Thompson v. Taracorp, Inc.

4 Citing cases

  1. McCoy v. Mallinckrodt Pharms., Inc.

    Case No. 2:15-cv-00723-MHT-PWG (M.D. Ala. Mar. 23, 2016)   Cited 3 times

    Doing business through a wholly owned subsidiary does not, in and of itself, constitute doing business by the parent corporation. Cf. Ex parte Baker, 432 So. 2d 1281 (Ala. 1983)(comparing activities in Alabama of parent and subsidiary corporations for purposes of determining venue); see also Thompson v. Taracorp, Inc., 684 So. 2d 152, 158 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (concluding that trial court was correct in finding that acts of subsidiary corporation in Alabama were insufficient to impose personal jurisdiction over parent corporation).Ex parte Unitrin, Inc., 920 So. 2d 557, 561 (Ala. 2005).

  2. Billingsley v. TitleMax of Ga., Inc.

    340 So. 3d 395 (Ala. 2021)   Cited 2 times

    "Doing business through a wholly owned subsidiary does not, in and of itself, constitute doing business by the parent corporation. Cf. Ex parte Baker, 432 So. 2d 1281 (Ala. 1983) (comparing activities in Alabama of parent and subsidiary corporations for purposes of determining venue); see also Thompson v. Taracorp, Inc., 684 So. 2d 152, 158 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (concluding that trial court was correct in finding that acts of subsidiary corporation in Alabama were insufficient to impose personal jurisdiction over parent corporation)."

  3. Ex Parte Unitrin, Inc.

    920 So. 2d 557 (Ala. 2005)   Cited 17 times
    Denying the plaintiff discovery before deciding a motion to dismiss on personal jurisdiction grounds where there the allegations were insufficient

    Doing business through a wholly owned subsidiary does not, in and of itself, constitute doing business by the parent corporation. Cf. Ex parte Baker, 432 So.2d 1281 (Ala. 1983) (comparing activities in Alabama of parent and subsidiary corporations for purposes of determining venue); see also Thompson v. Taracorp, Inc., 684 So.2d 152, 158 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996) (concluding that trial court was correct in finding that acts of subsidiary corporation in Alabama were insufficient to impose personal jurisdiction over parent corporation). III.

  4. Becton v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc.

    706 So. 2d 1134 (Ala. 1997)   Cited 29 times
    Holding that § 9658 was inapplicable where plaintiff could not state a claim under CERCLA

    584 So.2d at 1383. See also Thompson v. Taracorp, 684 So.2d 152, 159 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996), in which the Court of Civil Appeals, resolving the issue of personal jurisdiction, explained the scope of CERCLA as imposing retroactive and strict liability on parties that "either own, operate, or sent hazardous substances to a site that is ultimately found to contain hazardous substances." We note that Becton cited Tucker v. Southern Wood Piedmont Co., 28 F.3d 1089 (11th Cir. 1994), and Tower Asphalt, Inc. v. Determan Welding Tank Service, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 872 (Minn.App. 1995), in support of his position that "the Eleventh Circuit and most other courts have applied § 9658 even in cases where there are no underlying CERCLA claims."