Opinion
08-14-1918
THOMSON MACH. CO. v. BROWN et al.
Supplemental opinion.
For main opinion, see 89 N. J. Eq. 326, 104 Atl. 129.
LANE, V. C. 1. Upon the return of the motion to settle the order the defendants for the first time objected to the order running against the Grand Lodge International Association of Machinists with its headquartersin Washington, and its officers, relying upon Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65, 62 L. Ed. 260, L. R. A. 1918C, 497, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461. In that case the nonresident respondents did not appear except specially. In the present case, upon the return of the original order to show cause, all of the defendants appeared generally by solicitor and counsel, who consented in open court to a continuance of the hearing on the order to show cause and to certain ad interim restraint. It was not until after final argument on the application for preliminary injunction that counsel on motion to settle the terms of the order endeavored to distinguish between the resident defendants and those nonresident.
Under the circumstances, in the condition in which the record now stands, I think that, so far as preliminary relief is concerned, all of the defendants must be held to have appeared generally. The injunction will go against them all.
2. I am still of the opinion that the act of the respondents, maintaining in close proximity to the plant of the complainant a building upon which they maintained placards, upon which were printed statements of the following nature: "Don't scab. Honest jobs are plenty., Strike at Thomson Mch. Co.," etc.—distributing generally and handling employes and prospective employes of complainant cards, drawing attention to the fact that there was a strike on, and that those who labored for complainant were scabs, and that complainant was unfair, communicating with users of machinery manufactured by complainant and with labor employed on such machines in the use or repair thereof with the purpose of establishing a boycott, were illegal and should be enjoined. Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Association, 77 N. J. Eq. 219, 79 Atl. 262, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 445: Gompers v. Buck Stove & R. Co., 221 U. S. 418, 31 Sup. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65, 62 Li. Ed. 260, L. R. A. 1918C, 497, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461
3. The order presented by complainant contains all of the provisions of the order made in the Jonas Glass Co. Case. The strike was unaccompanied by violence. The only illegal acts of which there was any evidence was the posting of placards, the maintenance of a black list, the distribution of the cards, and the attempted boycott. How far the court will go, where a strike has been accompanied by so many illegal acts as that it is apparent that the strikers have no intention of complying with the law, in enjoining the performance of illegal acts not proven to have been performed, but so closely related with those already performed as to make it apparent that there is danger that they will be indulged in, I do not find it necessary to determine on this preliminary application. The complainant can be protected by enjoining the continuance of the illegal acts which have been proven to have been performed, with leave to, at any time, apply if any further illegal acts occur. The injunction will restrain defendants: First. From knowingly and intentionally causing or attempting to cause, by threats, offers of money, payments of money, offering to pay expenses, or by inducement or persuasion any employe of the complainant under contract to render service to it to break such contract by quitting such service.
Second. From attempting to cause any person employed by complainant to leave such employment by intimidating or annoying such employes by annoying language, acts or conduct.
Third. From causing persons willing to be employed by complainant to refrain from so doing by annoying language, acts or conduct.
Fourth. From inducing, persuading or causing to attempt to induce, persuade or cause the employes of complainant to break their contracts of service with complainant or quit their employment.
Fifth. From threatening to injure the business of complainant or of any corporation, customer, or person dealing or transacting business or willing to deal and transact business with complainant, by making threats in writing or by words for the purpose of coercing such corporation, customer or person, against his or its will so as not to deal with or transact business with the complainant.
Sixth. From displaying or circulating cards, placards, pictures or other devices, either printed, painted or written, in any place, reflecting upon the ability of the Thomson Machine Company to make and fulfill contracts, or in any way casting reflection upon the reputation, ability, or conduct of the present employes of the Thomson Machine Company, or any of them, or any persons willing to become such employes.
Seventh. From communicating with the users of the machinery manufactured by complainant or with labor unions whose members work with said machines or on the repair thereof in such manner as to induce or persuade such users to discontinue the use of such machinery and prospective customers to refrain from purchasing such machinery and labor to refuse to work with such machines or on the repair thereof.
Settle order Monday, August 12, 1918, chancery chambers, Jersey City (75 Montgomery street), at 10 o'clock.