank of Bloomington v. Norfolk Western Railway Co., 73 Ill.2d 160, 23 Ill. Dec. 48, 383 N.E.2d 919 (1978); Johnson v. Rinesmith, 238 So.2d 659 (Fla.App. 1969); Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8 (W.Va. 1982).