The rule applicable to this kind of a situation is that revocation is a matter that lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. See the following recent decisions of this Court: Smith v. State, 241 Ark. 958 (p. 963), 411 S.W.2d 510; Thornton v. State, 243 Ark. 829 (p. 831), 422 S.W.2d 852, and Blake v. State, 244 Ark. 37 (p. 43), 423 S.W.2d 544. In the Smith case we said:

Ark. Stat. Ann. 43-2307 (Repl. 1977); Thornton v. State, 243 Ark. 829, 422 S.W.2d 852. Perhaps the trial judge chose not to suspend the sentence of the appellant solely because of the unfavorable polygraph report, but opted for the minimum sentence due to the favorable recommendation of the presentence investigator. The record does not disclose the relative weight given to the various factors and, as stated earlier, there is no requirement that the trial judge enumerate the various considerations which made up his decision.

It is assumed that a defendant who appears in court with an attorney of his own choice has ample opportunity to understand a plea of guilty and the consequences thereof unless the contrary is shown. Thornton v. State, 243 Ark. 829, 422 S.W.2d 852 (1968). Nothing to the contrary was shown here.

Thus the action of the court does not constitute reversible error since the time imposed was within the discretion of the trial court and also within statutory limits. In Thornton v. State, 243 Ark. 829, 422 S.W.2d 852 (1968), we observed that: * * * It is within the discretion of the trial court to fix sentences within the limits prescribed by law, . . . . (Italics supplied.)

His contention that his accomplice Bean's receipt of a lesser sentence somehow entitles him to relief is without merit. See Thornton v. State, 243 Ark. 829, 422 S.W.2d 852. Appellant does not show how he was denied assistance of counsel.

No doubt the trial court properly took this into consideration. It is well established that the trial court is accorded great discretion to impose sentences within the legal limits as well as to suspend sentences. Thornton v. State, 243 Ark. 829, 422 S.W.2d 852 (1968). In the case at bar, the appellant has not demonstrated any abuse of discretion.

We have previously held that it is to be assumed that one who appears in court with an attorney of his choice has ample opportunity to understand the consequences of his plea of guilty. See Thornton v. State, 243 Ark. 829, 422 S.W.2d 852. We have never specifically stated that the same rule should apply when counsel was appointed.

" In Thornton v. State, 243 Ark. 829, 422 S.W.2d 852 (1968), we said: "* * * Until the contrary is shown, we will assume that a person who appears in court with an attorney of his choice has ample opportunity to understand when he has entered a plea of guilty and the consequences thereof."