Doing business through a wholly owned subsidiary does not, in and of itself, constitute doing business by the parent corporation. Cf. Ex parte Baker, 432 So. 2d 1281 (Ala. 1983)(comparing activities in Alabama of parent and subsidiary corporations for purposes of determining venue); see also Thompson v. Taracorp, Inc., 684 So. 2d 152, 158 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (concluding that trial court was correct in finding that acts of subsidiary corporation in Alabama were insufficient to impose personal jurisdiction over parent corporation).Ex parte Unitrin, Inc., 920 So. 2d 557, 561 (Ala. 2005).
"Doing business through a wholly owned subsidiary does not, in and of itself, constitute doing business by the parent corporation. Cf. Ex parte Baker, 432 So. 2d 1281 (Ala. 1983) (comparing activities in Alabama of parent and subsidiary corporations for purposes of determining venue); see also Thompson v. Taracorp, Inc., 684 So. 2d 152, 158 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (concluding that trial court was correct in finding that acts of subsidiary corporation in Alabama were insufficient to impose personal jurisdiction over parent corporation)."
Doing business through a wholly owned subsidiary does not, in and of itself, constitute doing business by the parent corporation. Cf. Ex parte Baker, 432 So.2d 1281 (Ala. 1983) (comparing activities in Alabama of parent and subsidiary corporations for purposes of determining venue); see also Thompson v. Taracorp, Inc., 684 So.2d 152, 158 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996) (concluding that trial court was correct in finding that acts of subsidiary corporation in Alabama were insufficient to impose personal jurisdiction over parent corporation). III.
584 So.2d at 1383. See also Thompson v. Taracorp, 684 So.2d 152, 159 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996), in which the Court of Civil Appeals, resolving the issue of personal jurisdiction, explained the scope of CERCLA as imposing retroactive and strict liability on parties that "either own, operate, or sent hazardous substances to a site that is ultimately found to contain hazardous substances." We note that Becton cited Tucker v. Southern Wood Piedmont Co., 28 F.3d 1089 (11th Cir. 1994), and Tower Asphalt, Inc. v. Determan Welding Tank Service, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 872 (Minn.App. 1995), in support of his position that "the Eleventh Circuit and most other courts have applied § 9658 even in cases where there are no underlying CERCLA claims."