Opinion
Civil No. 03-CV-5576 (JRT/FLN)
March 31, 2004
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Joseph Thornblad ("Thornblad") has sued defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his civil rights and filed an application to proceed without prepayment of fees. This matter is now before the Court on Thornblad's objections to the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel dated October 31, 2003. The Court has conducted a de novo review of Thornblad's objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C) and D. Minn. LR 72.1(c)(2). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will adopt the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, dismissing Thornblad's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) and denying his application to proceed without prepayment of fees as moot.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Thornblad is currently detained at the Minnesota Security Hospital, in St. Peter, Minnesota, having been found mentally ill and dangerous. Thornblad filed his complaint on October 20, 2003, claiming that as a detainee in St. Peter's Hospital he lacks adequate access to the State Law Library. Thornblad seeks only equitable relief in the form of access, without charge, to the resources of the State Law Library. Although he does not specify a legal foundation for his complaint, this Court interprets his claim as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of meaningful access to courts, as required by the United States Constitution. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). This appears to be the only legal avenue that could provide Thornblad the remedy he seeks.Thornblad previously, and unsuccessfully, brought a similar action in Minnesota state court, claiming that he was "denied meaningful access to the courts because Defendant Commissioner of Human Services ha[d] not provided him with weekly visits from the Minnesota State Law Librarian at the Minnesota Security Hospital." See Thornblad v. O'Keefe, Nicollet Co. File No. C6-02-248, at 2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. August 24, 2002) (Order for Dismissal with Prejudice and Judgment of Dismissal). The state court dismissed the suit with prejudice, finding that "the State of Minnesota has fulfilled its duty to provide plaintiff and other civilly committed persons with meaningful access to the courts." Id. (citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828), for the principle that "statutorily mandating legal representation is an acceptable means of providing civilly committed persons with access to courts").
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding "that Minnesota has established a constitutionally permissible means of providing Thornblad access to the courts and that Thornblad makes no showing of detrimental impact on his ability to present his claims to the court." Thornblad v. O'Keefe, No. C8-02-1583, at 4 (Minn.Ct.App. June 4, 2003) (unpublished). The Court of Appeals confirmed that "[s]tates do in fact have an affirmative obligation to provide persons in custody, including those involuntarily committed to a mental institution, meaningful access to court." Id., No. C8-02-1583, at 2 (citing Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d 1201, 1207 (7th Cir. 1983); Henderson v. McDonald, 857 F. Supp. 49, 50-51 (N.D. Ill. 1994)). The court noted, however, that "[n]o particular form of legal assistance is required," id. (citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832), and that the right of access to the courts does not "create a freestanding right to a law library." Id. (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996)). Rather, the right of access guarantees only a "reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the court." Id. Furthermore, the court noted that an inmate or patient in a security hospital "must make some showing of prejudice or actual injury" before relief for inadequate access to the courts may be granted, id. at 3 (quoting Kristian v. State, 541 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn.Ct.App. 1996)), and that "[i]f there has been no showing of a `detrimental impact to his ability to present his legal papers to the court,' [petitioner's] claim must fail." Id. (internal citation omitted). The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently denied Thornblad's petition for further review. Thornblad v. O'Keefe, No. C8-02-1583, at 2 (Minn. Sept. 16, 2003) (unpublished).
After being denied relief in Minnesota state court, Thornblad filed this action in federal court. In reviewing Plaintiff's pro se complaint and application for leave to proceed without prepayment of fees, the Magistrate Judge found Plaintiff's action barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In a Report and Recommendation dated October 31, 2003, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the action be summarily dismissed pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and that Plaintiff's application to proceed without prepayment of fees be denied as moot. Thornblad objects to the Report and Recommendation. For the reasons set forth below, this Court overrules Plaintiff's objection and adopts the Recommendation.
DISCUSSION
I. Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a court to dismiss an action "[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter." See also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (noting that "subject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative"). Thus, it is the duty of this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's action if it finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his claim, even though the issue of jurisdiction has not been raised by either party.
II. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine A. Description of the Rooker Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents federal district and circuit courts from rehearing matters that have already been adjudicated by state courts. The Eighth Circuit, in Lemonds v. St. Louis County, recently explained:
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that, with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments. Instead, federal jurisdiction to review most state court judgments is vested exclusively in the United States Supreme Court. Because the Rooker-Feldman rule is jurisdictional, it . . . may be raised sua sponte.222 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183 (2001) (citations omitted). The doctrine prevents even indirect re-litigation of issues determined by a state court. Id. at 492.
Federal jurisdiction is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine if the federal claim presented is "inextricably intertwined" with a specific claim already adjudicated in state court. Id. at 492-93 (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n. 16; Fielder v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 188 F.3d 1031, 1034 (8th Cir. 1999); Neal v. Wilson, 112 F.3d 351, 356 (8th Cir. 1997)). "A general federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment `if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issue before it.'" Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 492-93 (citing Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (Marshall, J., concurring)). The state and federal claims need not be identical. Id. (citing In re Goetzman, 91 F.3d 1173, 1177 (8th Cir. 1996)).
B. Application of Rooker-Feldman to Plaintiff's Claim
Determining whether jurisdiction over Thornblad's claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine requires comparing his § 1983 claim with the matters adjudicated in Minnesota state court. As noted, Thornblad did not specify the legal basis for his claim. Section 1983 gives a U.S. citizen redress for "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." Because there is no federal rule or statute which might give Thornblad a right to access the state law library, his claim must be that such a right is secured by the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners have a right under the United States Constitution to "meaningful access" to courts, and that one manner in which this constitutional right may be satisfied is by giving prisoners access to a law library. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 818, 828 (1978). Lower courts have extended this right to those involuntarily committed to mental institutions. Johnson by Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1983); Henderson v. McDonald, 857 F. Supp. 49, 50-51 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Hatch v. Yamauchi, 809 F. Supp. 59, 60 (E.D. Ark. 1992). Thus, the crux of Thornblad's § 1983 claim must be that the state of Minnesota has deprived him of "meaningful access to the courts," guaranteed by the United States Constitution as interpreted in Bounds v. Smith and subsequent cases, by not providing him sufficient access to materials of the State Law Library.
Given Plaintiff's reference to having exhausted all state remedies, it appears that he may be confusing his action with a federal habeas corpus petition. One requirement of a federal habeas corpus petition is that the applicant have "exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the state" before bringing action in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). This section creates an explicit exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by allowing federal district and circuit courts to entertain applications from persons claiming to be in custody in violation of the Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Because plaintiff does not claim that his commitment is unconstitutional, but rather that the manner in which he has been treated while in custody, is unconstitutional, his chim arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rather than 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and does not fit within § 2254's narrow exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
It is not clear whether this right arises out of the due process clause or equal protection clause. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. at 818, 828 (noting that respondents allege, "in pertinent part" that their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated, and holding that there is a "fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts" without further reference to the equal protection or due process); see also id. at 839 (Rehnquist dissenting) (arguing that the majority "enunciate[s] a `fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts' which is found nowhere in the Constitution," and noting that the decision does not seem to be founded on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
The Minnesota state courts have already determined that the state of Minnesota provided Thornblad with "meaningful access to courts," as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The relief sought by Thornblad in state court, access to the materials of the state law library, is essentially the same as that which he seeks in this action. Though it did not expressly reference the United States Constitution, the state court held that "the State of Minnesota has fulfilled its duty to provide plaintiff and other civilly bound inmates with meaningful access to courts." Thornblad v. O'Keefe, Nicollet Co. File No. C6-02-248, at 1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. August 24, 2002) (Order for Dismissal with Prejudice and Judgment of Dismissal) (citing Minn. Stat. § 253B.07, subd. 2(c) and Spec. R. Proc. Gov. Minn. Com. Treat. 9 providing Thornblad and other civilly committed persons an unwaivable right to attorney representation in all civil commitment proceedings). The court held that "statutorily mandating legal representation is an acceptable means of providing civilly committed persons with access to courts," id. at 2 (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. at 828), thus recognizing that access to a law library is not the only permissible means of satisfying the state's constitutional obligation. Affirming the dismissal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals discussed Bounds v. Smith and subsequent cases interpreting the constitutional right of "meaningful access to courts" at length. Thornblad v. O'Keefe, No. C8-02-1583, at 2-3 (Minn.Ct.App. June 4, 2003) (unpublished). The appellate court ultimately concluded that Minnesota's procedures were "constitutionally permissible." Id. at 4.
Thus, Thornblad's § 1983 claim, and the claim he previously filed in state court, are both premised on the same allegation, that the State of Minnesota deprived him of his constitutional right of meaningful access to courts as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. For this Court to grant Thornblad's claim for relief would imply that "the state court wrongly decided the issue before it," demonstrating that the state and federal actions are "inextricably intertwined." See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (Marshall, J., concurring). Consequently, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Thornblad's claim. The only court with jurisdiction to review the Minnesota state courts' determination that Minnesota has adequately protected Thornblad's constitutional right of access to courts is the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2000). The Court therefore overrules Thornblad's objections and adopts the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation that the claim be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the Court is dismissing Thornblad's complaint, his application to proceed without prepayment of fees is moot and is therefore denied.
In light of the dismissal of the action, the Court need not and will not act on Thornblad's request [Docket No. 6] that the Court retrieve paperwork from the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, all the records, files, and proceedings herein, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's objection [Docket No. 5] and ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [Docket No. 4]. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:1. Plaintiff's Complaint [Docket No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
2. Plaintiff's Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees [Docket No. 2] is DENIED as moot.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.